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Portland and Seattle are often considered to be divergent in
character, partly because civic leadership in each city has a
different vision. The adoption of contrasting downtown core plans,
projects, and p여icies in each city allows us an opportunity to
under’stand the nature of each city’s regime. As defined by Elkin, an
urban regime is the community's goveming coalition, those who
exercise public authority in a legal sense and those p꺼vate actors
able to act c이lectively and bring concerted influence to bear.
2
The time frame for this study begins with the first modern
planning document, the 1972 City of Portland Downtown Plan.
During this period, both central business districts were
transformed, simultaneously losing some retail, commercial and
industrial functions while gaining further control of regional
economies.
Portland perfected the entrepreneurial urban regime. The
linkage among the land use alliance (property owners, investors and
private professionals); the bureaucracy; and p이iticians was
established by the success of the 1972 Downtown Plan. There is
little conflict in Portland. Systemic bias is masked by overly
extensive citizen involvement processes; city subsidies and grants
which influence activists' positions; and use of tax increment money
to hire consultants who reinforce the business point of view.
Seattle never. perfected the entrepreneurial regime. The
business community was fractured into conservatives and
progressive camps. Also, the bureaucracy was caught in the
Mayoral-Council crossfire. There is great controversy in Seattle.
The prodevelopment decisions are still made but ac떼vist groups can
successfully make it to the ballot box‘
Primary sources of information included planning studies;
reports; memoranda; minutes of meetings; resolutions; budgets; and
activists' printed materials. Participants in each city were
interviewed. Secondary sources of information included articles,
and census materials.
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CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION
When we view the adoption of contrasting downtown core
plans, projects, and p이icies in Portland and Seattle, we view the
contest between effectiveness and democracy. City bureaucracies
and business organizations in these two very similar Northwest
cities have attempted to structure public debate and decisions to
their mutual advantage and to the disadvantage of social and
environmental activists.
This dissertation examines the two decades from 1972 to
1992, when each city had already r어ected the clearance of its core
and sought a new strategy to revitalize that core. Figures 1 and 2
illustrate mid-1980s views of each city’s core. During this period,
both central business districts were threatened with the loss of
retail , commercial and industrial functions to an expanding
metrop이is. Each city realized that it must plan its downtown,
encourage office growth, retain some retail , and prevent the further
erosion of downtown housing. Both cities sought out experts who
could explain how to modernize the core and retain a central role
within decentralizing metrop이itan areas. Citizens of both cities
。bjected to proposed freeways, to demolition and cleararπe of
historic districts, and to loss of downtown housing. Freeways were
stopped, historic districts designated, housing built downtown, and
2Fiaure j. Isometric View of Downtown Portland. From
City of Portland, Develooer’s Handbook, (1992).
3Fiaure 2. Isometric View of Downtown Seattle. From
City of Seattle, Summarv of the Land Use and
TransDortation Plan for Downtown Seattle (1985).
4retail cores strengthened. Although both downtowns lost market
share to outlying retail , commercial and industrial areas, they
simultaneously maintained dominance in headquarters office space
and upscale retailing. However, historical sketches in Chapter II
describe a divergence in the level of conflict and the role of local
governmemt in the 1970s. Portland had embarked upon extensive
urban renewal in the early 1960s, but within a decade' paused to
create a Downtown Plan. The 1972 Downtown Plan took almost a
decade to implement. The Plan gUided the actions of the private
sector and the city's Development Commission so successfully that
an update was begun in the mid-1980s. The Downtown Plan's
success ensured acceptance of a plannerly process-oriented
approach. Portland had created·a process-oriented, low conflict
political style which contained opposition to the well-entrenched
City Hall and downtown business interests coalition. The Portland
Development Commission became a dominant player. Activists were
absorbed or dropped out. Seattle undertook one project after
another, from the world's fair in 1962, to the clean-up of Lake
Washington in the mid-1960s and 1970s, to the creation of an
impressive downtown in the 1980s. Seattle built. these projects at
the cost of increasing conflict and increasing estrangement between
activists and City Hall. Seattle lacked a coordinating mechanism to
make agreements stick. Activists turned to alternative forms of
leverage such as ad hoc electoral coalitions rather than continue
fruitless negotiations with downtown interests. In the late-1980s,
Seattle voters adopted a limited lid on downtown development.
5
Chapter II also describes an activist local government in
Portland which endured as Seattle faltered. While Seattle failed to
implement urban renewal programs on the downtown periphery,
Portland extended urban renewal from the fringe to the heart of
downtown. While Seattle failed to address the increasing
congestion of freeways leading downtown, Portland built the first
leg of a radial light rail system and has begun work on a second leg
to connect downtown with the wealthiest suburbs. Portland
promoted development through a independently financed Development
Commission which has no counterpart in Seattle.1 For two decades
Portland pursued downtown growth at the expense of alternative
uses of tax revenue. The use of tax increment financing insulated
the use of tax revenue for downtown project from other city needs.
This policy was not challenged until caught in a statewide tax revolt
in the early 1990s, and downtown growth remains a regional
objective. Portland also institutionalized city design review as a
means to further development objectives by insuring quality
development appropriate 'to the status of the region's headquarters.2
In Seattle, downtown growth was successfully challenged by the
public. It is the goal of this study to examine the. reasons behind
these contrasting records.
Past history, p이itics and external events affect decision-
making as well. Both cities have been affected by great po앙war
growth, and increased sophistication of government, business
associations, neighborhoods and specific interest activists. The
crucial distinction between these two cities is institutional. The
6
difference lies in both formal governmental institutions and
informal arrangements between organized groups which have
adapted to modern times. Portland's political arrangements have
enhanced the ability of business and City Hall to form an alliance in
contrast to Seattle where more pluralist p이itics have created
competitive issues. In cities like Portland and Seattle, where
political parties are not significant actors in municipal p이itics ， the
institutions which structure pu비ic debate and provide continuity
are the bureaucracies and downtown business associations.
Contrasting political arrangements in each city allow us an
opportunity to understand the nature of each city's governing
coalition or "urban regime." As defined by Stephen Elkin, an urban
regime is the community’s governing coalition, those who exercise
public authority in a legal sense and those private actors able to act
collectively and bring concerted influence to bear.3 Private and
public investment decisions are coordinated by urban regimes. We
can trace the impact of the urban regime on public and private
decisions and the resulting transformation of each city during the
preparation and implementation of core plans and pr이ects in the
1970s and 1980s. Outcomes represent the bargailJing, conflict, and
consensus among various factions who are unequally positioned. The
time line presented in Figure 3 illustrates the continuity of p이icy in
Portland. A break in p이icy is indicated by a displacement of the
line. For example, the sole reversal of pUblic policy in Portland is
represented by the break between the Cadillac-Fairview project and
the Rouse project. The strong impact of the Downtown Plan is
7·m
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evident in Portland. In contrast. Seattle development is marked by
pronounced discontinuities.
This study is organized around the story of formal decision-
making processes rather than electoral p이itics. 4 It will describe
how Portland perfected an entrepreneurial urban regime and how the
urban regime dealt with conflict in three specific projects. plans
and policies. The linkage among the land use alliance (property
owners. investors and private professionals). the bureaucracy and
p이iticians was established by the success of the 1972 Downtown
Plan. There is little conflict in Portland. Systemic bias is masked
by overly extensive ·citizen involvement processes. city subsidies
and grants which influence activists' positions. and use of tax
increment money to hire consultants who reinforce the business
point of view. Seattle never perfected the entrepreneurial regime.
The business community was fractured into conservative and
progressive camps. Also. the bureaucracy was caught in the
Mayoral-Council crossfire. There is recurring. bitter controversy in
Seattle. The prodevelopment decisions are still made but activist
groups can successf내Iy challenge at the ballot box.
Chapter II provides theoretical tools to understand the
。utcomes of plans and pr이ects narrated in Chapters III through VII I.
The Chapter discusses competing reasons for the difference in
regime effectiveness. Postwar growth and governmental activism
set the stage for the formation of stratified urban regimes. Three
research qu‘굉tions are posed as a means to discuss the potential for
activist success. The next six chapters explore three types of plans
9or projects in each city. Chapters III and IV chronicle the Portland
Central City Plan/Downtown Plan update and the Seattle Land Use
and Transportation Plan effort. Chapters V and VI describe efforts
in both cities to develop downtown retail projects. Chapters VII and
VIII describe attempts to grapple with the provision of housing and
social services for the poor in each downtown. The concluding
chapter, Chapter IX, attempts to compare and contrast downtown
p이itics. Portland has traded democracy for effectiveness. Seattle’s
pluralist inclinations have hindered effectiveness but allowed the
articulation of alternative visions for the city.
10
ENOl잉rn=s
1Tax increment financ!~lg assigns the revenue generated above the adopted base year to
a development agency for use on pr，이e야s within an urban renewal dist꺼야. Approval of
Measure 5, a property tax limitation. has seriously affected the 뼈Iity 야 P.DC by bringing tax
Increment revenue within a property tax cap. However, this limitation was an inadvertent
result of the larger failure of the Oregon tax system and 싸 。ver reliance on the property tax.
The city Is now considering measures to ask the voters to reinstate this system.
2A1though design review seeks to further human scale design, the author 뼈els that It Is
supported by the downtown business community for the upscale status It ensures.
3‘Urban regime- Is a term coined by Stephen L. Elkin. See Stephen L. Elkin,~효낀희
Realme in the American ReDublic. Chicago: 까1e U메verslty of Chicago Press, 1987. Elkin 뻐d
。ther theorists are discussed In Chapter II.
4The opportunity to evaluate the expe꺼ence of the Rouse Corporation’s retail pr이ects
In both cities provided the Impetus for this study. The focus then expanded to include the
downtown planning environment represented by each city's downtown 미삐. I was als。
interested in the Impact of redevelopment. Redevelopment causes both small retailer and
housing displacement. I selected the latter because housing displacement was aprim히Y
concern of those activists who challenge the downtown urban regime. This dissertation was
written first as a chronology of events In Portland and Seattle. Interviews and written
documents such as p삐삐ng stu버es and reports provided a means to isolate significant events.
Other primary documents included memoranda, minutes of each meeting. resolutions, bUdgets,
etc. Secondary sources of information In히uded newspaper and magazine articles, and census
materials. These materials were aval뻐ble from the City of Portland and City of Seattle
archives; the Multnomah County IIbr하y and Portland State University libra매 and the City of
Seattle libra매 and Seattle Municipal 뻐하y; and individuals and government agencies. Bias is
a danger In such research 빼 this. To avoid bl훨， chapters were reviewed by knowledgeable but
disinterested participants such 훨 Paddy Tillett, who was a member of the Urban Design
Advisory Team for the Central City Plan in Portland and who pr없tices architecture in Portland
and Seattle; and Brewster Denny, professor of pUblic administration at the University of
Washington In Seattle. I also benl!삐tted fr,
CHAPTER II
PORTLAND AND SEAlTLE: POLITICALARRANGEMENTS
AND POLICY FORMATION
Informal and formal p이itical arrangements most directly
affect planning processes. These processes are more democratic or
more elitist (and presumably more decisive). This study focuses on
the interrelationship between informal and formal p이itical
arrangements and planning outcomes. Figure 4 illustrates this
model of urban p이itics. Community socioeconomic characteristics
indirectly affect a city's p이icy. External events and previous
community decisions even more indirectly set the stage. This
chapter describes postwar growth, downtown p이itics and general
socioeconomic characteristics to make the argument that these
more fundamental characteristics were shared by Portland and
Seattle at the beginning of the study period. Both cities were
economically successful, middle-class cities, which championed
similar development agendas Yet they diverged during the study
period. As sketched out in Chapter I, Portland implemented and
continues to implement a energetic downtown development agenda.
Seattle's agenda has been thwarted by successful appeals to the
voters. At the end of the chapter, we examine pluralist and
revisionist theory in order to understand the interaction between
group influence, political institutions and policy selection. Three
12
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research questions are developed to provide a framework for our six
case studies. Answers to these three research questions will
provide a description of the urban regime in each city and the
balance each city has created between democracy and effectiveness.
까케E IMPACTOF POSlWAR GROWTH
Using 1950 data, Otis Duncan and his colleagues described a
natior뀐I classification scheme which placed 151 metrop이itan areas
in a national hierarchy based upon pop비ation and economic
functions. The system defined the categories of national
metrop이is ， regional' metrop이is ， regional capital, diversified
manufacturing center with and' without metrop이itan functions, and
special cases. New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and
Detroit ranked high in pop비ation ， value added by manufacture,
wholesale sales, business services receipts, non-local commercial
loans and demand deposits. Portland and Seattle ranked 20th and
21 st in metropolitan population. These two cities were “alike in
being centers of commercial activity and nodal points for rather
extensive hinterlands over which they enjoy uncontested
dominance."1 The Seattle and Portland economies- were based on the
Pacific Northwest resource industries. (Figure 5 illustrates the
location and extent of these two metrop이itan areas.)
Since 1950, both cities have become integrated into the global
economy. The regions are caught up in foreign trade and foreign
competition. The manufacturing sector has been enlarged to include
electronics and computers. In both cities retail and manufacturing
14
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jobs are locating outside the core, but downtown remains the
predominant office center.
Seattle’s office spurt in the late 1980s convinced many that
Seattle had left the league of regional centers for an international
role. However, the City of Seattle itself could not make that case.
Seattle, like Portland, is not a major financial center, being far
outdistanced by Vancouver, B.C. and San Francisco.2 Furthermore,
much of the increasing statistical gap in population between Seattle
and Portland is the result of combining the Seattle/Everett and
Tacoma metrop이itan areas for census purposes. Seattle
metrop이itan counties grew 38.5 percent from 1970 to 1990 to
1,972,961 but this was less than the 40.2 percent growth rate in
Portland (reaching 1,412,374 in 1990.)
Table I indicates United States and Portland and Seattle
metrop이itan pop비ation growth since 1940. Both regions gained
approximately 40 percent in metrop이itan pop비ation from 1940 to
1950 as the result of war inmigration, th$n traded pop비ation leads
over the next several decades. Both metrop이itan regions have
grown considerably faster than the United States. In the 1950’s
Seattle grew close to the national rate (31.1 percent vs. 33 percent
while Portland lagged (16.7 percent). In the 1960’s, both Portland
and Seattle got close to the rate for all U.S. metropolitan areas (22.5
percent and 28.7 percent vs. 23.5 percent U.S.) During the study
period, 1970 - 1990, first Portland, then Seattle grew twice as fast
as the national rate. In the 1970’s Portland grew at a 23.4 percent
rate while the U.S. grew at a 10.7 percent rate. In the 1980s, .
16
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Seattle grew at a 22.7 percent rate vs. the U.S. rate of 11.6 percent.
As mentioned above. both regions grew approximately 40 percent
over the two decades of our study period. The study period was a
period of great metrop이itan expansion in both regions compared to
the U.S.
Both central cities experienced a declining share of regional
growth in the last two decades. Table II compares central city
pop비ation to the same surrounding suburban counties regardless of
Census definition of metrop이itan areas.3 Each city declined from
approximately 37 percent of its region in 1970 to 30 percent a
decade later. In the 1980s. Portland managed to temporarily halt its
proportionate decline by annexing approximately five percent of the
region’s population. rising to 31 percent of the region’s population.
Seattle declined to 26.2 percent of the region. Rapid population
growth has been fueled by an average annual 2 percent plus increase
in employment in the 1970’sand 1980’s. This growth rate is
projected to continue through the year 2000 in both regions.4
Portland and Seattle both managed to retain manufacturing
jobs despite the national shift to FIRE (finance. insurance. and real
estate), services and retail and wholesale trade. -In Portland.
manufacturing employment lost in the 1981·1983 recession was not
regained until the end of the decade. In Seattle, Boeing maintained a
strong presence. Boeing’s plants south of the CBO and in Everett and
the suburbs accounted for 40 percent of all regional manufacturing
employment. Table 川 indicates the mix of industry in the United
18
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States for 1970 and 1980 and both regions for 1970, 1980 and 1990.
These figures are given for the same geographic area as used for the
previous population figures. Despite national trends in which
manufacturing declined from 26.0 percent to 22.4 percent of
employment totals, there was little shift in the regional mix. Both
Portland and Seattle enjoy higher rates of employment in
transportation and wholesale trade than the U.S., as would be
expected for two major ports. In 1980, transportation employment
accounted for 8.5 percent of total employment in both cities, 1.2
percent higher than the U.S. figure. Wholesale trade totaled 6.1
percent and 5.7 percent respectively, or between 1.8 percent and 1.4
percent higher than the U.S. Services accounted for more than one
quarter of employment, followed by manufacturing, between one
fifth and one qua야er of employment and retail trade, which
strengthened in the Portland region over the decade. Trends were
similar in the 1980s as service employment increased in each region
at the expense of manufacturing and transportation employment.
Likewise, the downtowns' of each city had similar percentages of
predominant services.s In both downtowns, service employment was
the dominant category (Table IV). Portland's core .planning area
contains industrial districts such as the Northwest Triangle, Lower
Albina, Central Eastside and Macadam industrial areas.
Suburbanization and the decentralization of economic activity
affected retail and office functions in both cores.. In Portland,
downtown’s share of retail sales fell from 17 percent in 1958 to 6
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percent in 1972 to 4 percent in both 1977 and 1982.6 Although the
market had stabilized, the downtown Morrison Street Pr이ect was
envisioned to stop further erosion and cement the new strategy of
upscale merchandising. In Seattle, downtown retail sales fell from
31 percent in 1954 to 18 percent in 1967 to 3.15 percent in 1982.7
These were absolute declines in Seattle, from $1.2 billion to $975
million in 1982 dollars. The Seattle Westlake Mall was envisioned
to maintain the 리lure of downtown shopping by complementing the
big downtown retailers with a specialty retail mall which would
provide the pop비ar festival marketing concept of the 1980’s.
As both downtowns lost general merchandise dominance,
retailers emphasized upscale, high quality, expensive and
specialized goods. Despite continuing efforts to draw regional
shoppers downtown through free parking programs, the majority of
customers were downtown workers, tourists, business travelers and
conventioneers. Unlike m~ny U.S. downtowns, the retail cores
remained vital. But they were threatened with the loss of their
relative market share. The perception of status decline was linked
to a sense that downtown might no longer function at the apex of the
regional hierarchy.
Headquarters offices and specialized services have remained
attracted to downtown areas because of the concentration of
economic activities and high levels of services. But growth was
greatest in the suburbs. In the 1980’s both Portland’s and Seattle’s
share of the regional market for prime office space declined.
Competing office corridors along US 26 (Sunset Corridor) and Lake
23
Oswego in metro Portland and Bellevue and Redmond in metro
Seattle could now offer Class A Qffice space. The downtowns
captured only about half of the new construction in each region
during this period.
Expansion of office space in Seattle (900,000 sq. ft. annual
average in the 1970’s), outdistanced Portland (200,000 sq. ft.
average increase). In 1985, Seattle contained 17,560,079 sq. ft. of
prime office space contrasted. to Portland which had 12,468,561 sq.
ft. In Portland, only half the CBO growth was projected to take
place on the west side of the Willamette. CBO westside growth
would be matched by the eastside 니oyd District, the downtown’s
auto-oriented twin.8
Thus, by the 1980s, each city was a less significant part of a
dynamic, expanding metrop이itan area. Both downtowns were
thought to require planning to respond to that less significant role.
The retail cores searched for a future in dispersed economic
geography.
POLITICS
Portland and Seattle both transformed from. conservative to
activist governments after World War II. City Hall and the
downtown business community first faced the challenge of "Young
Turk" business interests, and then social and environmental
activists.
24
Postwar Reform Politics inJ:»ortland
In 1948, Dorothy Lee beat long-time p이itician Earl Riley on
police corruption charges. Riley had retained the support of big
Portland businessmen including retailers Fred Meyer and Aaron Frank
of Meier and Frank.9 Lee created a Committee on Municipal
Reorganization with the intention of modernizing public
administration. The Committee suggested a city-manager form of
local government. The effort was defeated 3-2at City Council. A
subsequent effort, led by a citizens committee, fell short of the
necessary initiative signatures required. Lee was defeated in the
next election without creating lasting p이itical alternatives. With
the election of Mayor Fred Peterson and continuance of William
Bowes’ 30 year reign as Commissioner of Public Finance, the city
lapsed back into timid, conservative government.
Reform Politics in Seattle
Arthur Langlie was put forth by the Order of Cincinnatus to
clean up Seattle. The Order of Cincinnatus was formed in response
to the chaotic, radical politics of Seattle in the 1930s Depression.
The Order was composed of downtown business interests, the·Young
Republicans and the Protestant Greater Seattle Council of
Churches.1o The Order of Cincinnatus stressed honest government,
reduced taxes and modest government expenditures. The Order of
Cincinnatus disappeared from public view after effecting a p이itical
shift from radical to conservative. Under Langlie, government
remained cautious, with a weak mayor and a council interested in
25
balancing a budget. City voters turned down eight of eleven bond
issues proposed by local government before World War 11.11
Seattle was a businessman’s city in the thirty years following
Langlie’s election. Private interest groups and citizen committees
took the leadership role in Seattle. In the late 1950s, Delbert
Miller, a professor at the University of Washington, identified a
consistent inner ring of influentials in Seattle. Businessmen held
eight of the top twelve positions in the innermost circle. The mayor
ranked eleventh.12 This grouping was well known as the “Big Ten."
As Banfield described it,
If you want to get anything done in Seattle," says Ross
Cunningham, p이itical editor of the Times, “you get about
six members of the Big Ten together and tell them it’s a
good pr이ect. If you convince them, you're in." The Big
Ten is an informal group of downtown financiers, real
estate men, and industrialists. Its representatives meet
every week with Chamber of Commerce and press, radio,
and television people in a ‘Monday Luncheon Club' to
discuss city affairs. No public officials are present, but
it is said that big decisions affecting the city
government are sometimes made.
The Chairman of the Board of Boeing was a member of the Big
Ten, but he seldom participated in downtown development p이itics.
Nor did Teamster President Dave Beck.13 Political historian Mark
Sidran writes that the caretaker government “left downtown
businessmen in a position of greater influence than might otherwise
have been the case."14 The private Municipal League played the
most public leadership role in the community. The League had f비1­
time staff and an extensive committee structure and in the mold of
the Order of Cincinnatus, "played the government watchdog role."
26
Its membership included “representatives of all the community’s
strongest interest groups and prestigious individuals."15
Cor야n해1
A steady political evolution during the Terry Schrunk years
helped to create a public-private partnership and diffused much
potential conflict. In 1957, Terry Schrunk was elected Mayor of
Portland as a moderate progressive. Shrunk’s election followed four
years of stagnation under Fred Peterson. Peterson’s term (1953-
1957) was marked by aη 를astside-westside conflict over the
location of Memorial Coliseum. Citizens had required by initiative a
location east of the Willamette River which revealed the split
between the westside business interests and the voters who mostly
lived on the eastside.
Peterson had also been involved with a failed attempt at urban
renewal through the Housing Authority. The Authority had been
unable to implement urban renewal in Northwest Portland and had
left the city with nothing but public housing projects to balance the
new opportunities in the suburbs. Schrunk revitalized urban renewal
and fused private and public interests through the creation of the
Portland Development Commission (PDC). The creation of POC and
approval of the South Auditorium project by a narrow vote in May,
1958 created an agency which would eventually learn from mistakes
and become a powerf비 implementation tool of the Portland planning
process. Despite support from the Chamber of Commerce, Labor
Council, the progressive City Club, the conservative Orecon Voter
27
and both dailies, it was still necessary to alleviate concerns that
the Development Commission would be granted too much autonomy.
A.V. Fonder distributed a review of legal constraints which would
prevent PDC from gaining too much power. (This was well before
PDC acquired an independent financial base in tax increment
revenue.) Businessmen as well as voters distrusted City Hall. The
virtue of the new agency lay in severing ties with the Peterson era
and creating an agency that could get things moving on the west
side. It also separated redevelopment from the social agenda of
public housing.
Ira C. Keller, a prominent businessman became chair; other
members included attorney A.V. Fonder, Roy C. Hill of the painter's
union, Vincent Raschio of Portland Homebuilders, Jack R. Caufield,
former U.S. Marshall. These members represented the mix of
business, professional and union organizations expecting to benefit
from urban renewal.
“Schrunk staked his political career on the success of urban
renewal. He recruited POC board members from the city’s business
establishment, gave them freedom of action, and expected tangible
results."16 The action orientation of POC was further enhanced by
the first Commission chair, Ira Keller, who insisted upon unanimity
and POC Executive Director, John Kenward, who put together a
remarkably talented team. Not only was a semi-autonomous agency
freed of "politics,I’ but later the agency acquired an independent
financial base. Tax increment financing πl티 allowed the city to use
the increment in additional property tax revenue beyond the base
28
year to fund future projects. Tax Increment Financing tied projects
to an economic feasibility analysis, since project revenue had to pay
off urban renewal bonds. This requirement disadvantaged housing
projects which were difficult to pencil out.
Fin려Iy， Kenward and Keller emphasized urban design, not only
as an aesthetic, but in a larger functional sense. The South
Auditorium· project was designed to create a stabilizing, enhancing
influence on downtown and to comp“3ment the retail core, not to
compete.
City Council approved the South Auditorium project on June 18,
1958 over the objections of 85 residents, bitter that the city was
displacing them. Portland financed that displacement through a New
York syndicate. Despite sympathetic portrayals by the Q쁘와끄
J.Qμrn울! and sporadic resistance, the 68 business firms and 470
families had no support from Council. The community came to
associate urban renewal with government power and insensitivity.
The newspaper headlines read “Residents, merchants, sad, bitter as
renewal area move-out nears."17
Mid-Sixties Challenaes in Seattle
The mid-sixties were years of tremendous growth, physical
expansion and challenges to city government in Seattle. The
Municipal League, League of Women Voters, and establishment groups
such as the “Citizens Committee for Strengthening Seattle
Government" sought institutional reforms to modernize local
government. However, the Council remained conservative at a time
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when even the downtown business community, reorganized as the
Central Association, began to push for a more activist government.
A new organization arose to articulate the values of Kennedy's New
Frontier. In 1967, a group of law school students and recent law
graduates of Washington, Harvard and NYU met, both Young
Republicans and Young Democrats. The new group met under the
auspices of the Governmental Affairs Director of the Seattle Junior
Chamber of Commerce. The group took up the challenge of the
downtown establishment weekly, the Arg브효:
The time is ripe for a young non-partisan group to select
and put up for election a full slate of candidates for the
Council at the next municipal election ... (T)he voters of
Seattle would welcome with open arms an infusion of
new blood in the Council. But they must be good
candidates, backed by substantial and responsible
people.18
The group’s name and acronym laid out its program - CHECC -
Choose an Effective City Council." A measure of the p이itics of the
time was that this new grouping was anxious to avoid arousing the
opposition of the downtown business leadership. The city press,
well-attached to the city’s business establishment, supported
CHECC in return. CHECC’s two candidates both defeated incumbents.
CHECC’s formation was an important milestone in Seattle p이itics.
A highly P이itical ， city-wide grouping sought to have impact on non-
partisan elections like the old Order of Cincinnatus, but through the
adoption of modern techniques - position papers and media press
conferences. CHECC created a model for future urban activists
organized around issues. Now that urban activists were on the scene,
'30
downtown development would be increasingly perceived as a city-
wide issue. The most significant activists would be grouped around
historic preservation and housing/displacement issues.
At the same time that CHECC was creating the potential for
wider citizen p이itics ， businessmen were embarking on the greatest
and last privately initiated venture, Forward Thrust. In November,
1965 Attorney James Ellis called for $819 million dollars of road,
sewer, parks and other capital improvements. Agreements among
Boeing, Western International Hotels, Pacific Northwest Bell and
Seattle - First National Bank (the “Big Ten") had all come before the
public announcement. Ellis announced this message to the Seattle
Rotary Club in November, 1965, and called for a county-wide
community effort to combat p이lution and congestion in the face of
the region’s suburbanization. Shortly thereafter, a “Committee of
200" representing various interests in the county was organized.
The size of the committee as well as the varied package of projects
was 'a reflection of the fragmentation of community int~rests:
In a p이itical system in which city government is either
unwilling or, due to the dispersion of authority, unable to
act, interest groups and citizen committees assume
partic뻐하 import를nce in promoting action and
leadership.19
The converse of this observation is that city hall would also be
vulnerable in controlling conflict. The city would be faced with
dissident groups who could impede or stop in-city .pr이ects such as
Pioneer Square, Pike Place Market and Westlake Mall urban renewal.
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Forward Thrust parks improvement bond issues passed in
February, 1968. One of the bond measures provided for parks
throughout the city, including downtown.
Neighborhood-oriented activists were elected to Council. From
1971 on, neighborhood organizations were permitted to decide how
to spend the Forward Thrust moneys for neighborhood improvements.
Neighborhoods were empowered, spending money and gaining
confidence. Funds were earmarked for neighborhood and downtown
parks.
Downtown Activism in Portland
Despite urban renewal successes south of downtown,
downtown Portland continued to decline in the Sixties. One of the
nation’s largest regior뀐I malls, 니oyd Center, opened in 1959 on an
eastside site over a mile from downtown. The location was
convenient to the eastside freeway and offered thousands of parking
spaces. At the same time, the erection of Memorial Coliseum on the
east side indicated a shift in the balance of power harmful to
westside interests. Businessmen formed Downtown Portland, Inc.
and tried several parking schemes to lure customers back. Bill
Roberts, prominent downtown retailer, was elected chair of
Downtown Portland, Inc. in 1960. Another business group formed in
1963, Downtown Associates. Although this was also short-lived,
the group initiated one of the first downtown development studies, a
decade before the Downtown Plan. Nothing appears to have come of
this study. Downtown interests were unable to get things moving.20
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One more business group was organized in the fall of 1968.
The Portland Improvement Corporation (PIC) was organized and
designated a Downtown Committee to initiate a parking. study. PIC
president was Paul Murphy, who represented the Ladd Estates, a
long-established land development firm. Board members included
Ira Keller; Glen Jackson, chair of the Oregon Department of
Transportation; Bill Roberts; Julian Cheatham, the vice-president at
Georgia-Pacific; Frank Warner of PGE; and banking officials.
Declining retail sales and increasing congestion were hurting
downtown. The attempt to duplicate the suburbs brought an
increasing loss of character. In 1969, Bill DeWeese, President of
the Chamber of Commerce, called for a committee of 50 to suggest
an agenda for private and public action over the next ten years.
These 50 citizens were to be appointed by the Chamber, the mayor,
the Multnomah County Commission chair, the chair of the Portland
Development Commission and the president of Lewis and Clark
College.
In 1970, thirteen top businessmen organized the Downtown
Committee. These businessmen included Edwin W. Steidle, president
of Portland’s largest department store, Meier and Frank; William E.
Roberts, former president of the other large department store,
Lipman and Wolfe; Glenn Jackson, head of the Oregon Highway
Commission and one of the most influential men in the state; Ira
Keller of the PDC; and the heads of major banks and realty firms.
The Committee hired a firm of economists and planners. Robert S.
Baldwin, the Multnomah County planner, was loaned to head the
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Downtown Plan effort. The committee moved aggressively but the
public, particularly the architects, objected to the lack of citizen
participation. Portland City Commissioner Lloyd Anderson was
sympathetic to citizen concerns. A compromise was effected
whereby a Citizens' Advisory Committee (CAC) brought reputable
citizens to the effort. The chair of the committee, Dean Gisvold, a
supporter of Schrunk’s chief rival, liberal Neil Goldschmidt, chaired
a series of negotiation sessions in which the Plan was hammered
OUt.21
The Citizens' Advisory Committee (CAC) supplied goals and
objectives which still' guide downtown redevelopment. The
Committee formed task forces on Housing and Downtown
Neighborhoods, Commerce, Waterfront, Portland State
University/Park Blocks and Transportation. Each task force digested
pu비ic comments from Town Hall meetings and planning reports and
forwarded a proposal to the CAC.· In about 18 months the Planning
Commission and City Council ratified the "Planning Guidelines,
Portland Downtown Plan" (December 28, 1972). The Downtown
committee, chaired by Paul F. ~urphy ， and the Citizens' Advisory
Committee, chaired by Dean Gisvold represented a· balance of
interests. The business representatives lent credibility; the CAC
supplied public approval. These two groups hammered out
compromises in frequent working sessions. Thus, both business and
"quality of life" issues were addressed.
The plan process transformed a parking plan into the
Downtown Plan. The plan sought the revitalization of downtown as
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an office and retail center while revitalizing housing, recreating a
waterfront and taming the automobile. The Downtown Plan
revitalized downtown by providing the framework for massive public
investment in transit, parks and commercial development (Figure 6
illustrates the Downtown Plan concept.) Access and economic
vitality were hitched to public transportation. The Plan failed to
address housing and social problems north of Burnside Street, bring
the middle-class back downtown or create a permanent solution to
the parking/air quality dilemma.22 However, these issues were
secondary to revitalizing the downtown core. The Downtown Plan
managed to be both visionary and pro-growth.
The Downtown Plan combined a desire to reinforce the
dominant position of downtown Portland with quality of life issues
such as urban design, historic preservation and mixed land use. For
example, the commerce goal read: “Enhance Downtown’s role as the
leading center for retail goods and consumer services. Provide an
atmosphere conducive to investment."23 The most significant result
of the Downtown Plan was the commitment to mass transit as a
principle means of access to Downtown. As this entailed the
conversion of SW Fifth and Sixth Avenues to a bu~ mall, there was
significant opposition on the part of retailers, especially Meier &
Frank. The department store was located between SW Fi한hand
Sixth and had been previously embroiled in an unsuccessful attempt
to build a customer parking structure in the heart of downtown. Bill
Roberts, the first chair of the Tri-Met board got the mall built.
Despite real controversy, eventual economic success won over the
5e
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CONCEPT PLAN
1. HIGH DENSITY OFFICES RELATED TO
NORTH·SOUTH TRANSIT
2. STRONG. COMPACT RETAIL CORE
RELATED TO N·S AND E·W TRANSIT
3. MEDIUM·DENSITY OFFICE RELATED TO
MμOR ACCESS & PERIPHERAL PARKING
4. LOW·DENSITY MIXED USES INCLUDING
HOUSING. OFF’CES & COMMUNIT'(
FACILITIES
5. SPECIAL DISTRICTS
eo PORTLAND CENTER
b. PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITV
c. GOVERNMENT CENTER
d. SKIDMORE FOUNTAIN/OLD TOWN
e. INDUSTRIAL
삼뽑L빨 훌、
Fiaure 6. Downtown Plan Concept. From City of Portland,
Planning Guidelines: Portland Downtown Plan (1972).
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Portland business community. As the official history of the plan
states:
The preparation and implen띤ntation of the Downtown
Plan and Program was an outstanding cooperative
endeavor involving Portland’s business community,
intensive citizen participation, planners and urban
designers, with the pivotal support of local, State and
Federal governn쩌ntal officials and agencies. This
endeavor is exemplary because the process of
Plan/Program preparation and implementation has
involved the cooperative participation of the business
community, the citizens of Portland and every level of
government.24
One practical result of this mythology is that neither
neighborhood organization nor citizen activist can escape the
community’s expectation for “public-private" participation. The
Morrison/Pioneer Place project, the Central City plan and even those
parties disputing social service issues were constrained to work
within the bounds of consensus and negotiation. One of the few
groups willing to act outside these bounds was the Burnside
Community Council. BCC was an activist organization north of
Burnside in skid road, the Downtown Plan's only failure.
A significant effect of the Downtown Plan was to trigger
private investment in the core. Plan implementation also redirected
the city’s Development Commission toward this end. As a major
element of the Downtown Plan, the City created a massive urban
renewal project along the waterfront in April, 1974. Governor Tom
McCall’s riverfront project area was expanded to incorporate a faded
downtown area within four blocks of the waterfront. Adoption of
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the waterfront program guidelines was handled by Bob Baldwin
concurrently with his work on the Downtown Plan.
PDC survived two midcourse corrections to emerge as the
linchpin to the implementation of the Downtown Plan. In 1971 , the
City Club went on record favoring the abolition of PDC and urging
merger with the Housing Authority of Portland or at least the
creation of a superagency which would combine Planning, PDC and
the Building Bureau.25 PDC was faulted for its lack of citizen
participation and comprehensive planning. Ira Keller ran the
Commission as before. PDC policy-making was considered backroom
p이itics. Neil Goldschmidt ran for Mayor, promising to abolish PDC.
Goldschmidt soon learned that he needed the agency to accomplish
his downtown agenda. PDC had the tools and the expertise; no one
else could b비Id Waterfront Park.26
Goldschmidt created the Office of Policy and Development
within his portf이io to coordinate development. OPD also received
federal money. The newly creatod OPD had responsibiliw for
implementing Goldschmidt’s vision and coordinating PDC with
Planning and other development agencies. OPD created a long term
agenda for PDC to implement the new Downtown Plan. PDC began to
work well with Bureau of Planning staff, notably Rod 0 ’Hiser who
met weekly with PDC. George Sheldon, chair of the Planning
Commission in 1973 also helped to coordinate the new downtown
development p이icy.
In 1977, PDC misstepped again when it offered public park land
for tennis courts for Marriott Corporation’s proposed hotel gue.sts.
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The Office of Planning and Development was called in to investigate
but suggested budgetary and reporting reforms rather than
abolition.27 The Commission withdrew from the Marriott deal and
one of the few citizen suits· was withdrawn.28 (Within the study
period, the Cadillac-Fairview deal would again cause community
scrutiny of POC project management.)
Neiahborhood Activism in Seattle
On July 10, 1972, the City Council adopted Resolution 23684
establishing the Seattle 2000 Commission. Mayor Wes Uhlman
supported the commission. For six months, hundreds of citizens
participated in numerous task forces, discussion groups and hearings
to produce a 330 page p이icy document. Community, liveability,
preservation and protection of residential neighborhoods became the
priority quality of life issues. Yet the Goals also promoted the
primacy of Seattle throughout the region. The city committed to an
elaborate process of setting population targets and rewriting the
Comprehensive Plan in single family, multi-family and commercial
districts in order to implement the Goals for Seattle 2000.
Throughout the 1970s, increasing conflicts over permissive zoning
densities and the impact of overly large apartment pr이ects began
sou꺼ng relations between the neighborhoods and City Hall. Zoning
battles nurtured citizen involvement in Queen Anne Hill and Capitol
Hill. Neighborhood activists did not yet connect between downtown
growth and displacement/gentrification in surrounding
neighborhoods.
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Seattle was concerned to keep a vibrant downtown, the center
of the region, “the pre-eminent center for business, governmental
and cultural activities in the region."29 Downtown, livability was
cast as a set of urban design principles:
The planning and development of the downtown should
bring about a unified, well-integrated whole, while
maintaining and enhancing the identity of areas of
special character or emphasis. The Seattle downtown is
arid should remain the headquarters of the region, where
activities of a citywide and regional character, and
activities requiring dense concentrations of people, or
other kinds of concentration, should tend to be grouped.
Major retail trade, principal financial institutions,
headquarters of enterprises both commercial and not-
for-profit, the executive offices of government, all
benefit from downtown location and all contribute to
or띤’s sense of downtown as the center of significant
thought and action. Such a center should contain the
major cultural, entertainment, and urban recreational
institutions.3o
This goal would become the foundation for an aggressive
downtown growth strategy in the subsequent decade. But vibrancy
and special character would translate differently for different
actors. The Sierra Club, Allied .Arts, and the downtown business
community, then represented by Downtown Seattle Development
Association, would grab different facets of the internally
contradictory Goals for Seattle 2000.
Thus, the 1970’s saw increasing complexity and potential for
conflict over quality-of-Iife issues endemic to zoning, housing
affordability and public participation.
In 1974, Uhlman proposed that an Office of P이icy Planning be
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created. The Goals for Seattle 2000 had called for more centralized
planning. OPP was created by Ordinance 104067 “to coordinate
currently fragmented City p이icy making and Planning." OPP was
responsi 비e for human resources and criminal justice planning along
with housing, transportation and I~nd use. OPP also took on short-
range pro예em solving for the mayor. OPP elected to begin a series
of land use p이icies rather than draft a conventional comprehensive
plan. OPP also began to range farther afield than physical planning.
OPP expanded the number of its activities - amenities, urban design,
and social welfare.
This amounted' to premature meddling with community values
and interfered witli the efforts of the agency to become
accepted by the public. Liberal Seattleites were quite
satisfied with the OPP-sponsored studies, but business and
other established interests that favored development did not
believe such work contributed to their goals.31
OPP barely survived the budget process in 1978 and was
reorganized in 1979. OPP became OPE, the Office of P이icyand
Evaluation. Planners were spun off into line agencies as part of a
general decentralization. T'맨。 years later, the agency lost all
functions except commercial district and downtown land use
planning. Relabeled the Land Use and Transportation Project, the
office was retained within the Mayor's Executive Department. The
decentralization of planning and the legacy of OPP made it difficult
to handle increasing neighborhood conflict resulting from the
increases in density allowed by the zoning code.
During the first half of the 1980’s, little new
construction was done because of a weakened economy
41
and delays in drafting of the new code language from the
p이icy plans. As a result, the projected densities of the
code were still unrealized. When the economy recovered,
however, building starts took off. Neighborhood
residents were suddenly dealing with the actual' impacts
of the new functional plans and land-use code, and many
didn't like it. Those neighborhoods facing extensive
development began pressuring City Hall for relief.32
Mayor Royer had run a "think small" campaign in his successful
1977 campaign for Mayor. He called for a park at Westlake; a
reduction in the 1-90 freeway project connecting the eastern
suburbs to downtown Seattle; more city resources for small-
business development and low-income housing and roll-back of fast
growth residential zoning enacted during the Uhlman administration.
Mayor Royer's constituency of 녕ctivists and camp followers in
Seattle’s vigorous feminist, minority, lesbian/gay and senior
communities"33 expected dramatic changes in the new
administration. Royer had directly challenged Paul Schell, the
former director of the city’s Department of Community Development
and the candidate of the downtown business community. However,
Royer's commitment to a re-evaluatlon of neighborhood densities did
not extend to a paral뻐I stance against downtown growth. (Se.e
Chapter IV, VI and VIII for Royer’s evolving position on the
downtown Land Use and Transportation Plan, Westlake, and housing
displacement.)
ComDarison
The adoption of the Downtown Plan in Portland and the Goals
for Seattle 2000 at the same time in the early 1970’s indicates a
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common interest in reinforcing the dominant position of downtown
Portland and Seattle and in grafting on ql펴Iity of life issues such as
good urban design, historic preservation and mixed land use. Both
cities benefited from strong mayors, Goldschmidt and Uhlman, who
centralized planning and began implementation of these p이icies.
Portland’s downtown plan cemented relationships between the
planners and the business community. PDC began a series of
projects which leveraged private investment with public moneys
using tax increment financing. Public disenchantment with PDC
methods did not include questioning of the city's basic
"public/private" partnership. The city had firm direction in its
efforts to promote downtown growth, including investment in
retailing.34
Seattle adopted the Goals for Seattle in 1973, but waited a
decade to begin downtown planning. In the meantime, increased
zoning densities and growth led to increased conflict.
Decentralization of planning precluded an effective bur~aucratic
response. Mayor Royer campaigned against City Hall. When the city
decentralized the planning function during the Royer administration,
the city lost its connection to a "comprehensive, Jong-range vision."
Fin러Iy ， there is concern among the public that the
exercise of planning becomes an end in itself, rather than
a catalyst for action. Without the link between planning
and i",!plementation, the work produced in planning is
0한en shelved. While citizens have identified the need
for City-wide and neighborhood planning and want public
outreach to be a meaningful part of the procE월s， they are
looking for assurances that this work set the stage for
resource allocation. In short, planning should go beyond .
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identifying outcomes and set out phases of
implementation.3s
When the city embarked upon a Land Use and Transportation
Plan for downtown in the early 1980’s, an ad hoc bureaucratic
organization within the executive department was created for that
sole purpose. The lack of centralized planning and/or planner
credibility made it extremely difficult to diffuse controversy
through negotiation. Seattle assigned a purely advisory role to the
Planning Commission. υnlike Portland, the Seattle Planning .
Commission did not act as a filter to constrain p이itical conflict
before the Council. City government was not able to translate a new
activist Seattle spirit into an institutional framework for blending
private and public interests.36
SOCIOEC빠OMIC CONT1풍r
Portland and Seattle both grew slightly in pop비ation in the
1980s - Portland grew primarily through annexation and Seattle
primarily through increasingly dense residential infill construc.tion
(See Table V). In neither city did annexation or gentrification create
significantly different cities compared to each other or to the
previous decade. In 1990 Seattle had a significantly greater Asian
population than Portland, 11.8 percent vs. 5.3 percent but even
Portland’s percentage was twice as high as the U.S. (5.3 percent vs.
2.9 percent U.S.). Seattle had a larger black population at 10.1
percent of the population versus Portland’s 7.7 percent. But
Seattle’s total gain was less than the national figure of 12.1 percent
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for all metrop이itan areas. The two cities contained few Hispanics
compared to the national percentage (3.2 percent and 3.6 percent
compared to 9 percent). The two cities were homogeneous and alike
compared to the national average. Portland and Seattle had diverged
less than Seattle’s more numerous office towers might suggest.
Both cities were ev메y balanced between homeowner and
renter. In' 1990, 53 percent of 198,000 housing units were owner
occupied in Portland. In Seattle, 48.9 percent were owner occupied.
Seattle housing was becoming increasingly expensive. While the
median owner .occupied unit was worth $59,000 in Portland, in
Seattle the median value was $137,000. In 1990, median rent in
Portland was $340 in Portland, compared to $425 in Seattle. Median
income was not reported in 1990' census summary reports, but the
per capita income in 1983 was $11 ,444 in the Seattle Primary
Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) and $9,803 in the Portland
PMSA.37 Seattle housing was perceived to be in an affordability
crisis compared to Portland, but downtown, the circumstances were
similar - housing was disappearing.
Downtown resident pop비ations were crucial to hopes for
keeping the downtown an 18- or 24-hour neighborhood. Table VI
lists population, housing units and race. Population and housing
units stabilized over the 1980's. Although minorities made up a
growing percentage of downtown residents, Portland - from 15
percent to 20.5 percent in Portland and from 27.8 percent to 33.3
percent in Seattle - relatively low figures. Economic growth
and/or building code enforcement often squeezes the amount
46
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of downtown housing. In 1980, the Portland Central City plan area
contained 10,092 housing units, 6.4 percent of the city’s total
housing. Most housing was low-income. Single Room Occupancy
(SRO) housing units accounted for 16 percent of the housing stock.
Since 1970, the downtown had lost 2,400 SRO units, or 59 percent of
the previous total.
A similar loss was reported in Seattle. Approximately 15,622
units had been lost between 1960 and 1983.38 In 1982, the Sea'한Ie
downtown contained 9,164 housing units, of which 7,311 were low-
income. The draft environmental impact report of the Seattle Land
Use and Transportation project forecast an additior뀐I loss of 3,073
low income unsubsidized units, about half of the 7,311 low-income
housing units of a total of 7637.39 The Seattle planning study also
indicated that additional downtown workers would create a demand
for 55,157 housing units of which only 2,768 would be created by
the plan.4o
These trends were well-known to decision makers in both
cities in the early 1980s: Although strong, the position of
manufacturing was threatened by the recession and by a national
economy which continued to shift from a manufacturing to a service,
information and professional base. Most downtown residents were
expected to be predominantly low-income and in need of social
services. Downtown social service agencies were finding it
difficult to disperse throughout the region. Both cities continued to
grapple with housing and social service crises. Neither city had yet
succeeded in bringing the middle-class back to the core. Both , cities
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sought to reposition themselves in the regional market with new
projects downtown.
GEOGRAPHYANDGROUP INFLUENCE
With growth and economic transformation has come a
corresponding shift in core district functions. As the central
business district grew, relocated and became distinguishable from
the port, maritime terminals in each city relocated away from our
study area. The central business districts moved less than a mile up
and away from the threat of flooding, leaving the original townsite
to become the workingmen's and then transients' quarter. Middle-
class and wealthy residential districts moved to higher sites
separated from the downtown. This has resulted in similar
downtown districts and patterns of group influence.
“Zones of Discard"
In Portland, the Skidmore/Old Town and Yamhill historic
districts remain from the original commercial district. The
Skidmore/Old Town district retained its connection to the working
waterfront but lost most commercial activity to the relocated
business district. After World War II, the district became the Skid
Road of Portland and residents became mostly social service agency
clients. Development p이itics became increasingly centered on the
“transient problem." Business associations were oriented toward
small business owners, often sluggish until a threat appeared on the
horizon. Portland's Old Town Merchants Association was replaced by
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the more shrill Union Station Business Association in the 1980s.
Highway projects fragmented the Yamhill district. The area to the
south of the Yamhill Historic District was destroyed by highways
and by urban renewal. South of Market Street, an old ethnic district
was torn down and replaced with the South Auditorium urban
renewal district of offices and high rise residential towers (See
Figure 7). Comparable areas in Seattle include the original
townsite, along Yesler Way, as part of a low-income residential
crescent which arcs from the International District (east of the
Kingdome), to Pioneer Square, north through the First Avenue
Corridor, to Pike Street Market and the Denny Regrade (See Figure 8).
As these older areas were often historic districts or provided
minority or low-income housing, activists played a part in some
public redevelopment decisions. Por야베tla메하n’1삐，d '녕s Chinese Cons。미Ii펴da하.ted
Benevolent Association in Old Town was para히h뻐톨l뻐ed by Seattle's
International District Improvement Association. Historic boards in
Portland’s Skidmore/Old Town district were paral뻐led by historic
groups in Seattle's Pioneer Square and Pike Place. Similar social
service agencies existed in botli Portland and Seattle.
Newer Reinvestment Areas
Portland’s center moved gradually at the turn of the century
from SW Front to SW Fifth at SW Morrison around the 힘deral
courthouse (now ca리메II뻐ed Pioneer COL야urt
department store was loca랴，ted in the new heart of downtown. Office
structures were built nearby until the Depression. In the 1950s,
Fiaure 7. Portland Historic Development.
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1852-1890 에1st뼈c De빼lopment of
Downtown Employment center
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Meier & Frank demolished the city's premier hotel, the Portland
Hotel, for a two-story structured parking lot. This was then
replaced in the 1970s with a city plaza/light rail hub, Pioneer
Courthouse Square, to anchor the retail district. The city also
proposed in the late 1970s to locate an upscale retail mall to
further anchor the retail district. The history of this project is
discussed in Chapter IV. The building of the Transit Mall along SW
Fifth and SW Sixth in 1977 and light rail along SW First to Yamhill
and Morrison in 1985 promoted new office construction surrounding
the retail core. The growth of the South Auditorium urban renewal
district knitted disparate areas into a large westside office and
retail core. The Lownsdale neighborhood was lost to new office
construction. However, at the same time, the co이아r‘댐trl띠uct센io。이n of the
L니loyd Center Mall in 1960 created a retail and office competitor
about a mile away on the east side of the Willamette. The 니。yd
property interests were headquartered in Los Angeles and did not
form a neighborhood association. By the study period, toe 니oyd
interests had sold the Lloyd Center Mall and several dozen eastside
city blocks to the eastside electric utility, PP&L.
The focus of Seattle moved from Pioneer Square to SW Fourth
and SW Fifth Avenues in the vicinity of ·Westlake. Big retailers such
as Bon Marche, Frederick and Nelson, and Nordstrom clustered in the
retail core ~etween SW Union Street and Olive Way (several blocks
to the east of Pike Street Market, the city's farmer's market).
Westlake Mall was intended to complement a downtown retail core
lacking much public open space. The history of this project is .
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discussed in Chapter V. New offices were located to the south of
the retail core. The area from Pioneer Square to Pike Street Market
along the First Avenue Corridor provided investment opportunities
for historic “adaptive re-use."
Downtown Portland was represented by business groups such
as the Portland Improvement Committee, the Downtown Committee
and eventu히Iy the permanently established Association for Portland
Progress. Seattle formed the Central Association and then the
Downtown Seattle Development Association. These business
groupings evolved from informal groups meeting weekly to more
organized fee-based business lobbyist organizations. These
organizations were relatively uninterested in peripheral areas.
Downtown residents also organized on a more piecemeal, informal
basis. The Portland Downtown Community Association was a
recognized association, but vacillated between activists and
affluent residents throughout this period.
Manufacturina and Wholesale Trade
Manufacturing and wholesale trade areas are adjacent to both
cores. Both Portland and Seattle have sluiced down hills and filled
in lower ground for industry. Portland sluiced portions of the West
Hills to fill in marshy ground along the river to the north of
downtown. In Portland, the Northwest Triangle to the north of
downtown on the west bank, the Macadam district to the south of
downtown on the west bank, and the Albina and Central Eastside
districts on the east bank were distinctively different districts
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from each other and from downtown. These distribution and
industrial areas also contained lower income housing. Some
Portland districts such·as North Macadam were dominated by a few
large, established· enterprises. Others such as the Central Eastside
Industrial Council were composed of many small businesses facing
obsolescence.
Seattle industrial areas were located south of downtown along
the Duwamish River. Former industrial areas along Eliott Bay north
of downtown were filled. These areas have been considered out of
the central planning area. Likewise, Portland’s Guild’s Lake district
has been outside the planning area.
THEORETICALQUESTIONS
Portland and Seattle are heralded for their emphasis on
extensive citizen participation. Both cities are consciously
inclusive and process-oriented. A wide range of positions put forth
by different groups, none with a monop이y on resources, is supposed
to result in public policy in the public interest. The fairness of
these processes is based upon· the pluralist assumption that
influence is dispersed.
Pluralism
Portland and Seattle political leaders subscribe to Robert
Dahl's description of the city as a forum in which p이itical demands
of different groups with different interests are represented. No
group has a monopoly of resources nor devotes all of its resources to
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politics. Political leaders are interested in winning re-election,
most eligible voters participate, and most voters are knowledgeable
and disinterested and have a real choice among alternative policies
put forth by rival" candidates. The p이itical system works because
there is a consensus about basic views.
Dahl’s study of New Haven found that "fundamental aspects of
the social, economic, and p이itical structures of New Havenl' had
fragmented 닝 system of cumulative inequalities in p이itical
resources". into 넙 system of noncumulative or dispersed inequalities
in political resources." Dahl hypothesized that:
1. Many' different kinds of resources for influencing
officials are available to different citizens.
2. With few exceptions, ‘ these resources are unequally
distributed.
3. Individuals best off in their access to one kind of
resource are often badly off with respect to many other resources.
4. No single influence dominates all the others in all or
even in most key decisions.
5. With some exceptions, an influence resource is
effective in some issue-areas or in some specific -decisions but not
in all.
6. Virtu러ψ no one, and certainly no group of more than a
few individuals, is entirely lacking in some influence resources.41
Contrary to Dahl’s model of open competition among p이itical
agendas, the theme of this dissertation is the strong desire in both
cities to create an institutional framework to carry out p이icies to
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reinforce the business core, albeit with quality of life amenities.
These p이icies called for continued growth. Cummings, Molotch,
Whitt, Neubeck and Ratcliff, in Business Elites and Urban
Develooment describe this concentration of influence:
The p이itical and economic essence of any given locality,
in the present American context is growth.42 I [Molotch]
further argue that the desire for growth provides the key
operative motivation toward consensus for members of
p이itic허ψ mobilized local elites, however split they
might be on other issues, and that a common interest in
growth is the overriding communality among important
people in a given locale - at least insofar as they have
any important local goals at all. Further, this growth
imperative is the most important cor띔traint upon
available options for local initiative in social and
economic reform. It is thus that I argue that the very
essence of a locality is its operation as a growth
machine.43
Local businessmen who own property, financial institutions
oriented toward local investments, profes$ionals such as lawyers
and realtors who directly benefit, and businessmen/politicians are
typical members of the growth coalition. The metropolitan
newspaper, university, and utilities also support growth because
general economic growth enlarges their client base. The latter
become growth statesmen rather than adVocates for a particular
distribution of growth. The agenda is controlled so that
the issues which are allowed to be discussed and the
positions which the politicians take on them derive from
the world views of those who come from certain sectors
of the business and professional class and the need
which they have to whip up public sentiment without
allowing distributive issues to become part of public
discussion.44
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City Limits
Paul Peterson writes that the conflict between efficiency and
equity also limits public debate.
Within a federal system the objectives of central and
local governments stand in contrast to one another.
Local governments are more concerned about operating
efficiently in order to protect their economic base, while
the domestic p이icy structure of the national government
is more concerned about achieving a balance between
developmental and redistributive objectives... The
emphasis local governments place on efficiency at the
expense of equality is due not to any antiegalitarian
commitments of local p이icymakers but to the
constraints under which local governments operate. In
order to protect the economic well-being of the
community, the government must maximize the
benefit/tax ratio for the average taxpayer.4S
Public debate is appropriate only when the probable economic
impacts of p이icies "is so problematic that reasonable individuals
can disagree about their effects.1146 These are typically allocational
policies such as where public facilities are to be built or general
housekeeping issues such as garbage collection or civil·service
employment. Peterson comments that Dahl1s pluralist theory may be
an appropriate theoretical framework to discuss New Haven school
p이itics. 47 But downtown development issues such as examined in
this dissertation are developmental policies necessary to the city's
well-being.
Peterson1s emphasis on the limits of p이itical choice, the
restrictive Ilsocial and economic" context in which the city is
embedded,48 suggests that the focus of this dissertation is
misplaced. These case studies should focus on broad national
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constraints, not just record the actions of local actors:
When developmental p이icies are considered, attempts to
ascertain the power of one or another individual or group
are prot져bly pointless, if not misleading. In this p이icy
arena the city as a whole has an interest that needs to be
protected and enhanced. Policies of benefit to the city
contribute to the prosperity of all residents. Downtown
business benefits, but so do laborers desiring higher
wages, homeowners hoping house values will rise, the
unemployed seeking new jobs, and politicians aiming for
reelection.49
Peterson justifies the dominance of the pro-growth coalition:
Lower levels of citizen involvement in local
politics can be understood as rational responses to the
structural context in which the public finds itself. ...To
the extent that local p이itics weakens the capacity for
mass pressures, it allows for due consideration of city
economic interests. At times the interest of one or
another notable may run contrary to the economic
interests of the city of the whole, but it is the interest
。f the disadvantaged which consistently come into
conflict with economically productive p이icies. By
keeping mass involvement at the local level to a
minimum, serious pressures for p이icies contrary to the
economic interest of cities are avoided.5o
I believe that pUblic resources are devoted quietly and swiftly
to downtown issues because powerf비 interests are most concerned
with downtown redevelopment. Neither pluralist·p이itics nor
economic necessity accounts for specific decisions. Pluralist
theory would lead one to believe that a significant number of
interests compete to determine specific public investment
decisions, whereas decisions are based upon a mix of objective
study and personal influence. Peterson’s analysis, if correct, could
lead one to believe that similar' cities will follow similar
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developmental p이icies with similar results and similar low levels
of conflict. (Peterson himself admits that the power structure
approach gives a "quite convincing portrait of the local political
landscape.")51 Is this borne out by our case studies?
Urban Reaimes
Stephen Elkin proposes an "urban regime" model which
responds to both Dahl’s and Peterson's concerns. Urban politics
is rooted in the political economy of the city:
The conceptual foundation on which my comprehensive
interpretation rests is the division of labor between
state and market as it has become manifest in cities.
The interpretation attempts to move beyond the now
sterile debate between elitists and pluralists that has
characterized community-power studies - and takes
seriously what common sense tells us, namely, that city
p이itics is a profoundly economicalψ 。riented enterprise.
It is bound up with economic matters in direct and
powerful ways, so that there can be no study of city
p이itics without the study of city economy. Moreover,
the nature of the city’s concern with its economic
destiny, the extent of its public powers and their
internal organization- in short, the principal features of
the state-market division- are all historically shaped."52
Elkin lists several features of city p이itics which undermine a
pure pluralist characterization of local politics. "Elections rarely
provide a referendum on development p이icy. City bureaucracies are
central actors in city p미icies. These bureaucracies are so
interested in growth in the local economy that city officials seek
local businessmen's direction. Bureaucracies have autonomy on day-
to-day running of the city and have significant influence on major
policy and bUdgetary decisions.
60
Elkin calls attention to three pairs of linkages:
1) the extent to which the land use alliance shapes the
activities of the functional bureaucracies, how its
efforts to do so are carried out and the pattern of
resistance, if any, of the leadership of city
bureaucracies to these efforts,
2) the extent to which the personnel and resources of
city .agencies are part of electoral coalitions, including
whether city politicians regularly penetrate the
bureaucracy for electoral advantage.
3) the extent to which the alliance between land
interests and local politicians is a crucial part of the
electoral organization created by politicians, including
whether land interests contribute resources and are
themselves candidates for office.53
Elkin provides an historical overview of the “continuities"
which have served as the building blocks of different city p이itical
patterns or “urban regimes. II As the nation’s economic history has
evolved, dominant regime types have succeeded each other.
Nineteenth Century privatist regimes turned Twentieth Century
pluralist; then federalist; and then entrepreneurial. Elkins's
description of the complex entrepreneurial regime provides a focus
for this study:
The shape of the p이itical economy is still emerging. But
the implications for the broad character of the
relationship between business interests and pUblic
officials can be discerned ... Even in the context of more
politic히Iy difficult land-use strategies for promoting
city growth and of changes in the p이itical arrangements,
public officials are still drawn to p이icies that promote
the economic growth of the city. They are thus drawn
into extensive links with business figures who share
these purposes and whose cooperation is in any case
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required in order to pursue them. These links are,
inevitably, different from those that existed under the
pure entrepreneurial p이itical economy. They are, in
fact, more complex, not least because public officials
are now themselves more diverse in their incentives and
business interests are more fragmented. On ba외lance ，’ the
re에lat센ion댐1
stronger ro이|뻐e than they did prev씨io아u“s히s헤Iy. This is partly
because business interests are, in fact, more fragmented
and partly because the problems are more comp뻐x and
business executives lack the time to act as civic
statesmen, thinking through proposals. In general, the
relationship between public officials and business is
more like a coalition than like the alliance that was
characteristic of the pure entrepreneurial political
econ까10아)mηly.54
This comp뻐x regime relies heavily on institutior뀐|
arrangements which bureaucratic actors administer. City Hall
promotes growth through sophisticated land use policy and specific
project proposals.
This contradicts pluralism's assumption of dispersed influence
and Peterson's re-definitlon of pro-growth bias as fundamentally
fair because in the interest of the city as a whole. This research
will refer to these linkages to explain the p이Itlcs behind our case
studies. For example, this study describes.the success of the
Portland Development Commission within the study period. Quasi-
public institutions, such as development commissions, create the
institutional context which constrains the pUblic agenda.
Development Commissions select projects which will facilitate
growth and involve the public and private business sector in
partnership.55
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Stratification
In addition to identifying 쁘센효뇨 linkages are most important to
each city, this study should be able to examine in detail 뇨으쁘 these
linkages work. Clarence Stone has restated stratification theory to
indicate how the “durable features of the socioeconomic system
confer advantages and disadvantages on groups in ways that
predispose public officials to favor downtown business interests."56
Social structure in cities is 'of a diamond shape - a small top
stratum, a large (and multiple) middle strata and a relatively small
bottom stratum. The top stratum has three advantages over the
more pop비ous middle class: economic position, hierarchical
position and social position or lifestyle. Economically, the top
stratum has great wealth and command of major economic
enterprises; p이iticians favor the top stratum as these revenue
produces are essential to institutional maintenance. Elite
associational groups are small and can act quicklyand devote
substantial resources to ~ny pr이ect. The high social status of the
top stratum exerts an allure.
Given the likelihood that public officials, elected and
appointed, will want to enhance their own careers and
assure the well-being of the organizational units they
are affiliated with, their behavior will be patterned by
the system of stratification. Specifically, systemic
power grows out the fact that as officeholders make
decisions, they take into account: (1) economic
considerations - especially the government’s revenue
needs; (2) associational considerations - capabilities of
various groups to engage in and sustain policy and other
goal-oriented actions; and (3) social status and Iife-
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style considerations • especially as they bear on
professional and career accomplishments.57 .... This
positional bias results in system power in which top
stratum business interests are indirectly powerful.
Public officials are subconsciously predisposed to favor
business interests.
Figure 9 presents a more sophisticated treatment of interest
demand generation and conversion.58
Systemic power comes into play during the “demand
conversion" phase..Action or inaction on articulated demands are
grouped into three stages: (1) mobilization· the stage at which
proposals mayor may not receive enough support to be brought up
for formal consideration by local authorities; (2) official
disposition - the stage at which officials formally decide to
approve, either fully or in substantially modified form, or
disapprove proposals; and (3) implementation - the stage at which it
can be determined whether or not after gaining official approval
proposals have been put into effect and if so, to what extent.
Finally, Elkin's linkages assume that the land use alliance
controls electoral contests. Elkin’s second and third linkages
involve electoral coalitions but voters do not decide alternative
policy choices. The fundamental questions is: Can citizens make a
difference? Dahl provides hope that not all influence is beyond the
reach of a committed activist. Elkin and Stone cast doubt that the
urban regime with its inherent advantage can be beaten. Peterson
thinks that the activist is misguided. Yet we desire local
democratic decisions. I suggest three research questions for our six
Demand Generation Demand Conversion
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Fiaure 9. Systemic Bias. From Clarence Stone, Economic
Growth and Neiahborho_oD_Discontent. System Bias in the
Urban Renewal Proaram of Atlanta (1976).
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case studies which provide a means of examining the extent to
which each city furthers or thwarts democratic citizen
participation:
1. How does the urban regime 0이pe하rate in each city? Is each
regime i삐n Por야베t센|녀a하n버d and Seattle equ따Ja러l씨Iy’ ef퓨fect센ive? Do business and
City Hall collude on every issue to their advantage?
2. How does the jobs argument affect the ability of activists
to envision alternative p이icies to those put forward by the urban
regime?
3. Can activists mount a challenge at the ballot box? Can
activists organize and create an alternative to the existing urban
regime?
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CHAPTER 川
PORTLAND: FROM DOWNTOWN PlAN TO CENTRAL CITY PLAN
NEWCHALLENGES
As described in the previous chapter, the Downtown Plan
revitalized the west side doWntown by providing the framework for
massive pu비ic investment in transit, parks and commercial
development. 1 New issues also arose at the start of the 1980’s
which suggested new action by the City. Downtown - circumscribed
by the rail yards to the north, the 1-405 freeway to the west and
south and the Willamette River to the east - continued to lose
market share to the suburbs. And suburban-style commercial
development was possible just beyond downtown borders. Downtown
parking restrictions did not apply beyond the freeway loop. New
projects to the north and south along the river and in Lloyd Center
benefited by the attractions of the core and centrality. In these
peripheral areas, excellent access to highways was complemented
by free extensive parking. 니oyd Center had the space and the
intention to build a new office tower every three to five years. The
Association for Portland Progress (APP), the west side downtown
business association, identified parking restrictions as the chief
drag on its efforts to maintain market share.
The Portland Development Commission was completing the
1970’s downtown development agenda with the development of
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projects such as Pioneer Courthouse Square, the Portland Center for
the Performing Arts, a retail anchor pr이ect on Morrison, the South
Waterfront Project, KOIN Fountain Plaza, South Park Blocks
improvements, and relocation of the bus station. At the same time
it was clear that the Banfield light-rail system and its proposed
westside extension would significantly affect the 니oyd
Center/Coliseum, North of Burnside and the Northwest Triangle
districts. The recession had hit Oregon hard; the city was having
difficulty marketing the retail core anchor project to potential
investors or tenants. Redevelopment of the North of Burnside area
had stalled. Hopes for a Portland version of Georgetown were
dimming in the face of continued conflicts between local merchants,
transients and social service agencies. It appeared that downtown
might not capture the new convention center.2 Influential downtown
business people such as John Russell, Greg Baldwin and Louis
Scherzer therefore felt that an update of the Downtown Plan was
essential.
CENTRALCITY PLAN: UPDATING THE DOWNTOWN PLAN
In October, 1983, Commissioner Margaret Strachan’s office
proposed a “Central City Plan" (CCP). The Plan was pa바Iy a counter
proposal to APP’s attack on the downtown parking lid and partly a
recognition that the Downtown Plan needed a new agenda. Strachan’s
chief aide, Richard Forester, wrote a Council resolution which
called for a review of the downtown plan and the urban renewal plan.
This review would include a Central City parking, transportation
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and traffic plan to enhance “the role of downtown as a mass
transportation hub of the region."3 The Central City would include
downtown west of the Willamette River, Skid Road (North of
Burnside), an adjacent immigrant neighborhood (Goose H이low) ，
railyards and industrial land adjacent to the west side downtown
(Northwest Triangle, the Macadam Corridor) , and areas east of the
Willamette (the Central Eastside and Lloyd Center). Forester and
Michael Harrison, a senior planner at the Planning Bureau, had
enlarged the scope of concern from parking supply to the diminishing
role of the core in the still suburbanizing region. This was a replay
of the Downtown Plan's evolution.
After two months of discussion and the circulation of ten
preliminary drafts, Strachan went pUblic at the beginning of 1984
with a Council resolution creating a broad-based citizen-driven
planning process (Figure 10 illustrates neighborhood and business
association territories). The Commissioner or her staff had
contacted prominent businessmen such as Doug Goodman, John
Russell, Bill Naito, Melvin Mark, Pete Marks, Bill Wyatt (APP) and
others and found support for the upda:te4• In the two months of
pu비ic discussion, Strachan and her staff called or wrote almost 300
interested parties - business people and organizations from each
geographic area, neighborhood organizations, politicians,
consultants, influentials, etc.s Widespread support for the plan
focused on the need to update the Downtown Plan.· The disparate
nature of this support was disguised because the Downtown Plan had
promised so many different results - economic development, humane
Plan
North of
Burnside
Plan
Fiaure j_O. Neighborhood and Business Association
Boundaries. From City of Portland, Central City Plan
(1988)
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design and replacement housing. In particular, westside business
interests focused on the private investment leveraged by the big
Downtown Plan projects such as the transit mall.6 These business
interests saw a chance to include the east side and other west bank
areas that had profited by the Downtown Plan effort while escaping
parking and design restrictions.
The chief obstacle to this initiative was Mayor Frank Ivancie’s
antipathy to planning. Ivancie had appointed Terry Sandblast as
Planning Director. Sandblast had formerly staffed an eastside
commercial strip business association. These small business people
were opposed to additional core planning initiatives as a diversion
of resources. Strachan sought to circumvent this difficulty by
creating an independent effort that would not directly involve the
Planning Bureau. With Council and business community support for
Strachan’s initiative, Mayor Ivancie reluctantly supported an update.
Ivancie and Strachan compromised over the location of the effort,
placing it as a separate unit within the Bureau of Planning rather
than an independent city office. As part of the compromise, Ivancie
and Strachan jointly selected the “pre-planning committee" charged
to make a proposal to Council for the organization. and content of the
plan. Mayor Ivancie insisted on Sandblast’s participation.7
The pre-planning committee included Strachan as chair; PDC
Executive Director Patrick L. LaCrosse, vice-chair; Sandblast,
William W. Wyatt of the business lobby group, the Association for
Portland Progress; Donald H. Lengacher of PGE (the westside electric
utility) and CEIC (the Central Eastside Industrial Council); and Don K.
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Stastny (an architect and supporter of Strachan). The pre-planning
committee was responsible for defining the powers of the citizen
committee, its composition and size and its relationship to 러I other
city commissions and review bodies. Ultimately, relationships with
the Planning Commission and Development Commission would be
most crucial to the outcome of the plan. The pre-planning
committee' was guided by cor띤ultants. Don Barney & Associates
coordinated pUblicity, meeting logistics, data requirements and
funding generally. Other consultants also included planner Dick
Brainard, who had worked on the Downtown Plan at CH2MHiII, and
Don Stastny who provided planning advice and who authored the
citizen-based, reiterative process eventu리ly used.
Process
On July 25, 1984 the Portland City Council adopted the
planning process which would guide the plan for the next 2 1/2
years. This process would consist of three phases - development of
a broad vision for the Central C빠y， translation of the vision into
“performance goals," and transformation of the goals into an
implementation plan. The final result would be a draft plan which
would inciude a vision statement, performance goals, public actions,
and potential private responses required to implement the plan.
Each of these products would be reviewed by the Planning
Commission and ultimately adopted by City Council.8 The plan called
for an innovative public outreach effort in the form of three “Design
Events." Design events were series of events taking place over a
two-week period involving organized groups and individuals from all
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。ver the community. Design Event One was to initiate the process of
creating a broad vision. The kick-off took place on the center span
of the Burnside Bridge. Balloons floated above the bridge in an arch
which symbolized the binding of both sides of the river into a
“Central City" core.
Design Event Two was to follow basic research and studies of
the different districts. (District studies were never 'comph를ted).
Design event two was to result in a refined vision statement “in
terms of performance goals that describe the City’s expectations for
the Central City in terms of housing, transportation, public
amenities, urban design and other issues." Finally, Design Event
Three was to take place to evaluate the feasibility of the refined
vision statement. Design Event Three was to take place in Fall 1986
or Spring 1987, two or three years in the future.9
According to a consultant’s presentation to the Planning
Commission, the original intent had been to do a more traditional
planning study in terms of citizeni volve erπstudy， experts isolate r levant facts and propose alternatives for
citizen comment. But the pre-planning committee felt that a
traditional planning process might not "jell.". In some ways, the plan
process was an experiment, different from traditional planning or
even from the mythicized Downtown Plan:
What we are charged with and are presenting to you is a
process by which the vision of the city can be planned.
One of the things that I [Don Barney] feel is inherent
within this type of process is that it is different than a
comprehensive planning process, it is different than a
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fairly, let’s say, then, a traditional planning process. A
traditional planning process, which is all that the
planners are trained in, has to deal with a derivation of
the scientific method of a data gathering, data analysis,
hypothesis setting, testing hypothesis, down the line. A
f비Iy step-by-step rote approach to planning. What we
have in Portland, and because of the structure that is
here, with the compo plan, the Downtown Plan, we have
the lUxury of developing a new type' of planning process
that takes planning, or the ability to do planning, a step
higher. So it enables us to: one, develop a vision for
what the city can be, to test that vision down through a
series of events within the city to come up with a final
vision and guidelines of what and how to get to that
particular point.10
The attempt to be non-traditional, to be a national leader in
an untried planning process, would mean unforeseen difficulties.
The Planning Commission acquiesced to the Central City Plan
process because the process was explicitly laid out by Council
resolution. Planning Commissioner Richard Bentley did question
whether the project would suffer from the lack of specific
timelines. The dialogue between the consultant and Planning
Commissioner Bentley foreshadowed the tension between process
and product. Strachan’s plan represented process. Her theme was
that goo~ process led to good product.ll
Critical Issues
At the very beginning of the process, the co이nsu비Ita하nts r면epor야r혐d
to the committee on the c하n때uc히ia허I issues which the Central City PI닙an
wou비j피|버d confront:
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From a development viewpoint, staff officials anticipate
a possible debate over the future nature of the Central
City. Right now, it is an area of great diversity, home of
the region’s highest paying jobs and some of its lowest
paying jobs. A decision of the CCP may be whether to
retain this diversity through the continued existence and
creation of warehousing and light industrial uses, or to
move basically toward office, as many core areas in
other m허or metrop이itan centers have done. Such a
transition has already occurred in the south Macadam
corridor, where 600-800 light industrial jobs have been
replaced by 2,000-3,000 office-related jobs.
The status of the industrial sanctuary in the Central Eastside
Industrial District (CEID) was one of the most important issues for
the new Plan. New proposals for offices had recently been made.
While the area’s lower cost space was supportive of incubator
industry, the “district’s relationship to the river places it squarely
at the table in the debate over recreation uses and public access
p이nts on the Willamette. All in all, the CEID is likely to be a real
center of intensive discussion during the CCP development." The
plan would also have to tackle the failure of the Downtown Plan in
the area north of Burnside. “The ‘gentrification’ of some of the
Burnside area with successful office and retail ventures has
produced co-existence problems between the business and the
transient community that ought to be more vigorously addressed for
the benefit of both populations through the CCP ."12 (Changing public
p이icy toward North of Burnside is treated in Chapter VI.)
The consultants also suggested that housing could be rebuilt in
areas such as North Macadam and Central Eastside outside
downtown.
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Balanced ReDresentation
The Citizen Steering Committee was elaborately balanced. The
steering committee consisted of 15 citizen members plus three 르츠二
으한파i으 members from the Planning Commission, Planning Bureau and
Development Commission. There were four at-large representatives,
including the chair, Don Stastny; four representatives of
business/development interests in the Central City planning areas;
four representatives of residential neighborhood interests within or
immediately adjacent to the core; one design/planning
representative (Sumner Sharpe, Strachan’s husband); one social
service representative and one representative from the arts
community. The membership was “an upfront analysis of community
power structure."13 The members were picked by Strachan and
Ivancie. To make the committee even more repr킹sentative ，
candidates who could represent more than one view were favored.
For example, Mary Burki held a Ph.D. in urban affairs, was a past
president of the Downtown Community Association, and was a
housing specialist for a North of Burnside social service agency.
Betsy Lindsay represented her 'Corbett-Terwilliger neighborhood and
the Art Museum where she taught. Commissioner Strachan made it
very clear that the plan was to be a citizen-driven process and
emphasized the great length of time and effort spent organizing the
planning process - six months, 17 public meetings, three public
hearings, and participation by several hundred individuals.l4
The Citizen Steering Committee would “prepare and review"
the plan. The role of the Planning Commission would be limited to
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recommendations to the City Council for formal approval, although
the Planning Commission was assured of and given periodic briefings
along the way. The CSC, as it was called, would be assisted by a
Management Suppo,rt Team. Its function would be to coordinate
technical/bureau people and citizen committees. Citizen
committees were envisioned to be divided into three parts -
Research 'Advisory Committee, Special Issue Committee, and
District Advisory Committee. The first two committees were
combined, the latter committee was never constituted.
The most important aspect of the Management Support Team was
that it was not headed by a planner or outside planning consultant,
despite the positive experience of the Downtown Plan. The CCP
Manager was specific~끼ψ intended to be a nonplanner - “a senior
level professional with project management and p이icy development
experience." Urban design or planning experience was “desirable."15
Dean Smith, a resident of the plan area, directed the effort as Plan
Manager. Smith had previously served as Strachan’s assistant and
before that as Don Clark’s public affairs assistant. His background
was public administration, journalism and neighborhood p이itics.
Staff to the plan Included citizen-Involvement planner Jim Owens
and Rod 。’Hiser ， who had staffed the Downtown Plan. O'Hiser was
the only Bureau of Planning employee on the project.
Plan Puroose
The mission statement, purpose and objectives clearly called
for the elaboration and extension of the Downtown Plan's emphasis
on economic growth and preservation of amenities:
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Mission ... To develop a plan that is a vision of the future,
establishes the Portland central area as the center of
commerce and cultural activity in the community,
recognizes the unique environmental setting and. historic
precedence of the area, incorporates the residential and
business characteristics of the individual districts
within the area,' preserves the integrity of adjacent
neighborhoods, and improves the livability of the area for
all citizens."
The CCP was intended to build upon the Downtown Plan, to lure
additional investment to the core and to meld the individual
districts into a cohesive Central City core. The CCP would be
comprehensive, and would tackle unresolved housing, social service
and parking issues:
Objectives... Planning issues to be considered include, but
are not necessarily limited to, urban form and design,
land use, transportation, housing, pedestrian environment
and historic preservation; riverfront use; retail ,
commercial and industrial developmemt; social services;
public and private education, convent센ion미，/tou바Jr씨끼is히하m끼n’，
c마u비j괴Itl띠u바ua히I entertainment and recreation activities.
The plan would “Clarify the functional role of the Central City
and its relationship to the community."16 The former referel1ce to
competition for new office space among downtown- and 니oyd Center
and Macadam had been downp떠，yed ， as well as the failure of the
Downtown Plan to address the loss of housing and the lack of a
social policy. The press briefly discussed the difficulties of
planning for such a balkanized area but participants were
optimistic. 17
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With the exception of the Lair Hill neighborhood there was
total community support for the plan before Council ,18 Lair Hill still
remembered its partial destruction by the South Auditorium urban
renewal pr이ect. . Downtown growth as a city-wide issue, affecting
housing affordability or the quality of life was not considered to
extend beyond actual plan boundaries. As long as the boundaries
were kept tight, no neighborhood or environmental coalitions would
fight downtown growth as in Seattle. (See Chapter IV.)
The period from Council approval in J비Y 1984 to the following
January was devoted to choosing representatives for the Citizen
Steering Committee (CSC). The process was so lengthy because the
process was elaborate. Sixteen neighborhoods within and adjacent
to the CCP area were allotted four spaces. Since each neighborhood
submitted three names, 48 people competed for four spaces. The
plan sought participants who could count as “two-fers" and “three-
fersl! and were new to city p이itics ，19 The plan sought to create a
multiplicity of interests, in conscious homage to pluralist theory.
The members of the CSC' were expected to make d훌cisions on a
consensus basis and within the confines of the meeting room.
Desion Event One
Design Event One was an elaborate community outreach
pr이ect， designed by a Portland public relations firm. On May 18,
1985, Portlanders were invited to celebrate the plan with a Bu바Jrr념i버de
B맑r끼i띠d때g맹e p뻐ar때ty. At noon, a'빠er the reading of the Mayor’s pro히amation ，
the “Dreamspan" balloon arch which symb이ic허Iy linked west and
east sides, was released into the air to begin the fun. What followed
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was an elaborate series of six city-wide and fifty neighborhood
workshops; a ballot distributed via The Oreconian; intercept surveys
of senior citizens, youths and tourists; a 1,000 person telephone
survey; Tri-met placards; children’s “Kid-mapping Project;" a
mobile van with interactive computers; displays and a slide show
touring Portland and visiting shopping centers; and Rose Festival
events - 러I programmed to “allow people to define the specific
issues of concern to them personally."20 The standard mailing list
contained 627 names of citizens, officials, community and business
organizations.
The outreach theme was “Portland - Give Us Your Dreams to
Build A Plan On." This slogan suggested the experimental, non-
traditional, even visionary nature of the process created by Don
Stastny. In the future, supporters of the original process would cite
citizen input from this Design Event as evidence of local and
democratic support for significant planning efforts. For example,
proponents of moving the 1-5 freeway off the east bank of the
Willamette would castigate decisions to retain its location on the
riverbank as a betrayal of the public’s desire to return to the river.
Others would call Design Event One a farce, ridic~ling the idea that
the 10,000 Portlanders who may have stopped by a workshop or
played with the computer were serious bargainers in the p이itics of
city planning.
Design Event One results were painstakingly itemized by staff
in twenty functional areas. Staff summarized broad issues and
inventoried specific issues. The issue statements were intended to
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be used as a basis for research during phase two. These functional
areas included commercial/industrial development,
convention/tourism, cultural/entertainment, education, government,
historic preservation, livability, natural environment, parking,
pedestrian environment, public safety, recreation and parks, retail ,
riverfront social services, transportation, urban development and
jobs. Respo이아n핍1
"cont까rover떠si녀a러I"’ and II녕ex차treme히Iy co아ntrove하r댐s히i떠a히I.νI’II The extent to which
these va허Il삐ues influenced the steering committee is unclear. In the
CCP final write-up, the planning staff relied instead upon the
proposals of the Functional Advisory Committees (FACs).21
Functional AdvisOJ'L Committees
The Functional Advisory Committees (originally called
Research Advisory Commi한ees) were created to review the research
to commence at the beginning of Phase Two. Potential committee
members applied and were appointed on the basis of expertise. In
addition to receiving technical reports from consultants and
bureaus, the members were suppo~ed to suggest implementation
options. In essence, the Functional Advisory Committees became
eight separate citizen idea committees. It would -be their reports
which would provide the “1000 ideas" considered by the Planning
Bureau. The original Functional Advisory Committees looked at
economic development, recreation and environment, land use and
housing, transportation, culture/entertainment and education, social
services and public safety. Approximately 50 research reports were
commissioned at a cost of $300,000. Despite this large expenditure,
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research money was not earmarked for social service planning, in
part because a grant application to Fred Meyer charitable trust was
not funded.22 Research on the 1-5 move was limited in scope. Much
of the research would not be successfully transmitted to the CSC by
the Functional Advisory Committees; many studies were useful only
to those agencies such as POC who were skilled in using data to
prove a point. These committees represented a lower level of
citizen activism. They did nQt have access to decision-makers.
New Actors: the Urban Desion Advisorv Team
At the same time that the steering committee was confronted
with massive citizen input, the Urban Design Advisory Team was
created. This team was modeled on the national program of the
American Institute of Architects which sent design professionals to
give vision to redevelopment efforts. The Central City Plan team
consisted of three prominent local architects, George Crandall,
Paddy Tillett, and Will Martin as well as the nationally-prominent
Berkeley planner Alan Jacobs. (Seeking design advice from San
Francisco was a Portland planning tradition.) This team of four was
responsible for creating the design vision for the steering
committee. Will Martin, a romantic visionary began to speak about a
pedestrian “ponte vecchio." After Martin’s untimely death in
September 1985, George Crandall would lead the team in critiquing
process and product. Ultimately, he would actively move the team’s
focus to the very center of controversy - the future of the Central
Eastside. The Central Eastside could not remain an industrial
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sanctuary and also redevelop with new mixed use development on the
east bank of the river.
Overload
By September it was clear that the process was too complex
and the information to be considered was too great. During this
period both POC and the Planning Commission chafed at the lack of a
direct role in the plan.23 Coordination among all aspects of the
project suffered from the large amount of work required of the
management team. Some members of the steering committee
became detached from the process.24
A cleavage between the process “visionaries," and the
pragmatists began to develop. The UOAT team, now led by Crandall,
began to c다tique the process. This exposed the narrow
representative positioning of most CSC members and the
unwieldliness of a 25 member group. The esc membership was so
parochial that no one could take a position based upon the merits of
an argument from a city-wide perspective. Discussion was difficult
as the CSC jumped from issue to issue, sidestepping the crucial
Central Eastside land use and transportation concerns. Technical
studies churned out by the consultants created undigested homework
for committee members.2S
As a result of the standoff, the steering committee issued a
partic내arly bloodless first draft of Goals and Policies by November
18, 1985. Economic Development, ConventionfTourism, Natural
Environn띤nt， Housing, Parks and Recreation, Public Safety,
Transportation and Pedestrian Environment were broad topics. Goal
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and Policy language was non-speci 힌Co' The plan stated that “the
Central City should operate as the economic center for the City of
Portland, the State of Oregon and the Columbia Basin." PDC had
strongly objected that the previous 헤sion statement had overlooked
economic development. Richard Forester, on Strachan’s staff, also
argued that jobs provided the basics of core revitalization. In
contradictory fashion, the p이icies indirectly called for maintenance
of the industrial sanctuary on the eastside while doing something
about the blight of the eastbank freeway (the CSC was told that to
move the freeway would threaten the continued viability of the east
side and that the state was about to build needed freeway access to
1-5, the primary north-south freeway corridor in Portland). The Plan
highlighted the desirability of these manufacturing and distribution
businesses in the core by specifically calling for a continuation of
manufacturing and distribution services. Somehow, without
disturbing plans to create even more freeway on the water’sedge,
the “intrusion of 1-5 on the eastside waterfront should be
reduced."26
Phase Two
After two years, and $350,000 it was clear that only broad
statements could pass muster with the heterogeneous steering
committee. Furthermore, the CSC was weakened by divergent
approaches to decision making. Most members were uncomfortable
with the reiterative Design One, Design Two workshops.27 Decision-
making itself was up for grabs. The Urban Design Advisory Team
assumed that the planning process was within their professional
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ambit while the designers of the original process pursued their
vision of a citizen-driven process. Also, the Pre-Planning
Committee’s distrust of parochial interests, inherited by the
management team meant that district studies could not be trusted
to be objective rather than parochial and biased.
At this point, organizational changes were instituted to create
more of a planning environment. Ft. Wayne planner Norm Abbott was
hired as Planning Director on the strength of his management ability.
Strachan’s office was confident that he could avoid further
confusion. Abbott was given the impression that the project needed
planning-style leadership. Of course, this raised the same problem
as before in terms of two staffs with different orientations
Already the management team had been brought into the Bureau’s
budget process in a move engineered between the Planning Bureau'
and the budget office.28 When Bud Clark defeated Frank Ivancie in
1984, Margaret Strachan was assigned the Planning Bureau. By this
point in time, onlookers were becoming polarized in their estimate
of the plan. Strachan, her advisors, and some neighborhood activists
saw the plan as visionary, citizen-driven, and systems-oriented.
Business peop뻐， the UDAT team and some members of the CSC saw a
leadership vacuum, lack of direction, wasted effort, and delay.
According to some interviewees, the steering committee had
diffic비ty in understanding the planners’ method of presenting
alternatives.
Norm Abbott convened a charette process to generate
alternative land use patterns. Michael Harrison and other planners
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were brought in even though no dollars were officially budgeted for
this extra work.29 The Planning Bureau, meeting with the UDAT team
and the CSC management team created three alternative growth
patterns for consideration by the steering committee: an
automobile-oriented central city, a central core composed of self-
contained “urban Villages," and a city built around an intensive
transit system. The auto-oriented model required the least public
intervention. This model assumed no new light rail construction and
the continued development of large-scale office and industrial
pr이ects just outside of the westside downtown. The urban village
concept suggested creation of intense development “cells" around
parks or landmarks. These would be oriented to a service-based
economy. A tr이ley would connect "cells." The transit oriented
growth pattern proposed light rail lines to the west, north and
south and the extension of the transit mall to Barbur Boulevard on
the south. Intensive urban development would take place along
transit lines. The first two alternatives were “straw men." It had
already been decided to extend the light rail line to the west. That
had been the trade-off as part 'of negotiations to create a light rail
system. The downtown could not grow without better access to the
western suburbs over the West 배Is. The steering committee made
its first decision in 18 months by adopting the transit alternative on
June 23, 1986.
Selection of the intensive transit option did not necessarily
dictate land use in the Central Eastside. Led by George Crandall, the
Urban Design Advisory Team proposed a m리or alteration to the
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structure of the Central City. The architects called for a modified
mixed use zone west of SE Union Avenue. By rei없ing zoning
prohibitions on housing and other uses excluding office, the east
bank would redevelop despite the freeway. Only office uses would
be prohibited to avoid competition with downtown and Lloyd Center
This was nicknamed the "donut concept" and it allowed
redevelopment even without moving the freeway (see Figure 11).
The key objectives would be a two-sided central city core with
active, intensive uses in a core transit loop on both sides of the
river. The industrial sanctuary would be confined to the east
between Union and SE 12th.3o The Planning staff and Development
Commission/staff opposed this proposal. PDC was especially
committed to an industrially-oriented Central Eastside urban
renewal area. Industrial development was represented as providing
roughly 17,000 jobs. (Actw페Iy， this was a relatively low
employment density, spread over 400 blocks.) These industrial
properties could successf내Iy compete with the suburbs given the
construction of the 1-5/McLoughlin ramps. The Bureau of Planning
drafted a report supportive of the industrial sanctuary cαo이아아가까nc
the requ“‘est of PDC.31
The committee agreed with the UDAT team by a split margin,
8-5. The m리ority believed that increased activity, jobs and
possibly some housing was the appropriate future, even if the
freeway remained - the land was strategically positioned opposite
downtown, the convention center was planned to the north and OMSI
ι~ιp1' OJ，μ꽤~
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Figure 11. Central City Concept Diagram, George Crandall.
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to the south. Tom Walsh and the other steering committee members
thought that redevelopment was inevitable.32• At the same time the
steering committee proposed to lower permitted floor area along the
Union/Grand corridor. The steering committee's version of a mixed
use zone was billed as a higher intensity of uses and a richer mix
“to create a two-sided city and to bring activity to the waterfront."
Principal office uses were to be prohibited so that the area would
not compete with Downtown or Lloyd Center. The market would
create a third tier similar to that happening in the Northwest
Triangle. πh뼈e t떠ab비10이i벼d a허Iso iI때l…뻐Il삐uJstra'하，te뼈d the in때ld마뻐us앙tr꺼i버a러I designation as
an a리Iterna'하t헤ive.꺼3
Business and economic interest groups opposing this
compromise included North/Northeast Boosters, the Central Eastside
Industrial Council, PDC and the Economic Development Functional
Advisory Committee. These groups thought the concept would have a
destabilizing effect upon otherwise healthy business. Liberalizing
permitted land uses while not moving the freeway was ~ fine
distinction. Most of the CSC members could not understand this
distinction. The location of 1-5 overrode all other discussions
regarding land use and urban form
The 1-5 question split the steering committee. It did not help
that the committee was presented with five different alternatives
on August 1, 1986. The steering committee had originally
commissioned private traffic consultant Robert Conradt and Oregon
Department of Transportation official Tom Schwab to study the
problem as a result of public sentiment expressed during Design
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Event One.34 As early as May, 1986 Conradt determined that the
freeway could be moved. According to summary minutes, the
steering committee took the position that moving the freeway was
not feasible during the life of the plan but that the area near the
east bank could redevelop “In order to satisfy a number of Central
City Plan goals and p이icies ， options for removal or relocation of the
1-5 freeway in the Central Eastside area have been explored. At the
current time, removal or relocat~on of the freeway do not appear
feasible... Beyond the 20 year scope of the Central City Plan is
envisioned the removal of the 1-5 freeway within the Central
Eastside and a restructuring of the inner-City freeway program.
(Co이m끼11m께i념ss히io이n띤1
further s하t삐udy. Strachan had spoken of binding west and east side
together - "not to re-create a downtown on the. eastside.")3S Don
Lengacher had been representing the eastside since the pre-planning
daysto insure that this would not happen. Those motivated by urban
design concerns - the architects, the Urban Design FAC and those
interested in returning the river to the people - an ad hoc group
called Riverfront for People - continued to push.
단밀화DSl
Several staff proposals that could increase the supply of
housing were rejected. Housing designations along the North Park
Blocks, west of the South Waterfront project, and along Southeast
Harrison Street and Station L in the Central Eastside were rejected.
The steering committee set a goal of adding 4,700 housing units
over the next two decades (6-4 vote) over the opposition of the
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Association for Portland Progress who feared that there would be no
market demand.36
The draft land use plan proposed new housing areas west of
Lloyd Center, in the Northwest Triangle area and in the North
Macadam district. Housing proposals were generally supported by
the public. However, in North Macadam, property owners were
opposed to housing or mixed-use pr이e하s. Property owners opposed
residential zoning and cited inadequate market demand, poor
environment and lack of infrastructure. While broad support for
housing was expressed, the plan’s objective of targeting 4700 new
housing units in the next 20 years was questioned. The issue pitted
the activists on the housing FAC against “realists" pointing to
previous demand. Housing advocates and developers split over
whether the railyards and sites along the river were suitable for
housing and whether housing should be required or not. The
Schnitzer/Zidell interests, who had controlled this area for their
metal salvaging operations for many years but were about to go out
of business. They were opposed to the staff’s emphasis on housing
and open space or park under the Marql퍼m bridge. These interests
wished for low-density office development, a marina and/or hotel.
At that point, the original plan process called for a second
design event. Margaret Strachan had been defeated by a planning
opponent, Bob Koch in November, 1986. Koch had campaigned against
public expenditures for downtown planning. New commissioner Earl
Blumenauer received the Planning Bureau assignment. 37 Norm
Abbott prepared a memo to Commissioner-elect Earl Blumenauer,
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outlining two options for completion of the project. Both options
would allow the CSC to complete its work and forward it to the
Planning Commission and City Council for acceptance and future
implementation. This would require an additional $131 ,000 in
Council funding. The management team would be kept on to finish by
the fall of 1987.38
These options were r머ected. In January, 1987, upon taking
official responsibility for planning, Blun범nauer canceled the
schedule and revised the plan timeline to insure completion by June,
1987. The Commissioner was uneasy about inheriting a plan which
was fairly unclear, without implementation tools and with negative
reviews by some in the business community. The Commissioner
decided not to ask Council for additional funding.39 Blumenauer
intervened aggressively, frustrating the committee members who
were not consulted prior to the truncated end. Work had to be
competed by May 1, 1987. A five week pUblic review process began
at the end of February. Four workshops and two hearings were held
in this period. By this time, support for the plan had worn thin. The
Dreconian speculated that putting the committee outside the
planning bureau, “slack" political oversight by Strachan, and lack of
direction by a staff committed to a citizen-driven process had led to
IIreal trouble" according to Bill Wyatt, APP. This approach could be
called slack, but Strachan had intended that citizens have the
latitude to d‘eve허10야p their own p미l녀anπ.4째o B페h씨u바Jm뻐e하na없l뼈’
look세in밍g ‘“'to the p이itica허페I r대ea허Ii센ti뻐es of trying to win public support and
City Council support for a plan."41 It was forgotten that Wyatt,
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eastside business interests, Ivancie, and later Clark, Sandblast and
LaCrosse had signed off on the planning process.
Extensive outreach was again cranked up for the second and
last design event. The staff established a special phone line;
broadcast television public service announcements; produced a live,
90 minute cable broadcast; printed 1000 buttons and bus placards;
and distributed newsletters and press releases. One thousand copies
of a 20 page four-color tabloid were distributed. A total of 53
presentations were made. The tabloid was designed to make
background information and issue discussions understandable to the
citizenry. The cover and first page were devoted to describing the
legacy of the downtown plan --“one billion dollars in public and
private investment and 30,000 new jobs" - and emphasizing the
“citizen-driven nature of the process.찌2 By April, the staff had
summarized all public comments on the steering committees'
proposals into a two-inch thick “Report on Public Review Period
2."43 This hectic schedule was mandated by the shortened timeline.
Much information was so condensed as to be unintelligible. All· of
the research undertaken by staff and consultants and
recommendations of the eight Functional Advisory. Committees could
not be digested in two sittings.
THE PLANNING BUREAU TAKES CHARGE
Bureau planners who had been outsiders became solely
responsible for the Discussion Draft, the last step prior to formal
consideration by the Planning Commission. Michael Harrison of the
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Portland Planning Bureau began to link the policies of the steering
committee and the Functional Advisory Committee to proposals for
implementation. Only those p이icies which could be implemented
and which had a willing agent were proposed. Since the Development
Commission was the city’s chief implementation agency, PDC
effectively co-wrote the document. By June 30, 1987 a discussion
draft was complete. Again, business and citizen infll뼈ntials were
contacted for their opinion.
The discussion draft eliminated the mixed use district by the
east bank. Housing production then depended upon Macadam, the
railyards north of Union Station and Lloyd District housing zones.
The Macadam district was most heavily targeted. North of Burnside
human service issues were put off for further study. The
eastside/industrial sanctuary controversy was also put off. The
plan did provide details of a bonus system which could provide an
additional 50,000,000 square feet of floor area beyond the already
existing allowances.
By November, 1987"the Planning Commission began pUblic
hearings, adopting the documents through the process of adopting or
rejecting amendments from the public and individ.ual planning
commissioners.44 The Commission called for capturing the eastbank
of the Wlllamette but preserving the Integrity of the Central
Eastside Industrial Sanctuary. They did not want to take on the
freeway move issue but Commissioner Joseph Angel changed from
initial dislike to ardent support.4S The Planning Bureau subsequently
called for a study of alternative freeway alignments. The
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Commission rejected a bid to increase the target housing goal from
5000 to 7500 upon the realization that the higher limit would
require the city to make zoning decisions and develop incentives
favoring housing over commercial and industrial use.
On November 23, 1987 the Planning Commission unanimously
adopted the plan and forwarded it to City Council for adoption. The
Planning Commission turned back last minute pressure from North of
Burnside, Downtown and Eastside business interests to reconsider
the limited pro-housing thrust of the plan.46 Blumenauer was' on
hand to salute the Planning Commission for “one of the best pieces
of work that we’ve seen ever."47 Yet the four year, $1.65 million
dollar plan had sidestepped the two most controversial issues - the
east bank freeway move and the location of social service agencies.
Neither the steering committee nor the general public participated
much in Planning Commission discussion. Indeed, the steering
committee had been involuntarily retired. The City Council heard
from individual property interests and owners who could now focus
upon the plan’s impact upon their investments.
The three basic issues faced by the Council were required
housing, social service siting and reductior댐 in d~velopment
permission. The business community opposed requirements for
mandatory housing at Union Station and North Macadam as "land
banking." The City Club did support housing requirements. The
Portland Development Commission supported required housing on
property other than its own. Generally, the Council supported the
compromises crafted by the Planning Commission despite continued
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opposition by Macadam interests. Reductions in bUilding density in
the Central Eastside Commercial strip were assailed as preventing
property development. The general concept of restricting density,
technical definitions of FAR, and specific downzonings were
assailed. There were a score of these requests from all three
commercial areas - Downtown, Lloyd Center and Central Eastside.
The irony of the CEIC request was that industrial sanctuaries were
most threatened by large-scale commercial development adjacent to
industrial areas. The most powerf비 members of the community
asked for increased commercial development rights- Jack Burns and
the CEIC, the North of Burnside business interests represented by
Roger Shiels, the Downtown interests represented by attorneys
Steve Janik and Tim Ramis. The Council turned down almost all
these requests, concentrating commercial growth in the downtown
crescent and away from the Central Eastside and the residentially-
zoned strip along 1-405. The City Club unsuccessfully challenged the
staff and Planning Commission decision to maintain the Central
Eastside as a sanctuary from the river to SE 12th Avenue
A total of 60 amendments' by business interests were defeated
by Council by the narrowest of margins. Mayor C!ark, Commissioner
Lindberg and. Commissioner Blumenauer outvoted Commissioners
Bogle and Koch three to two. Blumenauer sold the development
restrictions (actu리Iy not restricting the growth of the central city
per se, but confining it to the light-rail crescent - see Figure 12) as
a measure of Portland's egalitarian character: “A lot more people
FIGURE2·5
Commercial
Zones
LEGEND
ex Central Commercial
Fiaure 12. Central Commercial Arc. From City of
Portland, Develooer’s Handbook (1992).
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can make some money instead of one or two peop띤 cleaning up and
every one else waiting around for their turn."48
The Council postponed a decision on the location of the 1-5
freeway and authorized a new study. The study suggested moving
the freeway all the way to Water Street and freeing 32 acres,
freeing land between the Burnside and Marquam bridges. However,
City Council resolution 34473 added representatives from the
Oregon Transportation Commission and the Metropolitan Service
District (specific리Iy ， its regional transportation committee, the
Joint Policy Advisory Committee on Transportation, JPACT, which
included members from the City of Portland, and Multnomah,
Clackamas and Washington Counties) to the committee along with
PDC. Membership now consisted of two representatives from the
Central Eastside Industrial Council, two representatives of
Riverfront for People, one representative from the Planning
Commission, one representative from SE Upli야， one representative
from the Advisory· Committee on Design and Construction for the
Oregon Convention Center, and as the non-voting chair, Senator Jane
Cease, also chair of the Oregon Senate Transportation Committee.
This became known as the second Cease committe.e.49
The Council continued the “dl펴I-track" process of proceeding
with the East Marquam project (no move, intensification of 1-5
within the shorelines of the Wlllamette and further analysis of the
ODOT proposal. The East Marquam pr이ect would be delayed until
January, 1989.
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The Committee considered three alternatives - the original
OOOT design, now called Alignment A; a compromise to move the
freeway back from the river south of the Morrison bridge; and the
most “visionary" plan to move the freeway back from the river south
of the Burnside Bridge (see Figure 13). Alignment A actue페Iy
magnified the freeway’s visual and environmental impact upon the
east bank - the freeway was widened, including the Marquam bridge
and new ramps to McLoughlin (the East Marquam pr이ect). However,
the project was fully funded and right-of-way already in place. The
CEIC could get the needed access to 1-5 soon. Alignment B relocated
the freeway slightly to the east, within the OOOT right-of-way. The
bridge could still be widened and the connections made to
McLoughlin but the riverbank could be opened around the Hawthorne
bridgehead. This pr이ect would improve the safety of traffic coming
off the bridge. About 13 acres of land would be created. Eighteen
businesses and 160 jobs would be lost, but redevelopment could
capture from 200 to 1,700 new jobs. Alignment C, the proposal of
the first Cease committee, relocated the freeway all the way to the
railroad tracks and created 32 acres of cleared land next to the
water. This pr이ect would eventually provide the .best access to the
CEIC. Thi때-eight businesses and 435 jobs wo비d be displaced but
up to 2,500 jobs could be recreated.so All three alignments also had
alternative versions which made for a total of six choices.
The Committee included four members who had clearly defined
positions - CEIC members Vern Ryles and Bob Bouneff were opposed
to any move. Riverfront for People members Ernie Bonner and ~ob
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Belcher championed the original committee’s work. The Committee
voted 7-6 to recommend Alignment C. However, the method of
voting became so controversial that opponents of the move could
claim a split decision: The two groups had split the vote and chair
Jane Cease had cast the deciding vote. The original resolutions
establishing the committee had categorized her position as non-
voting.Sl The vote reflected the politics of the issue. The
proponents of the move included the Riverfront for People activists,
Southeast Uplift and individually prominent figures such as Planning
Commissioner Joe Angel who favored Alignment C. Their City Hall
champion was Commissioner Lindberg. Their vision is captured by
the Oreconian forum editorial penned by Commissioner Lindberg:
The citizens of Portland are facing one of the most
critical development decisions for the close of this
century. We can change the face of Portland forever. We
can expand both the aesthetic and economic potential of
the inner Eastside. The Willamette River is ours. We can
manifest the bold vision and decisive leadership
necessary to seize a great opportunity or, we can allow
our children’s rightful inheritance to slip through our
fingers.....
United, we can relocate the freeway and create a
profound civic legacy for the 21 st century. We need only
recognize this golden opportunity in our history and
exercise the stewardship our predecessors expected and
our descendants deserve."52
The no votes included the two Central Eastside members, the
suburban interests and POCo Although Commissioner Blumenauer did
not vote, it was clear that he was the dominant force who presented
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the 1-5 move as a threat to the westside expansion of the light rail
system.
It is true that as a public officeholder I’ve had occasion
to lament the lack of vision of my predecessors.
However, I am faced more often with the painf비 and
expensive consequences of our city’s failure to identify
the resources need to carry out a vision. Mentally ill
people roam our street after being deinstitutionalized
without proper care available in our community. Our
exciting Performing Arts. Center was built and opened
without adequate money for operation and as a result is
in a constant crisis.
The priorities and programs that the council has
identified may I'ack the emotional power or the media
magic of a proposal like moving the eastbank freeway.
They are, however, the result of careful consideration of
how best to build on our strengths and correct our
weaknesses in order to improve all of Portland. Most
important of all, they continue the city’s traditions of
tying our visions to specific tasks we are capable of
achieving.53
On March 28, 1989 the last decision of the Central City Plan
was made at a press conference. After a trip on the light rail line to
display it to Rep. William Lehman, (D-Fla.) chairman of the
transportation subcommittee of the Housing Appropriations
Committee. Mayor Bud Clark announced thathe would opposed the 1-5
move. “Moving the east-bank (freeway) would cut into the funding
and p이itical punch we would use to get more MAX lines out to
Washington County and elsewhere in the region."54 Both
Commissioners Koch and. Bogle agreed that movingthe freeway
would be nice but impractical. Commissioner Bogle had been
represented as "keeping an open mind". A Council majority could
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have been Lindberg, Bogle and Clark.55 The main force behind the
turn down was Commissioner Blumenauer, who feared to disturb the
city/suburb compromise on metrop이itan light rail. Suburban
interests, Metro, the big-league p이iticians back in Washington, D.C.
did not think that Portland could swing both56• In the final analysis,
continued expansion of the downtown into the Central City
“crescent" overrode the vision of joining East Portland across the
Willamette with downtown.57
!n this author's opinion, the greatest success of the plan had
been in creating a “Central City" core better equipped to meet the
challenge of the suburbs. There was strong business support in
general for expansion to the eastside to directly compete with the
suburbs through the expansion of the 니oyd District. There was also
strong support for the light rail link to the west, north and southern
suburbs. Also, there was continued consensus that livability was a
key marketing tool for the city.
The great visible failure was the lack of resolve to zone and
develop vast riverfront areas north and south of the downtown with
housing and to allow the market to bring mixed uses to the riverbank
part of the eastside industrial sanctuary. The Planning Commission
was swayed by PDC’s market data approach rather than persuaded by
visionaries such as Crandall. The Central Eastside could not be
ignored without p이itical cost. The other non-decision - spending
$60 mill따n on 1-5 improvements without moving it - was
precipitated by the decision to invite regional interests to pass
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judgment. This decision was made despite the physical practicality
of the move.
PLANNINGOUTCOMES
The interplay of redevelopment opportunities and business,
citizen and bureaucratic interests lead to differing planning
outcomes in each district (see Figure 14):
Downtown
Downtown experienced the least change because the status quo
was desired by all. The Central City Plan fine tuned the last
decade’s experience in a series of trade-ofts. For example, height
was fixed in exchange for a hefty increase in floor area bonuses.
The various land interests attempted to liberalize zoning
regulations, but lost their bid at Council when these changes
threatened the concept of development along a light-rail crescent.
Those properties along the crescent received greater development
potential.
North of Burnside
The original Downtown Plan had been ambivalent about this
area. Almost by default, the area had become increasingly
“blighted" as alternatives for SRO housing such as the Lownsdale
district of south downtown disappeared. The 1981 North of Burnside
study actually reduced development potential and promoted a social
service/low-income sanctuary parallel to the industrial sanctuary.
The demand of PDC to reverse this direction was entirely succ.essf비
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in changing official disposition. The only obstacle to a rout of the
agencies and their clients was the Clark-Shiels agreement which
traded a limit on shelter beds for sufferance of the existing
agencies. (Refer to Chapter VI for an extended discussion of the
North of Burnside area.)
L10vd District
Lloyd District planning was non-controversial as the dominant
corporation, Pacific Development Incorporated (anarm of PP&L
electric utility) cooperated in a first-generation plan. Bill Scott,
director of marketing at the time, had helped direct the Downtown
Plan effort under Mayor Goldschmidt. Conflict was postponed until
the eventual consideration of expansion of downtown parking
restrictions to the eastside (under way by 1992).
Northwest Trianale and Macadam
The plan generally confirmed the wishes of the m리or prope야y
owners to transition away from obsolete industrial functions. Land
owners and their representatives resisted draft plan requirements
for housing. Housing activists and the Bureau of Planning wished to
mandate housing; the land owners and PDC resisted restrictions on
redevelopment. Eventually a compromise allowed master planning
and postponement of the housing requirement. In these districts,
。wners’ market perceptions counted the most. Investors viewed
housing as a more promising market by 1992. In this new climate,
pUblic and private interests coincide. The city’s mechanisms
dovetail perfectly with private Investment.
110
Central Eastside
It is in the Central Eastside that the conflict was greatest and
clearly distinct demands put upon decision-makers. Here, vision
clashed with pragmatism - the Downtown Plan’s vision of a
pedestrian, post-industrial environment clashed with the demands
of rail and truck-dependent industry. The post-industrial vision was
clearly articulated by the Urban Design Advisory Team. The vision
was adopted in modified form by the Citizen Steering Committee
and when dropped by Blumenauer’s team, championed by some
members of the Planning Commission and finally by an ad hoc group.
Finally, pragmatism won out. The city establishment with the
notable exception of Commissioner Lindberg and Planning Director
Norm Abbott responded to the concerns of PDC and the Central
Eastside Industrial Council.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has sketched the successful expansion of the
west side urban regime throughout the core. City structures for
promoting and shaping growth are in place throughout the core
through the expansion of west side zoning and pU_blic investment in
the urban renewal districts north of Burnside and in the Lloyd
District. Portland has a sophisticated regime which understands the
mass transit/density connections and which values quality-of-life
amenities. But activists' demands are blunted.
The attempt to understand how the kaleidoscope of interests
and institutions came together led us to ask three research
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questions in the previous chapter. Is the urban regime in control of
the discussion and able to convert activists' demands? Does a
community-wide acceptance of economic development arguments,
such as Peterson’s redefinition of pro-growth strategies as
strategies in the pu비ic interest. cement that control? Can
activists circumvent that control by getting successful initiatives
on the ballot? Figure 15 provides responses to those' questions for
each phase of the Central City Plan.
The CCP reiterative and citizen-driven process created
uncertainty for the urban regime. Commissioner Strachan and her
supporters came from an activist tradition interested in traditional
neighborhoods, affordable housing and social services. This interest
in social p이icy did not fit well with the redevelopment bias of most
downtown interests. Consultants alluded to tough choices between
maintenance, of the status quo and redevelopment at the beginning of
the plan process, but these difficulties were expected to be resolved
in the reiterative process. Again, this process created great
complexity which had been avoided in the Downtown Plan process.
Dean Gisvold, Chair of the Citizens Advisory Committee, had engaged
citizens in negotiations but in a goal oriented, step-by step process.
Strachan's alternative process was created partly from
necessity - by-passing Ivancie and Sandblast - and partly from a
true desire to create a visionary re-iterative process. The citizen-
driven element of the plan created a credible but temporary platform
for alternative activist positions. Activists could argue that Design
Event One showed that the public supported east bank development
112
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across from downtown (the donut concept). Design Event One
findings created an alternative popular "vote. II
Membership in the Citizen Steering Committee was based upon
a "pluralist" approach which confused representation of multiple
interests with dispersed influence. That is, two-fers and three-fers
tried to vote on the basis of two or three constituencies -
geographic district, institution/business, or cause - rather than an
overall appreciation of the public interest. This. approach negated
the complex citizen participation process. CSC members
represented interests. CSC members could not take seriously the
wishes of the "10,000" Portlanders who attended one of the Design
Events. Two years into the plan, media events and iterative design
workshops began to pale. The varied interests were not able to
reach consensus on issues. There was increasing disenchantment
with the plan. Plan designers were process oriented. The business
community and city agencies were product oriented. Simply put,
entrepreneurial urban regimes want product, not process. As the
plan’s process orientation created complexity, Influentials became
frustrated with the plan’s inability to deliver. Finally, Strachan's
defeat allowed the product-oriented faction to wrap up the plan. But
the conflict over 1-5 and social service issues could not be
massaged. Strachan's "citizen-driven" planning process allowed
some dissidents to contest status quo decisions in the cause of
"vision."
The entire community, including activists, accepted the basic
need for growth in the core. Activists differed from the urban
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regime only in means vs. ends. Portland activists did not question
the dominant role for downtown. Portland warmed to Strachan's call
to update the Downtown Plan because the economic position of the
core was threatened by continued regional growth. The city could no
longer rely on momentum to maintain the center. The Downtown
Plan had been a success. The urban regime viewed the Downtown
Plan’s model as absolutely necessary to spark further reinvestment
in the core. The Downtown Plan model was one of public investment
leveraging private investment. Quality of life projects such as
parks and urban waterfalls had encouraged new office, retail and
apartment construction in the past and would do so in the future.
Investment in mass transit may have positive urban design
implications but it was re러Iy valued as the best means to get office
workers and shoppers into a very restricted space. The perceived
success of the Downtown Plan allowed Commissioner Strachan the
opportunity to outflank Mayor Ivancie, an economic deve히lopm띤e민하nt까1t
pro이jec하t-o야r끼iented 0야pψpO nE매‘ent of the city’s quality-of-Iife liberals.
Commissioner Strachan recognized that the continued threat of
suburban style development and the opportunities for expansion
beyond the 1-405 loop attracted the influentials wtlo had gained
from the previous Downtown Plan success. Powerful downtown
business interests and the Development Commission welcomed a
new planning effort. Antipathy on the part of Ivancie was overcome
with the support of these influentials.
The Central City Plan also provided an opportunity to redress
economic obstacles not satisfactorily resolved by the Downtown
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Plan. The conflict between North of Burnside business entrepreneurs
and established big corporations and transients/social service
providers had not been resolved by the 1981 North of Burnside Plan.
The continued loss of housing in Lownsdale and south of Burnside had
put increasing pressures on North of Burnside. πhese issues are
discussed in Chapter VII.) And the Downtown Plan could not have
foreseen the construction of the light rail line through Lloyd
District, over the Steel Bridge. through North of Burnside and into the
Downtown retail core. This would be the first leg of a region-wide
system which would center on the core and help maintain its
dominance into the next century. The complexity of incorporating
eastside interests to the more established westside urban regime
was reflected in the composition of the Central City Plan’s Citizen
Steering Committee and its inability to act as cohesively as the
Downtown Plan's Citizen Committee had.
The light rail crescent approach was based on a progressive
economic development approach The fundamental development
opportunity for reinvestment lay along the light rail crescent from
Downtown, through North of Burnside and Lloyd District. The
westside urban regime accepted expansion to the _crescent because
it understood that the regional light rail system would not be built
without the initial success of this first leg. In opposition, George
Crandall, a member of the design advisory team; Commissioner
Lindberg and others saw opportunity to redevelop the east bank and
create a real river city focusing on the Willamette. Commissioner
Blumenauer, speaking for the urban regime, saw the revitalization of
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the east bank not as the return to the river but as a noncritical
amenity. Investment in the east bank might be a hindrance in the
regional competition for development in the next decades. The
outcome of the ptan was a continuation of the status quo on the
westside and south of Burnside, and redevelopment of North of
Burnside, and Lloyd District as part of the light rail redevelopment
crescent. The industrial sanctuary p이icy was abandoned in the
Northwest Triangle district but retained in the Central Eastside.
PDC expanded its programs to Lloyd District and the Central
Eastside.
These planning outcomes represented the accommodation of
the urban regime to the changing nature of regional access to
downtown. Despite the mission statement’s claim on vision,
Portland's urban regime missed the chance to claim the
Willamette. 58 The decision to not move the freeway was justified
by the public interest in maintaining industrial jobs in the city. But
the westside urban regime had rejected compromises regarding the
freeway alignment. Decisions were made on the basis of p이itical
understandings, not citizen involvement.
From the mission statement onwards,. there was no
consideration of the alternatives to the monocentric urban region.
The Downtown Plan had established as p이icy that downtown growth
was in the pUblic interest of all city and regional residents. The
Central City Plan redefined the center of the regional bull's-eye as a
crescent from the west bank, through a redeveloped skid road to the
Lloyd district. The Portland Central City Plan reflects the conflict
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between a “citizen-driven" planning process and a well-established
“public-private partnership" which had directed central city
development for the last decade.
The plan was never threatened by initiative nor competitive
elections. The "public-private" partnership successfully expanded to
include eastside interests and westside peripheral interests. The
regime has proven adaptable and the stratified nature of most
p이itics works to the regime's advantage. Growth was not perceived
as contrary to quality of life. poe not only implements development
policy but also shapes policy. Activists threatened but avoided
challenge in court, much less the ballot box. Dahl’s description of
hurdles to electoral activity are especially true in Portland where
antagonists on one issue may be allies on another. Activists can
only indirectly criticize the urban regime and the p이iticians and
bureaucrats who learn to rely on the agency.
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CHAPTERIV
SEATTLE DOWNTOWN PLAN
POSTWAR OPTIMISM
The postwar optimism and ambitions which engendered the
Seattle World’s Fair in 19£?2 also permitted the urban regime. to
promote a greatly expanded downtown The 1957 Comprehensive
Planning and Zoning Ordinance allowed development to proceed
virtually without limit. Building size was regulated by a new
technique of Floor Area Ratio (FAR) limits, a maximum ratio of
building floor area to site area. 1 Height restrictions were dropped
and the amount of floor area allowed permi한ed skyscrapers
everywhere regardless of impacts on surrounding development. The
code divided Seattle into a compact “Central Business District"
which included the major retail, financial and office, government,
hotel, restaurant, entertainment and related parking areas, and the
“Central Business District Periphery" which included such support
services as parking, co아mr’1FT’nE
civic cen바t뼈e하r， med바Ica허I and ins하ti센tu따j까t센io아na려I activities. Housing was
zoned out of downtown.
MONSONPLAN
In 1958, members of the Seattle City Council and the Central
Association of Seattle, a new organization of major downtown
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business interests, agreed to formulate a series of p이icies to
“provide a workable guide for futL!re public projects to assure that
public funds available are most wisely spent; and a plan for private
development which will stimulate even greater investment by
private enterprise in Seattle’s Central Area."2 Consultant Donald
Monson, on leave from the New York Planning Commission, prepared a
plan to accommodate regional growth. Monson’s plan stressed
improved accessibility through the development of a radial system
of expressways converging on the downtown, tied together by a
circumferential route around the central business district (See
Figure 16). Transportation terminals would provide for transfer
between automobiles and public transit.
The plan was an attempt to impose on the framework of the
existing downtown the rational principles of spatial organization
and circulation that had been applied to modern suburban shopping
center development. In the downtown context, the area encircled by
expressways would develop as a complex of glass and steel towers
housing m리or office and retail uses. The retail core would be
recreated as a mall with pedestrian links between Pike Street
Market and Westlake Mall. The public space at Pi~e Street Market
would be placed on top of a seven-level 3,000 space parking garage.
Pike Street Market itself would be rebuilt or replaced in the same
location. As recommended by a team of national real estate experts
called “Build America Better," Skid Road would be redeveloped,
including the Pioneer Square district. While Pioneer Square might be
restored or rebuilt, the plan would basically level sixteen blocks,
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to be recombined into sUJ쩌rblocks for major highrise office towers
and parking structures.
The Monson plan has been described as a plan for both the
suburbanization of Seattle and the Manhattanization of Seattle. A
prominent feature of the plan was the ringing of downtown Seattle
by freeways, including two north and south connections between
Alaska Way on the waterfront and 1-5 on the east edge of downtown.
The plan also called for provision of an enormous parking deck and
rooftop shopping center to replace Pike Street Market. As in
Manhattan, floor area bonuses for plazas, setbacks and arcades were
introduced to encourage tall slender buildings. In addition to large
scale, publicly financed urban redevelopment pr이ects ， Monson
recommended revisions to the zoning code which were inspired by
the latest New York code revisions. The downtown was divided into
a Metrop이itan Business/Metropolitan Business Expansion zone
suited to a concentrated retail shopping area, and a Metropolitan
Comn띤rcial zone for offices and services. Residences were not
allowed in the Central Business 'District because mixed uses were
not promoted in the absence of schools or community facilities.
While Monson recommended base floor area ratlo~ with specific
maximum floor area incentives for specific districts, the revised
1965 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, created to carry out these
recommendations, established a uniform FAR limit of ten to one
(10:1) throughout downtown with no ceiling for maximum attainable
bonus floor area and, therefore, no height limit. Bonus allowances
were as follows: plaza, an additional ten square feet of bonused
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office or commercial floor area for every square foot of plaza;
shopping plaza 14:1; arcade, 6:1; and voluntary building setbacks,
6:1. The ordinance projected that a typical half-block project would
contain just under 500,000 sq. ft. gross floor area and be about 47
stories in height. (The average Seattle half block project would be
as big as the biggest buildings ever built in Portland.)
Seattle was thrown wide open for nearly unlimited growth.
Furthermore, the new zoning disrupted traditional building/street
relationships. No specifications were made within zones to
delineate where certain bonus provisions would be most appropriate.
Without direction, there was little hope that amenities like arcades
would be provided by individual private developments in such a way
that a continuous integrated system would evolve over time. The
tall tower set back from the street by a landscaped plaza became
the standard architectural response to the new zoning formula.
Buildings stood aloof, separated from their surroundings from each
other, unconnected by the envisioned pedestrian malls.
During the years that followed the code revisions, office
construction boomed. New office towers were of a completely new
scale for downtown, representing the physical con_sequences of the
new zoning regulations. An unprecedented demand for office space,
and a building technology that virtually removed any restrictions on
building size allowed office towers on a New York scale.
This vision of a sanitized, efficient central city was not
shared by all of Seattle. In the 1970s backlash described in Chapter
II, voters succeeded in halting urban clearance pr이ects. In 19,70,
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Pioneer Square was brought under the protection of a municipal
ordinance establishing it as Seattle’s first historic district. In
1972, the voters removed additional freeway links from the
Comprehensive Plan. In 1973, the seven acre Pike Place Market
Historic District was established by referendum and put under the
protection of the Landmarks Board. Voters had upset the New York-
inspired planning system of downtown businessmen, City Hall
politicians and staff. Planners responded to the electorate by
proposing the Downtown Concept Plan~ similar to Portland’s
Downtown Plan. The plan proposed to refocus the downtown
transportation network on a Third Avenue transit/pedestrian spine.
Parking would be funneled to the periphery and prohibited in the
core. This concept quickly failed due to lack of support from the
downtown community. The business community could veto any
proposal it disliked.
In response to the confusion created by the public rejection of
key aspects of the Mor뀐on Plan and business rejection of the
Downtown Concept Plan, the Municipal League, CHECC (Choose an
Effective City Council), and the League of Women Voters persuaded
the city to create a community-wide commission c:m urban p이icy.
The Seattle 2000 Commission established 12 task forces:
community; downtown; economy and economic security; education;
environment; government and citizen participation; housing; law and
justice; recreation and the arts; social and health services; social
justice and human resources; and transportation, utilities, and new
technologies. These 12 sets of p이icies were formulated by an
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Executive Board, twelve task forces and 21 discussion groups.
Approximately 2000 citizens participated. The downtown task force
proposed a downtown in many ways similar to the vision being
generated in Portland. Downtown would be redeveloped in a way that
was “non-uniform,' with different parts having distinctly different
densities, functions and characters (see Figure 17)." This goal
maintained the traditional vision of a downtown which was pre-
eminent in the Puget Sound region and provided a psychological
center as well. The downtown would continue to grow yet maintain
and strengthen in character despite the increasing competition for
land: “It is important to recognize that office buildings can often
pay a higher price for land, driving land prices beyond the range for
cultural or recreational uses. As a result, care must be taken in the
recruitment of new headquarters not to sacrifice other priority uses
for downtown land.3" The downtown task force also called for
downtown housing, a pedestrian-oriented downtown and excellence
in urban design.
Although the Council adopted the Goals for 2000,4 little work
was done to implement these recommendations. A Comprehensive
Plan process was begun but targeted the neighborhoods first. In the
next decade, the effort reached downtown This phase was named
the Land Use and Transportation Plan, to be addressed next.
LAND USE AND TRANSPORTATION PLAN (LUTP)
By the time the Land Use and Transportation Plan for
Downtown Seattle was adopted by Council Resolution 27281 on
Queen Anne Hili
Eiaure 17. Seattle 2000 Downtown Areas. From City of
Seattle, Goals for Seattle, Study Area of Seattle 2000
Downtown Task Force (1973).
130
June 10, 1985, planners, p이iticians and the public had
participated in an exhaustive four year process.s In March,
1981 , the Mayor’s Office of P이icy and Evaluation issued the
Backaround Reoort of the Downtown land_Use_and
Transoortation Proiect as a resource document “to give people
wishing to participate in the downtown planning effort the
basic information and analysis needed to develop alternatives
for land use and transportation downtown." This document set
out policy issues in five areas: transportation, natural
environment, energy, housing and services, and land use and
design. For each topic, a summary of Seattle history was
provided, background information research by consultants
summarized, and p이icy issues framed. The assumption that
continued growth would solve problems as well as provide new
challenges was the theme behind this as well as most future
debates:
Growth is at the core of nearly all m리or issues
confronting downtown Seattle. If employment in
downtown doubles in the next 15 to 20 years as
expected, it will affect the transportation system, the
natural environment, energy resources, the housing
supply and the character of downtown.6
A series of hypothetical p이icy questions implicitly
supported continued growth but also laid the groundwork for
acting to save the retail core and create additional design-
oriented regulations. The background report rhetorically
stated a fact and then pondered a suitable planning outcome.
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The issues are quoted at length so that the reader can sense
the tone of the project:
More housing is being built in and around downtown. To
what extent. can downtown housing be relied upon to
reduce commuter travel demand? Will people liVing in
new downtown housing also work downtown?"
Growth improves the prospect for achieving the City’s
goal of more housing in and around downtown. It als。
makes older apartments and residential hotels in the
downtown core more susceptible to redevelopment or
conversion to more economic uses. Should a balance of
low, medium and high income housing be sought
downtown?
The zoning ordinance segregates major land uses into
office, retail , service/manufacturing and residential
areas. The intent of the zoning is to concentrate and
intensify retail and office uses in particular. Are
offices encroaching into the retail core? Should the
retail core be kept compact? Should it extend into
adjacent areas along certain streets?
Seattle’s Zoning Ordinance treats downtown like a flat
plane without hills. The bonus system and others
regulations ignore the existence of steep slopes.
Without height controls, building on the lower slopes can
build high to maximize views diminishing the natural
topographic form and block upland views. Should zoning
take topography into account? Should protection of
private views be an objective of height limits?
Elements of bUildings and open space which lend a human
scale create a pleasant pedestrian environment. The
scale and texture of building materials, sizes and
spacing of windows or other openings in walls, heights
of buildings or portions of buildings, street furniture and
landscaping all are critical elements in determining the
character of pedestrian spaces. Should these desired
features be encouraged through zoning?7
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The background document left these and other rhetorical
questions unanswered. However, the document provided
support for the view that downtown Seattle should remain the
pre-eminent center for business, government and cultural
activities of the region. Activist positions that downtown
housing can provide an answer to commuter snarls, that zoning
tools to encourage low and middle income housing were
required, that the retail core. required protection, and that the
1965 zoning ordinance ignored or defeated valid urban design
considerations were accepted as well. Once the background
report was issued, citizens were invited to begin the pUblic
participation process. The Seattle Planning Commission
issued a paper on goals, and the city conducted forums and
workshops. These activities generated several “soft" or
preliminary alternatives.
In August, 1981 , the city issued Guidelines for Downtown
Alternative Plans which served as the basis for future
planning. These guidelines disallowed alternatives to core
dominance. Fifteen competing alternatives were then
submitted by civic interests groups. (See Figure 18 for a few
alternatives.) The most influential players in the process
were the Downtown Seattle Development Association (now the
Seattle Downtown Association or DSA), Allied Arts, a
venerable Beaux Arts group, the Sierra Club, and housing
activists. Many of the Citizen’s Alternative Plan initiative
issues were first raised by these interests.
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The Downtown Seattle Development Association (DSDA)
stressed the value of high intensity uses in the office core.
The DSDA argued that allowed density would even need to be
increased in the northeast area of downtown (now the DOC-2
zone.) A mix of uses such as retail , theaters, restaurants and
short-term parking would provide vitality and fill dangerous
empty spaces. This mix would be encouraged through floor
area incentives in and near the retail core. The DSDA was
willing to allow incentives for amenities such as usable open
space, landscaping, special sidewalk treatments, weather
protection over sidewalks and plazas, interior public spaces,
artwork, and preservation of landmark buildings. Housing
would be promoted through zoning incentives but not on a
higher priority basis than building or pedestrian amenities
through the bonus system. The DSDA was supportive of
altering base and incentive FAR limitations in different parts
of the core and was opposed to “simplistic, blanket height
limits." The DSDA was willing to acknowledge the need for
“light and air," protection of historic districts, the impact on
public services, and even shaping a certain city skyline but the
plan should not supplant investment considerations:
Public P이icies which are intended to guide the intensity
of development within the Downtown should recognize
the effects of both the height and the bulk of buildings.
Any controls on height and bulk should be based upon
consideration of a number of factors, none of which is
necessarily more important than any of the others To a
certain extent a clustering of taller buildings in the cor~
will also reflect the market place: high land values,
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more intensive business activity, etc. Third, building
heights can accentuate natural topographic conditions,
with greater heights at higher elevations. These factors
are complex and interrelated and are not adequately
addressed by simplistic, blanket height limits.8
The DSDA considered the proper mix of uses in the retail
core to be retail and offices. Retail and restaurants would
predominant at the ground floor with intensive office
development at upper levels. The DSDA parking subcommittee
urged that the supply of at least short term parking be
substantially increased and that any attempt to promote
transit or carpooling not discourage the suburban shopper. The
DSDA’s housing subcommittee envisioned substantial
residential growth in peripheral areas of downtown; most new
or rehabilitated housing would be market-rate housing.
In contrast to the DSDA, the Sierra Club Urban Committee
challenged the notion that the downtown could sustain any rate
of growth. The Sierra Club proposed that the city study the
"desirable rate of growth" of office and retail space in
downtown Seattle. Based upon a study of service costs and
effect upon city revenue, a maximum yearly allowable rate of
growth would be defined. Master Use Permits would be
rationed and distributed according to a point system. City
planners, politicians, architects, builders, retailers and
citizens would define the general characteristics desirable in
new downtown structures. Points would be awarded for values
such as “excellence in the design of the building itself,
’humanness' of scale in terms of height or bulk, the provisions
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of on-site parkland or moderate-income housing, or how well a
retail shopping complex was integrated with the office
structure. "9 A housing linkage program might be required
based upon a study of how many new residents would be
attracted to the city by a new project. The developer might be
required to build new housing units, rehabilitate existing
units, donate cash to the Seattle Housing Authority or obtain
low-interest financing for another housing developer. A
developer would also facilitate the provision of park land in
similar fashion. The Sierra Club also proposed urban design
initiatives such as requirements for retail , prohibition of dead
plaza space and prohibition of parking space at the ground
level. Height limits were set at 10 stories in the retail core,
and 28 to 38 stories in the office core. The retail core would
be expanded. Parking would be cut in half over the next 20
years and be devoted to short term shoppers parking.
Likewise, energy conservation would cut energy needs in half
in the next 20 years.
Allied Arts challenged the Monson notion that the city
become a high rise city, sUbject to office building speculation
in the retail core as well. The Allied Arts Plan proposed a
dense, low-height downtown.1o Floor area and height were
greatest in the office core, tapered down toward Puget Sound,
and were reduced by two-thirds in the retail core.11 In the
Central Business District two to three stories of housing
would be provided in the office towers with restaurants,
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hotels, and classrooms at the bases. Interiorshopping malls
would be prohibited. The retail core’s character would be
enhanced and preserved through establishment of a Special
Commercial District, characterized by preservation of existing
Art Deco architecture and height, bulk, texture and frontage
regulations built around the existing streetscape. Lower
heights in the retail core would create a sense of light and
openness in the retail core. A pedestrian wedge would be
created between the retail district and Pike Place Market
along Stewart, Pine and Pike Streets. The alternative proposed
a network of landscaped and identifiable pedestrian pathways
and streets, interconnected with a series of nodes to enhance
the user’s awareness of the relationship of the many activity
centers and facilities located downtown. Growth would be
accommodated through a more intensive use of existing
buildings and available land rather than concentration on a few
sites.
An architecturally-oriented faction called the Citizen’s
Alliance for Urban Seattle (CAUSE) called for the
decentralization of Seattle with mUltiple centers - throughout
the region to avoid formless regional sprawl.12 This group
represented architects and urban design oriented activists
outside the establishment American Institute of Architects
which generally supported the development community. This
ad hoc group lacked the institutional prestige of Allied Arts. A
housing coalition, the Downtown Neighborhood Alliance,
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wished to retreat in general from the DSDA/planner’s vision of
a greater downtown. The DNA suggested that the allowed FAR
be lowered to 5:1 and bonus FAR be restricted to housing or
energy conservation. Regional transportation projects such as
the 1-90 highway project or the downtown bus tunnel would be
scaled down. The downtown convention center would be
abandoned. Developers would pay a housing developnient fee
and a transit impact fee as in San Francisco. A unique
suggestion called for relocation assistance for displaced small
businesses, guaranteed five year leases, and use restrictions
which required neighborhood oriented uses.13 As far as this
research can determine, this was the first time that a general
anti-growth position was taken by any Seattle organization.
Much of the information marshaled in the organization’s
manifesto, The Issue of Downtown Growth - Limits to Growth
was generatedby the city’s requirements for environmental
impact analyses of each major downtown project.
A Mayor’s Advisory Group reviewed each “soft"
alternative (that is, business or citizen activist proposal).14
The advisory group did not formally approve or disapprove
p이icies or regulations but provided advice to the mayor’s
office. No consensus was reached on a partie비ar alternative.
Another two years of city work to June, 1983 resulted in the
Draft_Land_Us_e_and_ TransDortation. Plan _for Downtown Seattle.
Thirty-nine civic interest groups and thirty-eight community
councils participated in the review of the Draft Environmental
139
Impact Statement (EIS). Their response widened the gap
between the city’s proposed plan and activist expectations.
For example, Allied Arts applauded the proposed downtown
regulations for street walls, upper level setbacks and view
corridors. Yet, Allied Arts noted that the city was not
fundamentally addressing the question of the economic
compatibility of office and retail redevelopment with .the
continued existence of small businesses. Height limits were
too generous, and where height limits were in place, permi한ed
floor area would create p이itical pressure to raise height
Iimits.15 The planners responded that property values and
rents were likely to increase regardless of the approach to
growth taken. Any attempt to moderate growth downtown
would send development pressures to outlying commercial
areas and there small businesses would be displaced.16
The Mayor’s Recommended Plan was issued in May, 1984.
The document tallied the hundreds of citizens involved; the 50
staff presentations concerning the Draft Land Use Plan; the
nearly five hundred peop뻐 who attended the public forums in
September, 1983, and the one hundred peop뻐 who .attended a
forum at Seattle Center in December, 1983.17 Yet these
numbers do not prove public citizeninvolvemerπdiscussionsr garding the ba e FAR allowances and incentive
system bonuses and details were negotiated in a series of
workshops between planners, architects and representative of
the Downtown Seattle Association. Market studies provided
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the rationale for negotiations over base and bonus floor area
provision. 18 The Mayor’s Recommended Draft reiterated the old
vision of downtown as the pre-eminent commercial,
governmental and cultural center. No height limit was imposed
on the primary downtown office core. While the base FAR
remained at 10:1 as before, amenities such as the provision for
parking, pedestrian amenities and aesthetic amenities allowed
an increase to 15:1 FAR. An additional 5:1 FAR could be earned
by providing housing. But this was an incentive system rather
than requirements as originally required. The draft did
significantly advance planners’ desire to downzone the retail
core. Staff gained support from the Allied Arts proposal.
Projects in the retail core would have to include a performing
arts center or a m리or department store to approach office
core project magnitude. The retail core was kept at its
original proposed size mid-way between the Allied Arts
proposal and that of the DSA.
Paul Kraabel, chair of the Seattle City Council Urban
Redevelopment Committee, negotiated the plan between
property owners, planners and consultants and homeless
advocates. Staff prepared notebooks which contained details
of all proposals surviving to this stage. The committee voted
on each amendment. For example, the Committee refused to
impose a height limit on the Downtown Office Core-1. City
Planners calculated that floor area regulations would limit
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heights to approximately 700 feet but the Committee refused
to set a definite height limit.1 9
PLAN POLICIES
The 1985 Land Use and TransDortation Plan ratified many
of the decisions of the last decades restricting speculation in
the periphery of downtown - Denny Regrade, Pike Street
Market, Pioneer Square, the International District - while
allowing expansion in the core (see Figure 19). Those p이icies
most concerned with return on investment called for the
regional preeminence of downtown and expanded office,
commercial and retail trade. Those p이icies highlighting the
new concern for “use" values concerned urban form and
housing and neighborhoods. The document attempted to
reconcile these conflicting values by promoting a ψreeminent
regional center" but allowing only “reasonable" development
which could be serviced and which met vague p이icies.
선밀뭔ng
As a result of pressure from low-income advocates, the
city promised to maintain low-income housing. Previously,
planners had been concerned about the gap between low-
income and lUxury housing and focused on providing market-
rate middle-income housing with floor area bonus incentives.
LUTP pledged the city to maintain the existing number of low-
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Fiaure 19. Downtown Classifications and Heights. City of
Seattle, Land Use and Trar뀐Dortation Plan (1985).
income units and keep housing affordable. As Chapter VIII
illustrates, housing displacement was one area where
promises could not be kept; the activist community attacked
the city/development community emphasis on voluntary
provision of housing for the displaced.
Urban Desion
Allied Arts had championed urban design requirements to
address the failures resulting from the 1965 Comprehensive
zoning regulations. Allied Arts sought design-oriented
development regulations and also pushed for limiting density
and for preserving historic structures. However, developer and
city antagonism prevented the formation of an urban design
commission despite p이icies calling for enhancement of the
remaining varied character of different districts in Seattle.
욕다효
The arts community emphasized the economic benefit to
the downtown if provisions were made to allow major arts
institutions a chance to relocate downtown. A sizable floor
area incentive bonus was created for a performing arts center.
Because the Seattle Art Museum could only be built as a legally
vested project, Seattle City Council allowed more liberal
vesting than otherwise warranted in the transition from the
old to new zoning. Several large pr이ects were vested,
creating examples for activist arguments.
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Office and Commercial Concentr_ation
With the exception of the Sierra Club there was general
consensus on the need to have a high-density commercial core.
Much of the "mainstream" controversy centered on the First
and Second Avenue corridors. The development community
wished for higher densities than ultimately allowed, but lower
densities worked better in revitalizing existing structures.
The lack of height limits in the Downtown Office Core-1 was
not an issue. Traffic capability was conceived only in terms of
immediate infrastructure; that the bus tunnel would
efficiently get traffic to the margin of downtown but no
farther was deemed sufficient.
E략린l
Planners wanted strong protection for the retail area,
especi허Iy key sites surrounding the eXisting department
stores. Staff wanted lower floor area allowances than
eventu리ψ allowed; the DSDA wanted retail zoning in a'
smaller area than originally mapped.
Perioheral Residential Areas
The plan provided significant protection for peripheral
areas such as the International District and Denny Regrade.
Previously considered light manufacturing districts, or areas
ripe for redevelopment, these districts were now .protected by
strict zoning regulations in exchange for significantly
restricting commercial uses elsewhere in the core. This left .
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Pioneer Square without a pUblic commitment to maintain low-
income housing.
The mayor’s proposed housing linkage program was
qUickly abandoned after an initial proposal in 1981 due to
developer opposition. When the housing preservation ordinance
was declared invalid by the court in 1985, the incentive
provisions became the only zoning tool available.
Incentives
More than any other zoning device, the adoption of an
incentive system requires a balancing of private and public
interests. The choice of bonusable public benefits, the
establishment of minimum “as of-right" floor area, the ratio
of incentive floor area to public benefit feature, and the
maximum incentive floor area ceiling for different amenities
reflect the balance of interests in a community. The
"equivalent land value method" was used by the city to
establish the amount of incentive floor area permi한ed for
each public benefit feature.2o The cost of each feature to be
provided was equated to the cost of land per square foot in
each land use district. the plan trade-offs assumed that
bonusable feature must always be a more lucrative route for
the developer to be an incentive.
The Plan provided for a base FAR of 10 with allowances
for a FAR as great as 20:1 with the housing bonus or 15:1 with
amenity bonuses. Amenity bonuses included items which were
likely to be provided such as urban plazas, roof top gardens and
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public atriums. There was no height limit in the Downtown
Office Core-1. The Downtown Office Core-2 was more
restrictive with a base FAR of 8:1 , and FAR of 14:1 with
housing and 11:1 with only public amenities. Height limits
ranged from 240 to 400 feet.
The Downtown Retail Core also allowed tall bUildings of
240 to 400 feet, considerably larger than the eXisting two to
seven story buildings in the retail core. A maximum of 14:1
FAR could be built if a project included a m혀or department
store or performing arts theater. Bonuses were IItiered" so
that amenity features could be provided first to gain
additional floor area above the base floor area permitted.
Housing could then begin to substitute for any amenity and
became the sole option above an arbitrary limit. For example
in the Downtown Office Core-1 the following tiered density
schedule applied:
FAR 10:1 - 13:1 Amenity Bonus Features only
FAR 13:1 -15:1 Amenity c;>r Housing Bonus Features
rAR 15:1 -20:1 Housing Bonus Feature only
The following chart indicates the varying levels of
permi한ed and bonusable floor recommended at various phases
of the plan. (A하ivist proposals were incorporated into the CAP
proposal.)
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TABLE VII
LUTP DENSITY LIMITS
Prime Office Area
Plan Base Amenity Housing Housing TOR
Bonus BonuslTOR
1965 10 17.3 17.3 17.3
Staff 1983 10(12)b 16(18)b 18(20)b
Mayor 1984 10 15 15a 20
LUTP 1985 10 15 20
CAP 1989 5 7 10 14
Secondary Office Area
Plan Base Amenity Housing Housing TOR
Bonus BonuslTOR
1965 10 17.3 17.3 17.3
Staff 1983 8(10)b 12(14)b 14(16)b
Mayor 1984 8 11 14
LUTP 1985 8 11 14 10
CAP 1989 4 6 8 10
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TABLE VII
LUTP DENSITY LIMITS
(continued)
Downtown Retail Core
Plan
1965
Staff 1983
Mayor 1984
Base
10
5(8)
5(6.5)b
Amenity Housing Department
Bonus Bonus/TDR Store
17.3 17.3 17.3
7(9) 8(10) 14(17)C
7(8.5) 9(10.5)b 11(14)C
b
CAP 1989 2.5 3.5
a Housing or amenities
b FAR exemption for retail
c The theater bonus was reduced from 12 to 6 by CAP
LUTP 1985 5 7 9
4
1 1
6
Council adoption of the Land Use and TransDortation Plan was
anticlimactic. Several developers spoke in favor of the plan,
indicating that the city had successfully negotiated with the
development community. The staff’s greatest goal was simply to
get the plan adopted, while the citizenry h~d been lost in the
technical discussions of office construction costs associated with
the downtown building and density studies. The public had expended
much energy in disputing the Draft EIS. Paul Kraabel’s council
workshops made decisions without much input from city planners.
Allied Arts acquiesced in the compromises and the Sierra Club's
opposition seemed insignificant. Vesting new pr이ects was a
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political decision. Although technical· analyses were done by both
city planners and attorneys, liberal vesting regulations were
necessary if the Convention Center and Westlake Mall/Seattle Art
Museum were to be built. The vesting of several projects meant that
。ffice towers continued to rise at the same time as work progressed
on the Third Avenue bus tunnel and the Convention Center. Over four
million square feet of office space was under construction in 1988.
CITIZENS’ ALTERNATIVE PLAN
The decision to vest these office projects, including Seattle
Art Museum!Westlake, ultimately brought the issue of growth and
the form of growth to the entire citizenry. The Citizens' Alternative
Plan coalition represented the coalescence of environmental,
neighborhood and social activists' concerns that the political status
quo favored downtown interests at the expense of their own
concerns: namely, growth, housing, neighborhood commercial district
viability, traffic and air pollution, urban design and taxes. In 1987,
these interests came together in Vision Seattle, a grassroots
political organization. In July, 1987 two dozen neighborhood
activists met to discuss the lack of credible candidates opposing the
incumbent City Council candidates up for election. The
neighborhoods, especially the middle-class neighborhoods to the
north of downtown, were app러뻐d that Royer and the incumbent
Council had forged an alliance with downtown which did not include
middle-class neighborhoods:
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Mayor Charles Royer, who had campaigned a decade
earlier as the champion of the neighborhoods, aligned
himself most closely with the downtown business
community and the Democratic Party. He allowed
developers to build big skyscrapers in the center- of town
and bulky apartment buildings in the neighborhoods. At
the same time, however, he tapped them for help in
financing social programs and new housing for the poor.21
Pat Strosahl, Bill Keasler and other activists formed Vision
Seattle. The new president, Pat Strosahl, had drifted away from
early political activism (opposing the Vietnam war) into run '1ing the
family jewelry business. He was brought back to p이itical action by
plans for a massive apartment complex down the street from his
bungalow. Co-founder Bill Keasler had received a similar jolt. A
computer engineer and longtime activist with the Lake Union
houseboat community, he had become involved in neighborhood
p이itics when he had learned that his landlord planned to raise
moorage fees beyond his ability to pay. Keasler challenged his
landlord all the way to the state Supreme Court and back to City
Hall, and won. Within a year, Vision Seattle had led a successf내
fight to defeat Royer’s $35,000,000 plan to transform the Seattle
central waterfront into what it feared would be a Seattle version of
San Francisco's Fisherman’s Wharf. It had also beaten a King County
open space bond issue that it felt included too much money for the
Seattle Aquarium and not enough for purchase of land for open space.
The Vision Seattle coalition included advocates for the poor
such as the Catholic archdiocese’s Tony Lee, housing activist John
Fox and urban design advocates such as architect Peter Steinbrueck
and attorney Margaret Pageler of Allied Arts as well as Ted Inkley of
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the Sierra Club. The Asian and minority communities, whose long-
time positions of the Seattle City Council were challenged by Vision
Seattle candidates, were not part of the coalition. Vision Seattle’s
CAP initiative became a vote of no-confidence on the urban regime
which had pursued the same pro-growth p이icies since 1965.
The activists were given a useful example of what LUTP would
allow with the construction of the Washington Mutual Tower. The
tower, at 1201 Washington, was built under the new rules (see
Figure 2이. While the Washington Mutual tower was acclaimed for
its architecture, approval of this project indicated that any tall
tower could be easily built under the new system. The tower
reached 700 ft. at a FAR of 19.7:1 or 1 million square feet of
building. The new tower grew from 30 to 55 stories with the use of
bonuses. It gained 13 stories for a $2'.5 million dollar donation for
housing, two stories for excluding mechanical space, one and 1/2
stories for an atrium, two and 1/2 stories for an escalator to
connect Second and Third avenues, one story for day care for 22
children, two stories for an additional 15,000 square feet of retail
space, two stories for a public courtyard near the Second Avenue
entrance, 1/2 story for a flowered terrace above the plaza, and two
stories for a sculptured top. The Washington Mutual tower was
estimated to generate over 1,000 vehicle trips into and out of
downtown Seattle during rush hour alone and an additional 5,490
transit trips - the equivalent of 43 loaded buses. The single tower
would use enough electricity to light 1,300 medium sized homes
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Fiaure 20. Washington Mutual Tower Floor Area Bonuses.
From Plannina Magazine, "Child Care Grows Up,'1 May,
1989.
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increasing demand for non-hydro electricity. The project would
demolish the Savoy Hotel which had 225 vacant units of low income
housing. In sun-starved Seattle the tower would cast a 260,000 sq.
ft. shadow during a winter day.22
In February, 1988 Ted Inkley, on behalf of the Sierra Club,
proposed that Council consider reducing the rate of growth
downtown. Ted Inkley had previously written on behalf of the Sierra
Club to advocate rationing development but that concept had never
been taken seriously. He had also unsuccessfully opposed the
intrusion of an office tower into the Westlake/retail district area
as part of the group People for an Open Westlake. Council refused to
reconsider the matter. The Citizens' Alternative Plan proposal was
then put on the ballot and passed on May 16, 1989. Over 14,000
voters signed the initiative petition.
The Citizen’s Alternative Plan proposed the following:
- temporarily limits on the development of new downtown
office space to an average of about one million square feet a year
(exempting all new small buildings);
- a 450 (35-40 story) height limit on skyscrapers in the Office
Core zone, and no new skyscrapers in the ·12-block Retail Core zone
around Westlake Park and m리or department stores;
- a reduction in the allowable density (square footage) of new
office development to reduce impacts;
increased incentives to preserve low-income housing
through the transfer of development rights; and
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required study by city planners of measures for the long-
term management of Downtown development, taking into account
factors such as progress toward implementation of a regional light-
rail system; compliance with low-income housing goals; the effect
。f Downtown development on the affordability of housing in the
City’s neighborhoods; the cost of infrastructure and utility
improvements; downtown traffic problems; and the attainment of
clean air standards (see Figure 21).
The chief opponent of the CAP initiative was th,e Downtown
Seattle Association in coordination with the construction unions.
DSA’s “Citizens For a Better Downtown" argued that the initiative
would destroy the compromises folded into the 1985 Land Use and
Transportation Plan. LUTP was described by this group as “a
commitment to manage the quality of growth for the benefit of 려|
through sensitive planning and regulation and prudent public and
private investment." This group raised over $180,000 while the
pro-CAP group raised only $14,000. Again in contrast tq the CAP
forces which raised mon'ey in small amounts from individuals, the
anti-CAP forces raised its money from organizations such as
developers, architects, contractors, brokers, banks and title
companies (see Tables VIII and I지.23
Despite Citizens for a Better Downtown’s direct mailing
campaign to the 40,000 voters who voted in each of the previous
four campaigns, the measure passed 62 percent to ·38 percent on May
16, 1989.24 Voters ignored the Seattle City Council imposition of
interim controls prior to the election and a promise to review.the
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Eiaure 21. CAP Height Limits. From Ar흐르되르 Magazine,
'CAP: The Citizen's Plan,II April/May 1991.
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TABLEIX
SOURCE OF ANTI-CAP FUNDING BY INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTORS19
The Boeing Co $10,000
U.S. West $10,000
Seafirst Bank $ 6,000
Security Pacific Bank $ 4,315
Washington Mutual Bank $ 3,000
First Interstate Bank $ 2,500
Sellen Construction $ 4,000
Wright Schuch밟 Inc. (construction) $ 3,000
Wright Runstad and Co. (develop태 $ 4,500
Prescott Development Co $ 4,500
Unico Properties (developer) $ 4,500
IntraWest Corp. (developer) $ 3,500
Norman Co (real estate consulting) $ 2,600
Vance Corp. (property management) $ 4,227
Seattle Chamber of Commerce $ 5,000
Downtown Seattle Association $ 2,737
Iron Workers District Council - $ 2,737
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reg비ations. A subsequent survey found that voters had supported
CAP because of: a perceived need to plan development, to control
growth impacts, and to reduce building height and environmental and
traffic congestion impacts. The urban regime was revealed to be
out of touch with the electorate.25
Initial intentions to revise the CAP limit by 1991 have been
stopped by a shift in the market from office to housing. While only
one of the five vested office projects may be built, over 3000 new
units of market-rate housing have been proposed. Office growth has
slowed just as the housing market has heated up. Affordable housing
has become even scarcer (see Chapter VIII).
CONCLUSION
In 1973, Seattle let slip a golden opportunity to write a
downtown plan. Seattle was in a position to use the Seattle 2000
Commission Goals' for Seattle as a framework for downtown
expansion and attention to quality of life issues. Such a plan would
have been based upon the Goal 2000 Commission consensus on the
strong need for a regional center. However, the urban regime of the
time may not have accepted restrictions based upon quality of life
concerns such as design review or height limits, as in Portland.
Instead, unlike Portland, Seattle planned from the periphery
inwards, not reaching downtown until the beginning of the 1980s.
By that time, the city and region had grown greatly. New conflicts,
issues and activists had come to the table. The older groups -
CHECC, the Municipal League, and the League of Women Voters - were
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unwilling or unable to create a new spirit of Seattle. These interest
groups were replaced by urban design, environmental. and housing
activists who had learned to distrust city hall. Ultimately, a plan
based on pro-growth sentiment (and fearful of cyclical downturns in
Boeing employment) was equated by a majority of voters to the
growing congestion and perceived deterioration in the quality of life.
Figure 22 provides an overview of answers to the research
questions posed by this dissertation. At the beginning, the urban
regime was able to set the parameters of p이icy on the basis of the
standard economic development agenda. Downtown had to grow to
remain the region’s unchallenged center. The Land Use and
Transportation Plan was organized as a top-down plan in which City
Hall issued guidelines which assumed that proper types of growth
could grow the downtown out of its problems. For example, housing
could be created as a condition of a development review approval.
The guidelines also assumed a positive connection between
downtown growth, regional dominance and city well-bei r:tg, as in
Portland. The guidelines constrained the limits of discussion. But
Allied Arts and the Sierra Club offered alternatives which
challenged the downtown establishment’s preference for prestigious
tall office towers and sizable rentable floor area. The general
cohesiveness of the narrow land use alliance prior to the CAP
election can be indicated by the relative invariability of the
guideline throughout the process whose stages included comp뻐X
requirements for citizen involvement such as alt용rnative "soft" and
"hard" proposals; the environmental impact statement process t
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including comments and responses; Planning Commission review of
the Mayor's draft; and the ultimate City Council public hearing.
Initial proposals to restrict heights, to introduce housing linkage
requirements, and to modify the existing floor area bonus
requirements were modified to meet the DSA’s objections. Urban
design considerations were introduced as zoning standards to be
negotiated between city staff and business representatives rather
than design guidelines to be interpreted by the community design
review boar~t In general, city planners and the downtown business
association came to an agreement which avoided restrictions in the
core but ratified citizen activist victories in the periphery -
historic preservation in Pike Place Market, and Pioneer Square; and
pro-housing p이icies in Denny Regrade, Belltown and the
International District. By following proposals for floor area
limitations and amenity floor area bonuses, the relative strength of
the various interests can be quantified. Allied Arts and Sierra Club
proposals were not adopted although these "radical" proposals no
doubt gave planners leverage. The EIS process documents how
planners defended their plan against vociferous citizen activist
criticism. Clearly, activist concerns were not in~orporated into the
LUTP prior to pro-forma City Council approval in 1985. The Council
was not called upon to discuss the question of limited growth or the
congestion and costs involved in getting everyone and everything
downtown.
The Citizen Alternative Plan became a referendum on the
progrowth policies of the urban regime. The CAP referendum
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fundamentally rejected any characterization of LUTP p이icies as
"developmental" and therefore in the pUblic interest (Peterson’s
theory). The urban regime tried to override the demands of the
environmentalists and neighborhood and housing activists by
characterizing CAP as anti-urban and pro-suburban sprawl. Although
downtown interests poured money into the campaign, the EIS reports
on LUTP and the Washington Mutual tower provided material for
CAP's arguments. Each side, was comp리띤d to describe its vision of
the pu비ic interest. The election became a referendum on the
deteriorating quality of life in a period of intense growth throughout
Puget Sound.
A new p이itics has emerged which awaits the test of a new
boom. Seattle is again experiencing a mild "bust. 11 Boeing
employment grew from approximately 60,000 workers in 1985 to
over 100,000 in 1989. Boeing employment will decline to a
projected 80,000 workers in 1994.26 Would the public again adopt
the CAP referendum? I suspect that like the defeated Forward
Thrust transit bond issue, the public supports quality of life stances
during good times, and specifically high Boeing employment. But the
very need for public support indicates that the urban regime no
longer can negotiate a plan without weighing potential electoral
challenge from Vision Seattle.
A comparison between the two cities indicates that while the
Portland urban regime has expanded to the eastside, the Seattle
regime has seen neighborhood concerns interfere with previously
isolated core issues. The economic development strategy in
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Portland remains strongly pro-growth with new opportunities based
upon a regional light rail system centered on the core. But Seattle1s
downtown program is threatened by a "new popular perception that
downtown growth contributes to a deteriorating quality of life. In
Portland, activists are unable to mount successful initiatives or
openly back candidates, whereas in Seattle the urban regime has lost
pro-growth projects (Seattle Aquarium) and pro-growth land use
p이icies (LUTP). Politicians like Margaret Pageler question the
orthodoxy.
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ENDNOTES
1A FAR of ten to one means that the floor area of a building may be ten times that of
the site. That is, ten stories at 100% lot coverage, 20 stories at 50% lot coverage, 40
stories at 25% lot coverage and so on. BUildings can assume any configurati!'n as long as this
ratio is preserved.
2Donald Monson, ComDrehenslve. Plan for .Central Business District - SeattleI 1963.
3Seattle 2000 Commission, Goals for Seattle; pp. 30-33.
4Seattle City Council adopted Resolution 24283 on September 4, 1973. Resolution
24282 declared the Intention of the city to adopt a comprehensive p이icy plan each year by the
first Monday In J비y， and a program of implementation of the Seattle 2000 Commission goals
and objectives. M매。r Uhlman concurred.
5The Land Use and Transportation Plan was adopted by Council Resolution 278281 on
June 10, 1985.
6City of Seattle, Office of Polley 없ld Evaluation, Backaround ReDort of the Downtown
Land Use and TransDortatlon.Prolect, p.4.
7City of Seattle, Office of P이Icy and Evaluation, LUTP Backaround Document, pp. 4-7.
8Downtown Seattle Development Association, '‘Firm Alternatives," pp. 1-7.
9SIerra Club Urban Committee, "Seattle Downtown Plan Firm Alternatives," p. 1.
10Allied Arts of Seattle, “Firm Alternatives,· pp. 8, 9, 12, 13, 20·26
11 The Allied Arts Plan reduced floor area from 18:1 in the office core to 12:1 along
SW Third and 9:1 In the First Avenue corridor. The retail core far was reduced to 5:1. The
maximum height limit In the most Intense office core would be 5때 feet. Str\:?ng frontage
heights wo내d be lowered to 250 f~et along Third and 125 feet along Second. Maximum height
In the retail core was 165 feet but only 125 around Westlake Park.
12Citlzens Alliance for Urban Seattle, "CAUSE Hard Alternatives,’ summary, pp. 1·2.
13Downtown Neighborhood Alliance, The Issue of Downtown Growth - Limits to Growth,
p.9.
14The process called for ·soft" and ‘ firm· proposals from each participating
organization.
15Clty of Seattle, Land Use and Transportation Project, Draft Environmental ImDact
Statement for .the Land.Useand TransDortatlon Plan for Downtown Seattle, p.9.
16City of Seattle, 벼nd Use and Transportation Project, Draft Environmental ImDact
Statement for the Land Use and TransDortatlon Plan for Downtown Seattle, p. 145.
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17City of Seattle, Land Use and Transportation Proje야， Mavor’s Recommended Land
Use and Transoortation Plan for Downtown Seattle, p.3.
18This narrative and others descriptions regarding negotiations between the
development community, interest groups and the planning staff are based upOn the
correspondence generated during public re매ew of LUTP and interviews with Bill Duchek and
。ther Seattle Long-range planners in July, 1990.
19Jeannette Williams, Seattle City Council, CAP notebooks are the only documents in
the Seattle archives.
20BiII Duchek, LUTP, Memorandum “Assignment of Floor Area Bonus Values for
Downtown Public Benefit Features," December 3, 1985.
21Walter Hatch, Seattle Times, untitled, undated, unpu비ished background for a
possible news article.
22Seattle Times, “City Limits," May 1, 1989. See also articles by Rebecca Boren,
"Is Vision Seattle Too Nearsighted?" Seattle Weeklv, January, 1988, and by Eric Sclgliano,
"Vision Seattle Looks Ahead: Will There Be Life After CAP for the Citizen Coalition?" 효효융피효
쁘흐략!.¥.， August 16, 1989 and Chris von Veh, "The Vision Thing: The Citizen’s Alternative Plan
and Planning Anxiety,‘ A파효화효， February/March, 1989.
23Seattle Times, “Anti-CAP Group Attracts $180,000 in Donations," May 7, 1989.
24Seattle Times “'A Feather in Their Cap. Group of Neighborhood Activists Has Last
Laugh," May 17, 1989. The final vote tally was 42,643 to 26,303.
25Elway Research, Inc., Downtown Develooment Survev, November, 1989, pp. A14-
A15.
26Seattle Post Intelllaencer. "Boeing to cut 19,000 jobs here in the next 18 months,‘
February 19, 1993
CHAPTERV
PORTLANDMORRISON STR또TPROJECT
CADILLAC-FAIRVIEW
On March 20, 1979, the Portland Development Commission
(PDC) approved Resolution No. 2680 which authorized the
Commission to review a proposal from Cadillac-Fairview
Corporation of Toronto, Canada to redevelop four downtown blocks
between SW Morrison and SW Taylor and between SW Fi代hand SW
Third Avenues.1 These blocks were envisioned as an anchor to the
Downtown retail core which had been losing market share to the
suburbs. Their location between SW Fifth and SW Third would
provide a link between downtown and the waterfront (see Figure 23).
The 1972 Downtown Plan had called for maintenance of a compact
retail core which was defined as the blocks fronting on SW Morrison,
Alder and Washington Streets from SW Third to Tenth. (East of the
retail core, the city hoped to establish a "waterfront
retail/exhibition center.") The retail core was expected to be
“compact, colorful, intense and exciting" with such a strong
pedestrian environment that an entirely auto-free shopping precinct
was deemed ideal.2 The original plan did not envision an anchor to
the retail district; the future site of Pioneer Place was simply
indicated as a potential redevelopment site. The retail district was
to be tied together by a massive system of “skyways" running
The
Project
Site
Thesite for the Mor껴잊nSlreet
Project (Map 3) is centrally loat빼
뻐뻐n the downtown coreat the
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WDed siteu삐삐esBlocks60 at삐
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-Map 3 - Site Area
Fiaure 23. Morrison Street Project Site. From City of
Portland, Portland Development Commission Reauest for
Qualifications , Morrison Street Project (1982).
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midblock down the Morrison/Alder corridor.
As a m리or implementation step, City Council adopted the
Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Plan in 1974.3 The urban
renewal plan recognized that the area between the retail core and
the waterfront along SW Yamhill was underused, a mix of parking
lots and vacant bUildings. The area was expected to accommodate
offices, housing, convenience and specialty retailing.. This four
block site between SW Morrison and SW Taylor and between Pioneer
Courthouse Square and the Yamhill Historic District had never
enjoyed local prominence, being “jumped over" when the 19th
Century Courthouse and big department stores had moved to SW Fi代h
Avenue. Although Pioneer Courthouse and the big downtown
department stores had been built west of SW Fifth, little investment
was evident east of SW Fifth. Aside from two medium scale office
buildings along SW Fifth the area was “underdeveloped" with one-
story buildings mostly housing downtown trade restaurants. The
area was well suited to be included within the Downtown Waterfront
Urban Rer띤wal District. But by the end of the decade, the city
realized that something bigger was needed. The city, especi려Iy Neil
Goldschmidt, who had become Mayor in 1974, saw Jhe need for a
project which wo비d begin generating tax increment revenue to fund
the plan.
Although the resolution spoke of “serious study and
consideration" and “broad public review from interested groups,"
there had been none to that point. PDC had had preliminary
discussions with Cadillac Fairview and the Canadian firm had
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developed some diagrammatic concepts but PDC was already firmly
committed to the proposal. Few peop띤 knew about the project until
immediately before the resolution was brought before the
Commission.4 Cadillac-Fairview did not yet have a local architect
working on the pr이ect. However, they had an excellent reputation
and was one of the few firms experienced in multi-block urban
redevelopment projects. Within 60 days of the receipt of a proposal,
the Executive Director of PDC was to transmit copies of the proposal
to the Planning Commission and City Council, schedule a public
hearing and make a formal recommendation to City Council regarding
“disposition of this proposal.'’ The Planning Commission’s role
would be limited. It would be asked to review the project at the end
of the process with the formal amendment of the urban renewal plan.
The Development Commission scheduled a public reception
immediately after formal business to celebrate. It seemed as
though downtown would get its long sought after retail anchor, the
downtown shopping mails.
The Cadillac-Fairview project proposal promised a mixed use
comp뻐x in the heart of downtown. Four downtown blocks would be
filled with a full-line department store and an I. Magnin store,
(approximately 260,000-410,000 square feet) , 100 specialty retail
shops (190,000 square feet) , a 250-350 room Radisson Hotel,
300,000-500 Sql퍼re feet of office space, and 1,000-1 ,300 parking
spaces, The city estimated a potential for 1,300 -new jobs, $1.5
million in annual property tax receipts and $150,000 in hotel tax
receipts. Urban renewal activities would require a $10-$12 million
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subsidy. The project would eliminate apparently insignificant uses
(see Figure 24). One block contained a restaurant and deli, beauty
school and a three-quarter block surface parking lot. Another block
contained two restaurants, retail nautical supplies store, market,
low-income housing (Gilbert Buildingrraylor Hotel), and half-block
surface parking. A third block contained the Corbett BUilding with a
variety store and an optical shop on the ground Floor; the Goodnough
Building with a meat market, bar, card shop and candy store on the
ground floor; the Russell building with a restaurant, optical shop and
women’s wear and the Fred Meyer Building. The fourth block
contained a public market, a bookstore, bar, the U.S. Army recruiting
office, a religious shop, the Chamber of Commerce and a quarter
block surface parking lot. These blocks included vestiges of the old
Portland, such as the Bauer and Boston public market. Altogether,
the Cadillac Fairview project would replace 43 retail
establishments, 400 housing units (the Taylor Hotel), 59 commercial
offices, and one and one-half blocks of surface parking. Of 16
buildings' in these four blocks, none were judged by POC to be in 'good
condition. Two were in fair condition, three were in poor condition,
and eleven were in bad condition.6
These local businesses and local owners had not been party to
the preliminary negotiations. The eventual spokesman for the
merchants group first read the news in the paper. The local
merchants then were invited to a briefing with POC and were
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Fiaure 24. Morrison Street Pr이ect Site Land Use. From
Patterson and Stewart, Report on the Existing Conditions
Within Block 50. 51. 60 and 61 (1979).
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informed by PDC in a way that seemingly left no room for them.
These merchants, who included several Vietnam War era activists,
had succeeded in developing small independent businesses and did
not like what they perceived to be a condescending attitude on the
part of the city. Newspaper stories echoed the theme of the City's
1960s urban renewal pr이ects - obsolete buildings, displaced
owners and businesses.7 The Oregonian ran a pictoral obituary eerily
similar to the photos of the small immigrant merchants displaced by
the South Auditorium urban renewal proje하. Some of these
businesses had already been the object of urban renewal. The very
popular Dave’s Deli had moved once before when the Portland
Development Commission had obtained a city block for the Morrison
Park East parking garage. Ironically, many of the city officials who
proposed to displace the deli were frequent customers.
Mayor Goldschmidt was committed to the proje하 because it
would generate tax increment financing for a new convention center
and anchor downtown retail. The only issue for him was financial
feasibility. Fair value for lands taken for the project, adequate
parking and project design were expected to be the significant
issues. The Oregonian recorded the “local color vs. flashy new
stores" issue only as nostalgia for the old days.
Oooosition
Within two months the issue became one of people vs.
progress, at least as reported by the Qr웰오a 괴으μ띠화. Planning
Director Ernie Bonner of the Planning Bureau argued for progress but
urged preservation of the more significant buildings. (The Planning
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Bureau was subordinate to the Office of Planning and Development.
The Portland Development Commission also reported to OPD.) People
advocates included Michael Stoops, a low-income housing advocate,
who decried the destruction of the Taylor Hotel low-income housing
and Martin Gix of the Downtown Community Association who stated
that the pr이ect was too big and would erase all traces of Portland.8
The proposed project connected seven blocks with skybridges and
created visual barriers 760 feet in length both north-south and
east-west (see Figure 25). Most significantly, the Society of
Industrial Realtors called the City’s closed dealings with Cadillac-
Fairview a moral issue and called for open identification,
acquisition, and disposal of urban renewal land. The Chamber of
Commerce opposed public subsidies to the pr이ect.9 Thus,
design/historic preservation and low income housing displacement
issues complemented a Portland conservatism which resented POe's
closed negotiations with a Canadian developer.
PDC conducted two public hearings on April 18, and June 27,
1979. A total of 450 attended the hearings and expressed concerns
about project design, historic preservation, public costs for
relocation of utilities, parking and the closed process itself.1o Most
downtown businessmen and their attorneys/consultants were
heartily in favor. Bill Naito, not closely associated with the retail
core but a major propeπy owner north of Burnside, tried t。
compromise, offering support for the project while arguing for
saving some of the buildings. An insignificant player, Gregory
Clouse, a resident of the Taylor Hotel, talked about the threat of
175
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Fiaure 25. Cadillac Fairview Skybridges. From Patterson
and Stewart, Report on the Existina Conditions Within
Block 5Q. 51. 60. and 61 (1979).
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multi-national investment capital. The most compelling criticism
came from Walter W. McMonies, Jr. an attorney representing both the
Downtown Community Association and Metzger-Parker Company,
which managed the Russell building, located within the project area.
These parties were not opposed to the introduction of additional
retail space into the project area but raised several questions: (1)
whether the city should condemn property which was not blighted
and owned by local owners in order to sell to absentee landlords; (2)
what effect this threatened condemnation would have on the ability
to lease space; (3) whether commercial displacement would be
caused by the increased rents necessary to finance the project; (4)
whether the project would result in the displacement of other
businesses and housing, especially the likely disappearance of SRO
housing; (5) whether increased traffic would impact air quality; (6)
whether the project was too massive in scale with its seven
skybridges and finally, whether the threatened Goodnough and
Gilbert Buildings should be preserved.
PDC responded to these criticisms. The agency explained that
the staff had made a presentation at an Urban Land Institute
conference in June, 1978, to a large audience of private developers.
Cadillac Fairview had subsequently approached the city and was
asked “under the direction of Mayor Neil Goldschmidt, as
Commissioner-in-charge" to present a detailed proposal. This was
done in order to avoid creating uncertainty and resultant blight
following a pu비ic process of site identification and request for
proposals.11
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As a result of the controversy, the project concept was
somewhat modified. One of the most prominent local architecture
firms, Zimmer, Gunsel, Frasca, was retained to alter the project
concept. The facade of the Goodnough Building was retained and the
Gilbert buildingrraylor Hotel was to be moved across SW Third to be
saved for housing. This effort was proposed to mollify the
preservationists. The architect also endeavored to reduce the
monolithic quality of the project by designing contrasting
components and scaling down the width of the skybridges.12 In July
1979, the project won POC approval with qualifications. The staff
report noted that the city was “unlikely to achieve the adopted goal
of enhancing the retail core and expanding it easterly" without this
proposal. The staff suggested additional requirements such as a
deli; an open air market; space for displaced merchants at less than
market rates, relocation assistance; and replacement housing. POC
approved the general concept minus the skybridges linking the four
blocks to other downtown properties. The project still contained
160 foot wide retail skybridges which made the four blocks into' one
big superblock.13 The Planning Commission also approved the
project but balked at the make or break skybridge issue. Cadillac-
Fairview had continued to insist on skybridges which effectively
destroyed the downtown distinctive pattern of small 200 foot by
200 foot blocks. Architect Robert Frasca of Zimmer, Gunsel, Frasca,
offered to stake his professior년I reputation on his ability to make
the retail bridge, skybridge system into "urban streets." The
Planning Commission called for a study of the skybridge issue.' The
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Commission did not have formal authority over the project. It did
not officially participate in granting permits to allow skybridge
encroachments over the street except to render advice.
Many Portlanders were not happy with the pr이ect. An August
7, 1979 Orecon Journal straw poll found that 196 of 250 readers
found the project “bad for Portland," that 222 faulted the
condemnation process, that 201 disliked the retail bridges, and that
227 were opposed to a subsidy.14 A prominent consultant, Don
Barney, criticized the proposal for its internal orientation and
skybridges.
In spring 1978, President Carter appointed Mayor Goldschmidt
Secretary of Transportation. There was concern that without
Goldschmidt, the project would falter. A new mayor, Connie
McCready, had been appointed by City Council to 헤II out
Goldschmidt’s unexpired term. McCready was committed to the
project, but expressed some concerns about condemnation precedent
and the skybridges.1S After a Council informal discussion of the PDC
recommendation for approval,16 Mayor McCready directed the City’S
Office of Planning and Development to conduct a detailed study of
the project which considered economics, plannir떠/design ，
transportation/parking, historic preservation and renewal
financing. 17 Don Barney, a prominent local consultant, coordinated
the efforts of a team of expe야:s. In December, 1979, the OPD report
was issued, endorsing the project with some qualifications.18 OPD
supported the thrust of the Downtown Plan which called for pUblic
action to create a retail core. Without a city-funded project, using
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eminent domain and tax increment financing, this opportunity for a
retail anchor would disappear. Only the Corbett and Gilbert
buildings would remain and the small businesses would be replaced
in any event by office buildings blocking the extension of the retail
core toward the Yamhill Historic District and the river. “A multi-
block development was required to achieve “critical mass" with
direct pedestrian connections and suitable parking necessary to lure
a major department store."
OPD not only supported the rationale for the pr이ect but also
defended PDC’s secretive dealings with Cadillac Fairview: “The City
is dealing with Cadillac-Fairview because the company represents a
level of interest and expertise not previously seen." Only Cadillac-
Fairview had made a formal proposal. A more open process would
have taken two or three years and created an “unacceptable" cloud
。ver the four blocks. However, OPD also advocated redesign of the
project to reduce the mega-structure look from a distance and a
tunnel feeling at street level. The retail sky bridges would have to
be scaled back and retailing should be re-oriented to the streets.
The OPD report was an attempt to get ahead of the ball. The report
created the necessary arguments to approve the project while
isolating issues that could be negotiated with the company.
On December 19, 1979, over 400 citizens attended the public
hearing with the m리ority in opposition. An interesting new
complaint by Clyde Brummel, President of the Oregonian
Homeowners Association, attacked the project as “corporate
welfare."19 Despite criticism by citizens and hard questioning of
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the experts by Council, Cadillac-Fairview insisted that the project
could not be made smaller or skybridges sacrificed.2o Mayor
McCready publicly expressed her concerns - the need for further
modifications regarding the density, design and use of retail bridges
and skybridges. Locally prominent attorney Steve Janik privately
negotiated the size required for the skybridges on behalf of the
developer.21
ln· the public’s mind, the skybridge issue remained symb이ic of
the developer’s and Development Commission’s disregard for the
public interest. The developer insisted upon “밝lcroaching" upon the
public’s right-of-way in order to provide a “retail bridge" between
each of the blocks. The architect for the pr이ect speculates that the
developer would have settled for a 50 foot wide retail bridge,
sufficient to allow a single row of retail shops of 35 foot width and
an additional 15 feet for pedestrian traffic. In any event, the
비timate project settled for fewer, narrower pedestrian bridges
without retai l. On January 31 , 1980, Council approved the project.
Mayor McCready and Commissioners Ivancie, Lindberg, and Schwab
outvoted Commissioner Jordan. Commissioner Jordan cited the
opportunity to seek other development proposals from local firms. 22
Criteria for negotiation were set out (although these criteria
could be modified.) These related to sufficient retail space,
including a major department store; a hotel with at least 250 guest
rooms; a fresh fruit and vegetable store and a delicatessen; limits
on skybridges - one per block face and retail skybridges no wider
than 110 feet; the department store could encroach 10 feet; an
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outward orientation; consideration to saving the Gilbert building and
the facade of the Goodnough building (or spending money on
preservation elsewhere); replacement of lost housing; including
locally based businesses; rent reductions for merchants relocating
to the project and construction scheduling to provide for relocating
tenants; loans for new equipment; parking to be funded by parking
revenue bonds; a $150,000 letter of credit; a sharing of costs for
liability between the developer and the city; use of tax increment
financing money only; and a 90 day negotiation period (Ordinance
149087 and Res. 32603). Like the OPO report, City Council action
positioned the city to approve a “hot" project by isolating public
concerns for eventual negotiation.
During this negotiation period, citizens organized. There were
three distinct sources of opposition. These were not only the
businesses who would be displaced but also the Downtown
Community Association and Save Our Livable Downtown, an ad hoc
protest group of citizens, architects and preservationists.
Bureaucrats at City Hall offered surreptitious help. By June 6, 1980,
over 7,800 signatures were gathered on an initiative petition. The
initiative petition would have required low and mQderate income
housing to be incorporated into an urban renewal pr이ect using tax
increment financing. These pr이ects would also have to go to a
public vote. This initiative was signed not only by prominent
opponents such as Howard Glazer and Terrence 0 ’Donnell but also
Frank Ivancie. Ed Tenny, manager of an affected small business,
became spokesman for 16 businesses suing the City.23 These
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merchants engaged in locally televised debates with POC staff,
lobbied City Commissioners and filed court papers in an effort to
delay the project and build public opposition. These activists were
pro-business but were frustrated by the City’s inability to
understand the small business environment and by its infatuation
with mega-projects. The merchants wanted to be included.24
Demise of__CaD1IJac-Fairview
Negotiations were extended but resulted in Cadillac-Fairview's
withdrawal after six months. The city and the company could not
come to terms on finances. Both pr이ect economics and the financial
strength of the developer were shaky. Cadillac-Fairview wanted the
$20 million upfront regardless of how long it took to sell the bonds;
a delay could result in a loss of $600,000 to $1 million. Cadillac
Fairview also wanted the city to guarantee that it would repurchase
the hotel site if a hotelier could not be found. And, Cadillac
Fairview wanted the width of the retail bridges finalized. This type
of design issue was of less importance to the City Council but was
crucial to Cadillac-Fairview.25 Persons interviewed for this study
split over whether the conditions of approval were serious
roadblocks. City Council may have been willing to renegotiate if
Cadillac Fairview had not withdrawn. Alternatively, the conditions
of approval may have represented a good faith effort by Council to
attach significant conditions while securing an important retail
pr이ect. With the Cadillac-Fairview proposal dead, the merchants
dropped their lawsuit in exchange for PDC’s promise to revise the
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selection process. The “1000 lb. gorilla" project was to be
rethought.
ROUSEENTERSTHESCENE
The Council qUickly reaffirmed its support for a Morrison
Street Downtown Development Project “in order to fulfill the retail
goal of the Downtown Plan."26 Bill Roberts, chair of the
Development Commission, clearly understood the need to build on the
momentum that downtown had recently achieved in rebuilding its
retail core. Mayor Goldschmidt had worked hard to get national
retailers such as Nordstrom and J. C. Penny to build or renovate
downtown. A new, prestige retail anchor was needed to cement
these commitments. Furthermore, these blocks at the 100 percent
downtown corner remained the last prime parcel of real estate
available to meet the goal of extending the retail district east to
the river. PDC’s reputation and ability to deliver were on the line.
A new public acquisition process was adopted by Council on
August 6, 1980. This was a crucial break with the past. Up to this
time, PDC could condemn any block. Commissioner Schwab put
through Council a requirement that property acquisitions be made
through amendment of the Urban Renewal Plan and review by the
Planning Commission and approval by Council. Throughout the
Cadillac-Fairview phase, the issues of major public concern had not
been dealt with outside the context of the Cadillac Fairview
proposal. What PDC needed was to isolate these issues outside the
emotional framework of a specific proposal. Then the selection
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process could conform with predetermined objectives in an open
process. Resolution 32723 provided for a different process: concept
development, an amendment to the urban renewal district, request
for and selection of proposals, plan refinement by PDC and the
developer, and necessary public reviews. At this time, the Planning
Commission also adopted new p이icies to address previous pUblic
controversies. These included urban renewal acquisition of property
through a public process and a skybridge policy to guide the next
project. From November, 1980, to March, 1981 , PDC conducted a
public review process to create the conceptual plan27 PDC met with
the newly formed downtown business association, the Association
for Portland Progress; the Building Owners and Managers
Association; the Chamber of Commerce; the Downtown Community
Association; the Planning Commission; the Design Commission; the
Landmarks Commission; the Yamhill Historic District Advisory
Committee and others. The Development Commission pUblished
“Outlook and Options for the Morrison Street Project" in March and
an “Action Plan for Downtown Retail Development in Portland, OR"
in June, 1981.
With this process, the City made a fundamental shift to an
urban renewal program based upon public polices put in place prior
to the developer selection process. The old urban renewal pr이ect
process would no longer serve as the standard PDC approach. The
City’s new process would answer the most telling criticism of local
businesses that they were frozen out of the development game. A
two-part process to select the developer, the request for
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qualifications (RFQ), followed by the request for proposal (RFP),
responded to the concerns of local business interests that the
process be open to them. The two-part process also guaranteed that
a strong company would first qualify, then address the complex list
of pu비ic issues. Urban design considerations were a minor part of
the City’s decision. A “beauty contest" would be avoided by reducing
aesthetics/project design to 25 percent of the selection choice.
PDC was still pre-eminent as the Downtown Plan
implementation agency. The city refused to allow the Planning
Commission to co-author the development proposal with PDC. The
city had made procedural but not institutional change.
The most significant aspect of the process conducted by Doug
Obletz, PDC staffer, was the simultaneous but separate consultation
with the public regarding the public issues and the development
community regarding feasibility. Two detailed documents were
published establishing the vision for the project - fashion and high
quality retail - and setting out a detailed set of development
gUidelines.
The Development Guidelines document contained minimum and
desired development square footage and function,. and potential floor
area bonuses for retail and for housing; parking and loading access
requirements; consideration of encroachments in the right-of-way,
and street-level pedestrian orientation; consideration of retention
of the Corbett and Goodnough buildings; integration with the transit
mall; and integration with the Yamhill historic district.28 The City
asked for a minimum of 240,000 gross lease square feet of high-
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quality retail , including a minimum of' 100,000 square feet of retail
anchor space and 90,000 square feet of specialty shop, restaurant
and/or entertainment space. The developer was also required to
provide a 400-500 room hotel or 300,000 - 400,000 square feet of
office space. Retail parking would require a minimum of 450-500
shopper parking spaces. At this point it was expected that a $12
million sUbsidy would leverage a $130 million project with two
department stores, 90,000 - 130,000 square feet of sl갯cialty retail
with a four to six year payback.29 The City was also willing to grant
floor area bonuses for retail or housing.
The tone of the introduction of the Development Guidelines
indicated strong public involvement in the process to be undertaken.
The project guidelines emphasized prior review of the project
objectives by the Portland City Planning Commission, Portland
Design Review Committee, Portland Historic Landmarks Commission,
Portland Development Commission and Portland City Council.
Although the Development Commission maintains a
flexible poαst삐u바r면e toward the design and d‘eve터10야p까)m띤1
the project, the following requirements and guidelines
are intended to assure that the design of the Morrison
Street Project meets the project objectives, conforms to
City goals and p이ices ， addresses key public ·concerns and
meets the test of good urban design. These guidelines
are meant to encourage the deve에10이pment team to produce
an imaginative design conc
with pu비b비3끼페lic objectives for downtown Po아r메t헤la히n삐1띠d and the
Morrison Street Pro이jec하t.
The Planning Commission then held its public hearing and
recommended approval. Council adopted the guidelines with little
dissent on July 17, 1981.30 This anticlimax represents real success
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in touching base with all influential members of the downtown
establishment.
The publication of the Development Guidelines for the Morrison
Street Project represented the zenith of public representation.
However, the small retailers who had opposed the Cad버베iI떼lI ac앙-Fa러irv비i먼ew
pro이jec하t became irπre히leva히nt.
The OPD report made it clear that they would be swept away by
inevitable private development. Urban Renewal would give them
relocation recompense and they were promised right-of-first
refusal to lease space in the new project.
PDC authorized acquisition of Blocks 50, 60 and 61 on August
11 , 1981 (PDC Resolution 3024). The Commission established the
IIfair reuse value of the land for uses developed in accord with the
urban renewal plan to be $6,500,000 adjusted for inflation" (PDC
resolution no. 3129, June 11 , 1982). The Downtown Waterfront
Urban Renewal Plan was suitably amended on September 2, 1981
(Ordinance No. 152218).
PDC proposed that a citizens committee be appointed to pick
the next developer. Although the Planning Commission argued that it
should be involved in the selection process, perhaps jointly meeting
with poe, the Development Commission deftly sidestepped this
issue by appointing the chair of the Planning Commission, Joan H.
Smith to the committee. As Joan Smith herself puts it, she is
female, had experience with the successful Fountain Plaza project
developer selection process, and is a team player. Each member of
the selection committee represented different interests or talents -
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Joan Smith, the chair of the Planning Commission; Patrick L.
LaCrosse, Executive Director of POC; Robert F Franz, president of
Pacwest Bancorp; architect Jon R. Schleuning, Partner, SRG
Partnership; and most importantly, William E. Roberts, Chair of the
Portland Development Commission. All decisions were by consensus
with four of the members working to reach agreement with the fifth
and most powerf비， Bill Roberts. Bill had built the new Transit Mall
and Pioneer Square, a new open space for the retail core. Both Bill
Roberts and Mayor Frank Ivancie were “bricks-and-mortar" men.
PDC received four proposals in the fall of 1982 after national
pu비icity. PDC selected three finalists: The Rouse Company of
Columbia, Maryland; Williams Realty Corporation of Tulsa, Oklahoma;
and Wright Runstadt of Seattle, Washington. ZGF, Soderstrom and
BOORIA represented local architecture firms. All other principles
were from out of town.31 Bill Roberts noted that economic viability
would proba비y be the biggest factor in the selection process.32 It
was. The memorandum to PDC from the Selection Advisory
Committee noted that “relatively little public discussion has
focused on the dramatic or sUbtle differences in experience and
abilities of the development teams to attract key .shops, finance,
build and operate a major retail project in a central downtown
setting" but that this was a crucial consideration.
Selection
The Selection Advisory Committee selected Rouse. The three
principal reasons for selection of Rouse were team qualifications,
project economics, and retail identity concept design. The
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Committee voted for Rouse because it was voting for retail
expertise and deep pockets: “other proposals, while visually
exciting, are overly ambitious, perhaps to the detriment of the retail
component."33 Only the Rouse Company team focused on retail and
then sometimes added hotel or office space. The others did not have
Rouse’s ties with Batus, parent company of Saks and Frederick &
Nelson. Rouse included a letter from Batus evincing interest in the
Portland project in its request for qualifications submittal (Batus
Retail Division to Rouse, dated April 3, 1983.)
Most architects and architectural critics favored the Wright
Runstadt proposal. While the Portland Chapter of the AlA selected
Wright Runstadt, and only one Design Committee member voted for
Rouse, conceptual design mattered only 25 percent. Project
economics and retail concept favored Rouse. The City’s economic
advisor, Keyser Marston Associates Incorporated, recommended
Rouse. Even Rouse’s critics conceded Rouse’s superior retail
experience.34 Bill Roberts knew of Rouse’s reputation through his
previous retail experience. Rouse’s glossy promotional brochure
noted that it operated “over 100 m리or department stores and more
than 5,200 individual stores, shops and restaurants in 31 million
square feet of space." The 1982 Annual Report noted that 1982
earnings were up 45 percent to $23,784,000. Bill Roberts distrusted
its competitors, mostly suburban-oriented firms.
On June 30, 1983 PDC authorized negotiations with Rouse to
commence over the next four to six months. The Commission also
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approved Saks Fi代h Avenue and Frederick & Nelson as retail anchors.
Rouse proposed a three-block, mixed-use project to consist of:
two department stores totaling approximately 200,000
square feet gross leasable floor area (GLA) on Block 50 (between SW
Third and Fourth Avenues and SW Morrison and Yamhill Streets) and
Block 60 (between SW Fourth and Fi한h Avenues and SW Yamhill and
Taylor Streets);
specialty retail shops totaling approximately 155,000
square foot GLA located below grade on all three blocks and above
grade within a two-story pavilion on Block 61 (between SW Fourth
and Fifth Avenues and SW Morrison and Yamhill Streets);
• a 400 room, 25-story hotel and related facilities totaling
approximately 340,000 square feet gross building area (GBA) located
on Block 50;
a 22-story office building totaling up to 350,000 square
feet located on block 60.
The pr이ect would build two levels of underground parking and
retail prior to the hotel and office construction. Preliminary work
required as part of light rail construction would accommodate the
two levels. City approvals were quickly forthcoming. The Planning
Commission and Design Commission split on the issue of skybridges
but the Council approved skybridges with conditions. One skybridge
would be two-levels.3s The Hearings Officer approved 1,024 parking
spaces.
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Re-neaotLation
Through 1985, the Rouse Company searched for tenants. In
July, 1985, PDC announced a six month delay.36 Despite the delay,
Council approved a $35 million economic development bond issue on
September 10, 1985.37 Rouse did announce an additional 30,000
square feet of specialty retail space and an Oregon Investment
Council loan of $135-150 million was secured.38 However, Frederick
& Nelson bowed out on January 9, 1986 despite a letter of intent.
And Rouse failed to land Stouffer as hotelier.39 The Oregon
Investment Council withdrew $40 million from its loan to the
project.
The four blocks were now vacant without a replacement in
hand. The retail core was suffering and local retailers were restive.
Burnett Jewelers, Looking Glass Books, Golden Optical, and Dave’s
Deli considered suing the city.40 These were a few of the 30 ground
floor retail uses and 56 offices displaced and not yet relocated.41
The June 25, 1986 deadline for negotiations had to be extended for
three months.
PDC had known since early 1986 that neither Frederick &
Nelson nor a hotel would be part of the first phase of the Morrison
Street Project. Rouse had proposed to limit its financial liability by
dropping the second department store, the hotel, and underground
parking (see Figure 26).42 At the March 19, 1986 Commission
meeting, staff presented four options for proceeding with the
Morrison Street Project43. The options included:
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Figure 26. Revised Pioneer Place Concept Proposal. From
Rouse-Portland Proposal (1987).
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Option 1: Place the project on hold until all m허or components
could be delivered. Not recommended by poe staff.
Option 2: Develop those components of the project that could
proceed on Blocks 60 and 61 (Saks, retail pavilion, office tower,
subsurface parking) and reserve Block 50 for future development.
poe staff rated this option acceptable.
Option 3: Develop all three blocks at once with ground-level
retail activity and above-grade parking on Block 50. A second future
office tower could be incorporated into this program, sUbject to
securing a City FAR variance. Not recommended by PDe staff.
Option 4: Develop Blocks 60 and 61 with Saks, the retail
pavilionand office tower and locate the parking in an above-grade
structure on Block 51. Acceptable to POC, Rouse’s preference.
While PDC wanted Saks, the retail pavilion, and the office
tower with below or above-grade parking (Options 2 and/or 4) Rouse
“preferred" above-grade parking but would “pursue" parking below-
grade. After two executive sessions in May the Development
Commission told Rouse that the project’s main goal was to
maximize retail development and that 히I design, program, financial
and that timeframe decisions should be made from this perspective.
The Selection Advisory Committee was called to review the
issue purely on a “rubber stamp" basis, according to one of its
members. The Selection Advisory Committee no longer had real
authority; this was a pro forma presentation. The Selection
Advisory Committee saw a brief presentation of a few boards with
the “good news, then the bad news"approach.44
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At the September 15, 1986 POC hearing Rouse proposed a four-
block, two-phased project to include:
Blocks 60 and 61: 135,000 square feet of retail , including a
glass pavilion on Block 61 containing 70-100 specialty stores;
Block 60: a two-level, 60,000 square foot Saks Fifth Avenue
as retail anchor, along with a 18-story office tower;
Block 51: An 8-story, 600-675 space public shopper garage on
the northern 3/4 of the block;. 14,000 square feet of ground floor
retail would be master-leased to Rouse.
Block 50- reserved for future development of the second retail
anchor and hotel or office tower.
Cost of the pr이ect’s first phase was estimated at $120
million with a total public/private investment of $180 million
completed.45
POC approved the redesigned project on October 9, 1986 and
the City Council allocated $12.7 million to build the above ground
parking garage on December 12, 1986. ($3 million was paid by
Rouse.)46 According to the Oreconian, the consensus on the street
from downtown retailers, real estate brokers and p이iticians was
that the company and poe had “salvaged a decent, albeit incomplete,
version of the original development plan approved three years ago,
but which has since proven economic려Iy unfeasible for a variety of
reasons. "47 Bill Roberts - who knew when and how to close a deal -
had picked Don Magnussen, a banker, to succeed him as chair of the
Development Commission. Roberts supported the redesigned proje하.
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The switch from below-grade to above-grade parking remains
one of the most controversial decisions from 1986. Several
observers considered this unnecessary. This decision would line the
SW Third/SW Fourth corridor, from SW Washington through SW
Salmon, with surface parking lots and parking structures. This could
be compared to a hole in the donut. The retail core could end up
mostly parking sJ카:lce.
Not all observers thought that Rouse's and PDC’s excuses were
legitimate. Rouse perhaps refused to build 800 underground spaces,
and made an ultimatum to the City. Observers discount Rouse’s
excuses of escalating project costs, construction problems (poor
soils and a sloping site), and marketing issues such as public
aversion to below ground parking. (Several sources alleged that the
Rouse Company had promised a hotel aware that there was no
market.) Simultaneously, the Rouse Company was renegotiating in
Seattle for concessions. Willamette Week quoted David Soderstrom,
a former chair of the Design Commission that "Rouse purposely
promises more than it can deliver in order to win development
projects. That’s been Rouse’s style on its last four or five projects.
They wait for the city to run out of patience and then build whatever
they want."48 The AlA called this a reversal of the decision-making
process.49 POC replied that an amendment to Waterfront Urban
Renewal Plan was required, which allowed for 삐II pUblic discussion.
The City was forced to trade long-term benefit - private
development and tax revenues on a 비ock adjacent to Pioneer Place
for a one-time compromise payment from Rouse of $3,000,000 to
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not build 175 units of underground parking. The Oreaonian
editorialized for approval of the revised project, pointing out that it
would serve the Yamhill Market retail project, a former PDC project
in the Yamhill District.5o The irony of this reference is that Pioneer
Place would compete with a failing Yamhill Market. Despite the
setbacks, Batus/Saks approved their participation and the Rouse
board approved the pr이ect. The State of Oregon Employee’s Pension
Fund granted a 35 year variable rate $110.5 million loan to Rouse51 •
This represented 96 percent of the project’S COSt.52 PDC received
Design Commission approval of the revised project on July 2, 1987.
The pr이ect was described as a mixed-use project containing
174,000 square feet of specialty retail , a 60,000 square foot
department store and a 16-story 329,000 square foot office tower.
The project survived two court challenges. An owner of part
of the site sued simply to receive more cash in settlement for the
public taking. A tax activist ur댐uccessfully tried to block the
pr이ect. Tom Dennehey charged that PDC had been “illegally"
collecting tax increment revenue over the previous six years ($77
million). None of the previous activists were involved.
Determining value for condemned property represents the
typical jousting over compensation for government takings. The
latter case reflected Dennehey's view that POC unfairly warped the
property tax system in favor of downtown interests.53 Tax
increment financing raises the level of taxes paid outside the
district for a specific period of time walling off revenue that can be
d이lars) in return for a
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used for general governmental purposes. Tax increment financed
projects are not put to a vote of the citizenry.
OPO anticipated $1.915.000 in annual tax revenue (1985
public investment of $19.5 million (1988
d이lars). Two thousand jobs would be created. The Corbett building
was demolished in a spectacular implosion and construction began in
early 1988.54
OPENING
The project opened on a beautiful spring day. March 29.1990.
The Sundav Oreaonian published a promo야i가t센io이n뀐1
newspaper trumpeted:
The
Class & Sass, Pioneer Place mall mixes elegance with a little
whimsy. n
Upscale but small-scale. New yet old.
Fitting in but standing out.
Fun but not trendy.
But Laurin Askeκ project design director, and other observers
believe most of those wishes are ful:ηlIed in the π:nal product
that opens Thursday....
"Portland has a nice quality about it; it has a very human scale
to it." Askew said. In designing the retail pavilion, "the trick
was to find a building that was crisp and modern in its
approach, yet lived without becoming ye aIde.. ’”
II，’'It능 one of our best projects in terms of architecture, quality
and materials,n said Perry Page, vice president in charge of
West Coast project for the Rouse Compan，ι oarent of Rouse-
Portland Inc., developer of Pioneer Place.
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’'It has·a very special sense and quality to it. It’'s as good as
anything we ’ve done anywhere in the country, as good as
anything anybody has done anywhere. ’
POC expressed satisfaction. POC project coordinator Chris
Kopca stated that: “It’s everything we could’ve hoped for. It’s
proven worth the wait. 1I Pat LaCrosse acknowledged that the city
“did not get quite what we hoped for when we started out. But I feel
very satisfied with what we have, knowing we came close to not
having anything at all. 1I LaCrosse credited Rouse with going “the
extra five miles." Rouse predicted that between four million and six
million shoppers would visit Pioneer Place annually. Sales should
average close to $400 a square foot, about the same as Westlake
Center. Rents were climbing in shops in the vicinity, toO.55
Of the 29 tenants tracked by the Oreaonian, 19 were still in
business in March, 1990. POC spent $468,000 in relocation
assistance to help relocate 27 retailers and 41 office tenants.
Seventy percent of this money went to the retail firms. Twenty one
businesses had been invited back to the pavilion but none could
afford the rent. Only nine of 51 Pioneer Place retailers were
Oregon-based. Rouse’s tenant mix is tilted toward national brands.56
Furthermore, all the big projects - the Transit Mall, light rail,
Rouse - disrupted retailing during construction. POC disregarded the
opportunity to relocate the small retailers to Yamhill Market, a
city-funded project only two blocks away. Nurturing small retailers
was not city p이icy. As the small retailer was a pawn in the
Cadillac-Fairview controversy, so were the Corbett and Goodnough
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buildings. Historic preservationists no longer argued to save these
buildings once it was clear that they were in conflict with Rouse’s
design plans.
CONCLUSION
This ten year process of conflict and resolution provides a
clear view of Portland's urban regime and its incorporation of
influentials' concerns into its urban renewal mechanism. Figure 27
illustrates how the urban regime handled opposition, the degree of
community agreement on the need for the pr이ect ， and whether
activists challenged at the ballot box.
At first, the regime proved unskilled in dealing with the
demands of citizen activists and the unforeseen objections of
realtors. The Downtown Plan called for a compact retail core
extending to the river and counted the loss of the Lownsdale
residential community as the price of a revitalized metrop이itan
core. The plan hoped to replace the Lownsdale residential
community with a bridgehead redevelopment pr이ect and did not
propose anything special for the four blocks bounded by SW Morrison
and SW Taylor from SW Third to SW Fi뼈. The plan could not foresee
the national trend to build urban versions of the regional shopping
mall as the means to downtown revitalization. The Portland
Development Commission, under activist Mayor Neil Goldschmidt, put
out feelers at a national Urban Land Institute meeting and attracted
an international developer without local public discussion. The
announcement caught the local pro-growth regime by surprise. The
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chief benefit of growth is profit to investors and it appeared as if
locals would not benefit. Land assembly, land price write-downs,
consultant fees, and other public subsidies would not be available to
local investors and professional firms. The resulting s미it in the
business community allowed an unusual amount of criticism to
surface. Those major property owners expecting to profit supported
the project. Neighborhood activists who had helped create the
Downtown Plan were ambivalent. Housing activists, historic
preservationists, and urban design aficionados opposed the project
or sought modifications. Under siege, the developers brought in
local influential professionals such as attorney Steve Janik and
architect Bob Frasca to meet the demands of the moderates.
However, a small group of displacees - Vietnam era radicals who had
prospered as small businessmen - mobilized. Ultimately, these
small business people had no greater success than residents and
businesses displaced in the South Auditorium era. Council still
approved the project (with design modificatior댐 to sati~fy the
former group andrelocati'on sweeteners to appease the latter).
The retail mall strategy was accepted even by opponents. The
question was one of means rather than ends of trus widely accepted
economic development strategy. The underlying p이icy of rescuing
the retail core was paramount. The institutior뀐I weight of OPD and
PDC’s support and the City’s sense of urgency cannot be
overestimated. Still, whether it was weak economic times or a
dispute over the amount of retail space within the skybridges, the
project collapsed.
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The small merchants' threat to put an initiative on the ballot
never materialized. Although they reacted to the threat of
displacement to an unprecedented degree, no lasting p이itical
organization came of the controversy. Interestingly, Tom Dennehey's
suit foreshadowed a state-wide tax revolt which will not be
determined until the summer and f려I of 1993 when Oregon voters
will be asked to exempt tax increment financing from a property tax
limitation. Unlike Seattle, relations between opponents remained
cordial. Housing displacement and loss of small businesses were not
blamed generally on downtown growth. On the contrary, the
experience validated the need for a commercial retail core project.
POC staged a careful public process which came closest of all six
case studies in reaching deep into the community. But these public
hearings involved members in good standing with the urban regime.
The urban regime coalesced in pursuit of the project once the
realtors' objections were met. The City made a fundamental shift to
an urban renewal program based upon multiple public p이icies put in
place prior to the developer selection process. But the city pursued
the same goal as before - luring an national retailer at the expense
of other competing users of this central space. The demands of
small local retailers were less important than the chance to regain
dominance in the regional upscale retail scene.
The adoption of public objectives was an open process, but the
selection of Rouse was decided by Bill Roberts. Roberts, a
successful retailer, downtown property owner and chairman of POC,
had no peer. The selection committee, itself restricted to important
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urban regime members, deferred to Roberts' jUdgment. Negotiations
with Rouse were negotiations between POC/Roberts and Rouse.
Whether Rouse unfairly re-negotiated in the crisis summer of 1985
is difficult to determine. The city was in a great bind having moved
tenants out in the previous months and having created a rather large
four block hole. The crisis was not time to rethink the public
interest. The Selection Advisory Committee was in place to
maintain appearances of the regime’s continued adherence to the
Request for Proposal’s public intentions.
The City succeeded in redeveloping three and one-half blocks
and spurred a successful revitalization of the retail core in the
immediate vicinity. This came at the expense of tenants and
retailers located more than a block away from the nine blocks
surrounding the project. Downtown retail no longer prOVides a f비 l
range of comparison goods for a diminishing residential
community.57 The project still has one f비I block to redevelop. The
block will be difficult to develop and is being used for surface
parking. The project does not fulfill the Plan's initial goal of
extending the retail core to the river. In fact, the public has
forgotten this goal. The pr이ect has helped to kill Yamhill Market,
another tax increment financed project in the Yamhill historic
district. The public's patience with a new surface parking lot in the
center of the city is a measure of the City’s reliance upon POC to
implement a traditional economic development strategy.
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CHAPTERVI
SEATILEWESTLAtKE MALL PROJECT
The vital point is that our cities must be gradually reordered
and restructured so that each part will contribute toward
intensifying the lives of those who live in them.
Fred Bassetti1
EARLYSTRUGGLES
The 1965 Comprehensive Plan for the central business district
envisioned a series of pedestrian malls on Westlake, Pike, Pine and
Fifth Avenues connecting with a redeveloped Pike Place Market, a
new Market Park, and the redeveloped Waterfront. Although a symbol
of progress, the monorail built for the World’s Fair cast a shadow
over the Westlake right-of-way and divided the retail core centered
on Westlake and Pine.
In 1968, Forward Thrust bond moneys became available to
provide solutions for the acknowledged lack of downtown “sit-in
parks." Of the $118,000,000 bond issuance, $1 ,7QO,OOO was
earmarked for the “acquisition of several small sites in the central
business district."2 In November, 1968, representatives of Mayor
Wes Uhlman’s office, the City Council, the City Planning staff and
the Central Business Association met to discuss downtown park
improvements. Perhaps influenced by an American Institute of
Architects (AlA) proposal,3 the Cultural and Beautification
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Committee of the Central Business Association recommended that
the Forward Thrust funds budgeted for downtown be concentrated on
one or two major projects with maximum impact, and that one of
these projects be 삐II development of Westlake Mall as a principal
downtown focal point at a cost of $1 million. The AlA began a
twenty-year process by proposing that Westlake between Pike and
Olive, Pine Street between Fourth and Fi한h ， and Fourth Avenue
between Pike and Olive be closed and incorporated into a major open
space adjacent to complementary retail space. Fred Bassetti was
chair of the AlA subcommittee which produced the proposal. The
accompanying diagram indicated a large circular open space
surrounded by the Bon Marche department store to the northwest, a
new monorail terminus to the north, Weisfields jewelers to the
northeast, and Nordstrom department store to the south. A new
building to the southwest was also indicated.
In 1969, the Central Business Association and the City of
Seattle jointly contracted with Fred Bassetti to design a project for
Westlake. The Westlake planning area was considered to be Olive on
the north, 6th Avenue on the east, Pike on the south, and 3rd on the
west and Westlake on the east. Bassetti proposed closing pa야s of
Fourth Avenue and Pine Street in order to create a roomy plaza and a
tightly-woven system of shops, offices and a hotel perched over an
underground parking garage. By this time, the Central Association
had withdrawn its support from the $270,000 study. The Central
Association withdrew its support when the Bon Marche’s James
Walsh became president. Walsh was opposed to closing any streets.
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Closure of Pine would cut off direct access to the Bon Marche
depa야ment store down Pine from the 1-5 freeway (see Figure 28).
Also, Bassetti’s opposition to plans to raze Pike Street produce
market put him at odds with the downtown business establishment.4
Bassetti’s next design was a stretch of shops beneath the monorail.
Bassetti’s other client, the City Parks Department, vetoed this use
since it would mean spending pu비ic money without creating new
open space. The third design was also doomed. It avoided placing
structures in the alignment of Pine Street, pushing the monorail
terminal to the north and shops to the south of Pine. Although
closing Pine Street to cars but not to buses was intended as a
compromise, Walsh remained opposed. The City could not build in
vacated alleys and streets without the acquiescence of the
businessmen.
Mayor Wes Uhlman sought to garner pu바c support by holding a
public meeting on May 27, 1971. The meeting was a failure.
According to the A파괴흐， the meeting highlighted the lack of City Hall
leadership, the opposition of the Bon Marche, the conflict between
the downtown retail establishment and the Friends of the Market,
lack of a business leader who “could stop the bickering," and the
suspicious public long kept in the dark. The next day, Bassetti’s
contract was terminated.5
The following year, Allied Arts, an influential civic
betterment organization, progressive CHECC p이iticians ， and
property owners got the process moving again by hosting a talk by
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visiting architect Archibald C. Rogers on successful redevelopment
in Cincinnati. In June, 1972, Mayor Uhlman named a 12-member
Westlake Advisory Committee to act as a public forum for
discussing the issues and resolving conflicts. According to a later
City of Seattle EIS statement, the Advisory Committee determined
“that it would not be economically feasible to expect private
concerns to finance all of the desirable redevelopment other than
that intended for park use." The April, 1973, Committee proposal
was significantly more profit-oriented than the development of
Westlake Park. Two components were proposed - a spati려Iy
distinct market and a large public space of 50,000 square feet. Both
Westlake and Pine would have to be vacated. The Committee thought
that public and private interests should merge.6 To quote from the
report to the Mayor:
A pr이ect to achieve these goals in t~e Westlake area can
be accomplished only by a cooperative effort of City and
private interests. Not only will retail goals be defeated
if the pu비ic space is designed so that it impairs the
retail function, but proper design and development of
surrounding commercial structures is essential to
success of the public space. Since each aspect of the
pr이ect should not only not detract but enhance the
other’s function, any pr이ect in the area must be jointly
designed and accomplished.7
The Committee proposed a core project which would redevelop
a po베on of the 비ock between 4th and 5th Avenues and 이ive and
Pike Streets to provide a public space on the second floor of a
commercial mega-structure. The space was roughly equal in area to
the existing Westlake right-of-way being vacated. The committee
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rationalized adding commercial space· as providing “both an
economic return and necessary retail density and amenity, and an
appropriate setting for the pUblic space."
The Council authorized $60,000 for economic and architectural
studies. The Westlake Advisory Committee directed a City
management team. Coldwell Banker did the retail market analysis
and found the downtown to be distressed and in need of such a
project.S Naramore, Bain, Brady and Johanson and Fred Bassetti did
the architectural study. These firms had participated in the
previous decision to build more shopping center rather than park.
The new “Westlake Park Feasibility Study" proposed 36,000 square
feet of retail space surrounding a 7,000 square foot glass atrium,
new monorail terminal, and skybridge connections to surrounding
department stores. "public space" was again located one story above
surrounding public sidewalks. Pine Street was to remain open (see
Figure 29).9
The Parks and Recreation Department proposed to fund the
pr이ect with $983,000 in'Forward Thrust funds and an additional $8
million of Councilmanic Bond Funds. The Final Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) was published in May, 1975. Pul;llic investment was
expected to leverage a $27 million ·dollar redevelopment effort in
the area.10 The project faced opposition from two sides. Small
prope야y owners objected to the large expenditure of public funds,
the demolition of eXisting buildings, and displacement of a variety
of small business tenants such as the Mayflower Hotel, Sherman &
Clay Music and Bartell Drugs.11 These property owners threatened
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litigation. . Large private investors would not assent to a project
conceived and developed by the City alone. The City dropped the
pr이ect again. On August 11 , 1975, the Council passed Ordinance
104797. This ordinance authorized
the Director of Community Development, with advice
from the Superintendent of Parks and Recreation to
prepare or cause to be prepared through contracts with
expert consultants, a proposal for the Westlake Project
. to provide an aesthetically satisfying urban park of
appropriate scale to strengthen the retail core of the
City's Central Business District and of a size
approximately equal to the eXisting right-of-way of
Westlake Avenue between 4th and 5th Avenues, including
a proposal and recommendations for appropriate
contiguous private commercial development to enhance
such park to achieve establishment of a downtown focal
point. ..
The City issued a prospectus inviting developers to submit
proposals based upon the goals of the Westlake Advisory Committee.
Criteria for selection included (a) development experience, (b)
qualifications of the architect, (c) qualifications of the principal
staff on the project, (d) capability to finance the project, (e)
experience in leasing and management, (1) proposed ownership role
in completed pr이ect， and (g) proposed scope of work and timing.12
M매α린V
In December, 1975, the City selected Mondev International of
Montreal. Architects were Mitchell-Giurgola of New York and Joyce,
Copeland, Vaughn and Nordfors of Seattle. Mondev beat out Cadillac-
Fairview of Toronto who would propose the ill-fated venture in
Portland a few years later.13 The famous urbanist, Edmund Bacon,
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consulting for Mondev. promised new energy for the core and at the
same time new open space by demolishing the historic Bartell Drug
store. Mondev made public presentations throughout the next year
and delivered schematics to the Department of Community
Development in October. 1976. The proposed project consisted of a
300 room hotel. retail shops. theaters and restaurants. two pUblic
plazas. malls. arcades. a parking garage. a pUblic park and a new
monorail terminal. The pr이ect expanded to incorporate the Times
building to the north and sent development north toward Denny
Regrade. the old psychological limit of downtown. As far as public
open space. the proposed park became 40 percent smaller at a cost
of $9.5 million dollars.14
Oooosition
Proponents of the project included the· Chamber of Commerce,
the Downtown Seattle Development Association. Allied Arts. the
League of Women Voters. and the two newspapers. the Sea한Ie Times
and the Seattle Post-Intelliaencer.15 Opponents of the pr이ect
included some of the 42 merchants likely to be dispossessed by the
project and those who thought the pr이ect too large. too commercial
and too privately-oriented with an inadequate public square.
“Citizens and Merchants Against the Westlake Mall Project"16
appealed to the public at large to stop the downtown interests
“juggernaut."17 CHECC opposed the project because the City and the
downtown business interests had turned a public square into a retail
opportunity. CHECC’s protest pamphlet summed up their argument:
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“The Park that Got Swallowed Up. Westlake Park, an Easy Catch for
Big Fish Progress?1I18
The architecture was admired by University of Washington
professor Victor Steinbrueck who called it livery imaginative and
intensely dynamic." Steinbrueck liked the architecture but disliked
the principle of private interest advanced as public interest. Victor
Steinbrueck's concerns had weight because as a University of
Washington architecture professor he had led the fight to preserve
Pioneer Square and had contributed to the preservation of Pike
Street Market. His two books, Seattle Citvscaoe and 률르략낀르
Citvscaoe #2, had provided a clear philosophical alternative to the
big projects favored by the downtown urban regime.
With f비I recognition of the interest and excitement of
the architectural plan and with due respect to the
impressive stature of the professional persons and
corporation involved, there need to be further concerns
expressed and questions asked.
Perhaps the most important concern is raised by
consideration of the relatively humble nature of the
origins of the pr이ect; the Forward Thrust “sm히I sit-in
parks" proposition, the acorn from which this mighty oak
has grown.
Is it appropriate for the city .to be responsible for, and
in actual partnership with, private enterprise in
developing a large-scale, commercial project as the
focus of downtown?
Is business itself a pUblic amenity and therefore
deserving of direct financial support?
218
What of the symb이ism of the publicly advocated and
planned focus of downtown as a commercial complex - in
contrast to a public space to be enjoyed by all?
One might ask also if a private developer, however
enlightened, ever can place the pUblic interests above his
own financial motivations (or are the public amenities
being used to enhance a private pr이ect?) What is the
public responsibility? What does the city pay for - and
maintain? Should, or can, Seattle spend another $8 or $9
million on such a development which includes so much
private benefit? Will the City Council buy it? Will the
public buy it?19
Despite Steinbrueck’s principled opposition and the opposition
。f those who faced condemnation of their property, the City Council
unanimously approved the project following completion of the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on May 10, 1977. The
Westlake Development Authority, chartered and appointed by Wes
Uhlman in December, committed $10.8 million in bonds to cover the
city obligation. These bonds were not subject to voter approval.20
There were two significant roadblocks to the project. First,
an outsider candidate might make this a downtown vs. neighborhood
issue in the upcoming Mayoral race. Uhlman would not be running for
another term. The second roadblock, alluded to by Victor
Steinbrueck, was the legality of the council decision. At the time,
the City supported State legislation, HB 1191 , which would
specifically authorize Westlake.21
Rover’s Revision
Charles Royer, an Oregonian who had succeeded as a mildly
controversial investigative newscaster in Seattle, ran as the .
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neighborhoods’ candidate. Royer made his opposition to Westlake a
campaign issue in his raceagainst Paul Schell, former head of the
Seattle’s Department of Community Development and proponent of
the Mondev pr이ect. His campaign literature stated that he “would
work to complete as Mayor, a smaller scale, downtown park which
would stimulate and encourage private development at private cost."
Royer agreed with Steinbrueck that the scale of the project was to。
large, that the park was clearly a secondary priority and that the
project would price middle income business and middle income
consumers out of downtown. Royer emphasized his opposition on
principle:
There are serious constitutional and moral pro비ems.
The proposal depends on the lending of public credit to a
private developer. And, for the lending of our credit, we
are developing amenities which many of our citizens will
not be able to afford. The shops proposed by MONDEV
would be nice, but it is my guess that most of our
citizens are not able to buy their clothes from Pierre
Cardin. Most of our citizens should not then construct an
outlet for Cardin’s wares. Nor should our money help
build a swimming po이 for the guests in the proposed
hotel...
As Mayor, I would pursue such an alternative with all the
persuasive and executive powers of that office, keeping
in mind that public pr이ects must involve early and real
participation of affected businesses and citizens. And
they must be completed in 리I due speed within the
means provided by a tired and burdened taxpayer.22
Upon assuming office in January, 1978, Mayor Royer
established the Westlake Evaluation Committee to review the
project. The Committee was made up of a broad range of citizens,
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including architects, Council members, community activists,
neighborhood and downtown business people, developers, the City
Attorney and the Director of the Department of Community. Victor
Steinbrueck was on the committee.23 At the same time as that
committee deliberated, the Royer administration continued
discussion with Mondev. Following an earlier initiative by Schell,
the Seattle Art Museum was induced to join the project.24 On April
21 , 1978, Mayor Royer announced a revised concept of the Westlake
Project which replaced the 300 room hotel with the main facility of
the Seattle Art Museum, an existing non-profit institution (see
Figure 3이. The new proposal decreased the scale of the pr이ect ，
added pUblic roof gardens, closed Pine and extended north of
Stewart. Project planning moved ahead. In the summer of 1978,
Mitchell/Giurgola initiated design work on the revised pr이ect.
Schematics and preliminary specifications were completed in
September, 1978.25
An appeal of the EIS filed by Steinbrueck and the Committee
for Alternatives at Westlake (C.A.W.) was denied by the Hearing
Examiner in January, 1979. Victor Steinbrueck objected that Royer’s
process was rushed. He argued that one Council hearing was not
acceptable pu비ic participation since it had allowed only five
minutes for organizations and three minutes to individuals, and only
three City Council members had been present. Critics compared the
proposal to San Francisco redevelopment projects and Verba Buena
s하tyle d바i넙sp미lacer하me히하nπ1
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PIKE STREET
‘-----
Figure 30. Mayor Royer’s Westlake Proposal, 1978. From
City of Seattle, Supolemental Draft Environmental
Statement for the Westlake PrQject (1978).
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the City and the Westlake Development Authority rNDA); and then
among the WDA, the Seattle A야 Museum and MONDEV, USA.
Subsequently, Westlake Associates (a limited partnership consisting
of MONDEV, USA and the Seattle Art Museum as limited partners) and
Daon Corporation as the general pa야ner replaced MONDEV as the
development entity. The City issued $12.6 million in General
Obligation Bonds, and an immediate appropriation of $942,000 for
projectimplementation activities. The Department of Community
Development negotiated the purchase of four of the nine properties
necessary for the planned project. HUD granted $2.8 million toward
purchase of the properties.
Demise of Mondev/Seattle Art Museum ProDosal
Westlake Project prope야y owners filed suit to stop the
project. 27 . Why, they asked, wasn't land being condemned for a public
purpose like the park rather than a competing commercial use?
Charles Royer testified that lithe city changed its original plan after
finding that large urban open spaces often became places where
criminals, drunks and derelicts congregate."28 The property owners
facing condemnation argued that:
1) The Westlake Pr이ect is not a “public use" under the
Washington State Constitutional provision controlling
the taking of private property through condemnation
proceedings (A바. 1, Sec. 16, Amendment 9).
2) The establishing of the Westlake Pr이ect is not a
valid municipal purpose.
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3) The relationships established among the· parties to
implement the Westlake Project violate the state
constitutional provision prohibiting a municipality from
making a gift or lending its credit to private corporation
(A메cle 8, Sec. 7).
4) The Amended Tripartite Agreement (WDA, Seattle Art
Museum" Westlake Associates ) violates state bidding
requirements.
5) Using Forward Thrust moneys to develop the
triangular park component of the project is an improper
diversion of such bond proceeds.
6) The City of Seattle has no statutory authority to
condemn for the Westlake Project.
7) The City is not authorized to give to the WDA nor is
the WDA authorized to receive from the City either
money or property.
Appeals were carried to the Washington State Supreme court.
The DSDA filed a brief in support of the City through the law office
of Jim Ellis, of Forward Thrust fame (see Chapter II). The court
ruled against the City on the issue of pUblic use in a 6-3 decision.
The City was prevented 'from acquiring three properties through
condemnation.29
Subsequent efforts were made to revise th~ project with the
Seattle A바 Museum (SAM) purchasing the properties. However the
City and the museum could not reach mutually acceptable terms of
sale. In March, 1982, SAM announced its intention of seeking another
downtown location.3o As a result, Mayor Royer recommended to City
Council that the City sell its prope야y at Westlake under tight design
restrictions (April 13, 1982). Steinbrueck again argued that t~e
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City should build a park and that a sale to a developer could not
“provide an aesthetically satisfying public open space" as the “heart
of downtown." Royer simply said that the City could not afford such
an alternative.31 Royer also received advice from the Westlake
project manager, Barry Getzel, that incorporating Steinbrueck’s
ideas about maintaining a sense of open space along the old Westlake
alignment would discourage developer interest. Royer denigrated
Steinbrueck's desire to reduce the private Wintergarden space in
favor of a larger public plaza by characterizing such an increase in
public space as the “Steinbrueck CUt."32
On July 6, 1982 the City Council narrowly voted to sell the
Westlake site.33 A Westlake Proposal Evaluation Committee made up
of citizens experienced in design, finance, and development was
subsequently established by the Mayor and the City Council to select
a purchaser. This was a small committee of downtown influentials:
developer Donald J. Covey, architect David Hewitt, builder David
Wright, financier Robert B. Filley, and attorney Calhoun Dickinson.
William Whyte was selected as the outside expert.
The prospectus offered to sell two-thirds of the block located
between Pine and Olive Streets and Fourth and Fi한h Avenues, 25,500
square feet of the Westlake Avenue right-of-way, and a portion of
the adjoining alley for $7.8 million in cash, approximately $1 million
in utility work and $1.8 in monorail terminal redevelopment work
for a total of $10.6 million The purchaser was expected to meet the
following project goals:
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1. To provide an aesthetically satisfying public open
space. This space should become a center for general
pedestrian-oriented amenities, both in the day time and
at night; a place where people can pause and relax and
enjoy the natural mix of people away from the rush of
the City. It should also potentially provide a gathering
spot for public events and celebrations. Therefore, the
project should become a point of pu비ic pride to local
residents.
2., To strengthen the retail core. The pr이ect should
encourage additional investment in the retail core and
strengthen the identity of the area. It should further
encourage an appropriate mix of quality businesses, have
a pedestrian orientation, minimize vehicular/pedestrian
conflict, encourage day and night downtown utilization
and improve the urban design quality and general quality
and amenity of the area.
3. To redevelop the downtown monorail terminal in a
manner compatible with the above goals. The new
terminal should be a functional , aesthetically pleasing
facility that: provides easy handicapped access, provides
for efficient circulation of monorail patrons,
interrelates well with downtown public transit, meets
the highest standards of safety and comfort and provides
the most efficient utilization of underlying and adjoining
land area.
Despite this ordering, the' retail anchor was the City’s first
priority. The developer was also constrained by _the following siting
requirements and design standards: permitted uses included small
shops and restaurants, a retail department store and public space. A
minimum of 15,000 square feet of ground level space was required.
The maximum height was regulated only in the vicinity of Pine
Street. Towers greater than 150 feet were to set back at least 100
:ft. north of Pine Street. The monorail was to be incorporated into
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the project. The maximum FAR was 5.3:1 , although the FAR could be
increased to 6.5:1 FAR if additional pUblic space were to be provided.
The design of the building was to be comp년mentary to other
depa야ment stores nearby and the project plaza was to mirror the
park to the south of Pine. Finally, design should recognize the
existing orientation of Westlake Avenue.34 Like Portland, a two
stage process was implemented in which developers submitted
qualification proposals, then. finalists were invited to submit
proposals.35
ROUSEENTERSTHESCENE
The selection of Rouse has been described as victory through
attrition. The other serious contender, Emerald Place Associates
insisted on a program incompatible with the prospectus. After
exhaustive negotiations, Seattle had only Rouse. Rouse’s design was
too inward-oriented for the Westlake Advisory Committee. But
Rouse was known as a retail-driven corporation and Filly and other
business interests were especially concerned that the retail
component be viable.
c。이야n해1
During the pu바t비기페ic review pro야c야‘es‘s there continued to be concern
over the private nature of the project (see Figure 31). Margaret
Pageler of Allied Arts and Fred Bassetti now opposed the project and
joined Victor Steinbrueck and the group of architects who essayed in
the Seattle Weeklv as the Gang of Five.36 The City Council objected
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Fiaure 31. Private Public Space vs. Public Public Space at
Westlake. From City of Seattle, Final Environmental
Imoact Statement Westlake Propertv Disposal and
Develooment (1983).
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to Rouse’s proposal to locate the monorail over the Fi한h Avenue
sidewalk.37
In fact, the design would never be satisfactory to the
community. The Seattle Weeklv editorialized that the project had
declined from an exciting “civic vision" to a “ho-hum shopping mall"
(see Figure 32)."38 There would be general community
dissatisfaction with the 18 story tower dropped right on the vacated
Westlake right-of-way. There would be no strong lead
person/agency for the City. The city review process would be split
between the Department of Community Development, Department of
Community Land Use (regulatory review) and Parks. The Design
Commission would have no formal role. Rouse was able to design
and redesign without any serious objection by the evaluation
committee who feared to delay the project. Yet, the City was able to
incorporate a tie with an important underground mass transit
project, the bus tunnel project.39
C.A.W. appealed the final EIS statement and the H~arings
Officer remanded the EIS to the City for supplemental information
on shadowing, current uses, pr이ect economics, architectural
massing and a space analysis. The City Council authorized execution
of a Contract of Sale with Rouse on September 26, 1983. In May,
1984 further C.A.W. appeals were denied. Only Denny Regrade
neighborhood, immediately adjacent to the north and the most
impacted area, opposed the pr이ect with C.A.W. Other Seattle
neighborhoods did not see this issue as affecting their interests.
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Allied Arts did not join Steinbrueck in opposition. On June 18, 1984,
the City Council voted to endorse the $100 million Rouse plan.
An internal confidential memorandum from Royer’s office
provides us with a snapshot of Council p이itics. Paul Kraabel, the
Chairman of the Westlake committee, was described as “nervous,"
wanting Westlake to go, but also wanting low density and plenty of
public space. The “recommended strategy" was to t히 I him that the
open space would be of high quality, reinforce his understanding of
the City’s financial bind and convince him that there were no
alternatives.
Jeannette Williams, a member of the Westlake Committee and
also Council President, had concerns about transportation but was
also politically pragmatic. She drew her p이itical support from
downtown and the DSA could be used to retain her vote.
Norm Rice, the third member of the Westlake Committee and
also Finance Chairman, was described as fully understanding the
“basics of development" and not likely to “get tied up with the
aesthetics or the density issues."
Sam Smith drew support from downtown interests and
minorities and his support would be reinforced by _continued DSA
lobbying and revenue considerations.
George Benson, who also drew support from the business
community, was somewhat “fed up" with Westlake and sometimes
an unreliable supporter. The recommended strategy would be to
“reinforce the ‘this is it or no Westlake’ approach."
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Jack Richards, a first term Councilman, tended to vote with
business interests. The anonymous staffer recommended “heavy use
of DSA and Chamber."
Delores Sibonga, derived much support from low and middle
income neighborhoods. She had voted consistently against Westlake,
but as she had a good relationship with the Seattle Center, the
staffer thought that the director might be able to change her mind.
Michael Hildt, the prime supporter of a Metro terminal at
Westlake, was dismissed as a “burnt-out" lame duck. There seemed
to be no need to “waste much time" trying for a yes vote.
Virginia Galle was disliked by the downtown community and
derived much of her support from neighborhood· activists. “She is
strongly against most new development and is literally in the ‘no
growth' camp."
Clearly, the connection was made between downtown political
ties and support for the pr이ect. 40
A Contract of Sale between the City and Westlake Associates
(Rouse-Seattle, Inc./Koehler, McFadyen & Company) was finally
executed on August 17, 1984. The sale price was $7.6 million cash,
$1 million for city utility work and $1.8 million for the monorail.
(The park south of Pine was budgeted at $7.8 million.)41
C.A.W.’s persistence in court resulted in a redesign which
Steinbrueck and Folke Nyberg could accept.42 The compromise was
announced at the October 10, 1984 news conference. The Rouse
Company redesigned the project to move the southern mall perimeter
to the north away from Pine Street, thereby increasing uncovered
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public space from 2,000 to 15,000 square feet. The increased
setback from Pine Street caused the project to drop its
“Wintergarden" and push the shops back into a conventional mall
arrangement. The six-sided 23 story office building was changed
from multi-faceted and glassy to beige and boring to “com미ement"
the surrounding terra cotta department stores. The City paid
$156,800 in business relocation expenses and $33,000 in legal
expenses.43
As construction commenced, the community reaction,
especi러Iy that represented by the readership of the Seattle Weeklv,
was that of disappointment. The 쁘르략IY had actively disliked the
Rouse proposal. The 쁘르르kIY noted that at every stage, Rouse’s
design was found wanting. The City asked Rouse for revised
concepts, schematics, and design development plans. The record
bears that observation out. For example, D.avid Moseley, of the
Community Development agency wrote to Rouse on April 9, 1986 to
withhold formal approval of the schematic drawings. The City
referenced specific concerns of the Westlake Evaluation Committee,
Citizens for Alternatives at Westlake, the Seattle Department of
Construction and Land Use, the Seattle Engineering Department and
the advisory Interdepartmental Design Review Group which
consisted of DCLU, Engineering and Parks.44 Media and community
mistrust was high. "Blunders" such as mismeasuring the monorail
and the resultant relocation outside the project were seen as cold
calculated moves by the devel야쩌r.45 This was a $16 million dollar
mistake. Norm Rice, who would win the mayoral contest four years
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later, made the monorail an issue in his unsuccessful bid to be
mayor in 1985.46
The “Battle of Westlake"
Once the buildings were down, Seattle activists began to
imagine a true civic space instead of the miniature triangle south of
Pine (Figure 33 shows what might have been.). The Seattle Times
changed its position and editorialized in support of the larger
square. Columnist Emmet Wilson publicized the challenge. The
League of Women Voters, Allied Arts and others organized the People
for an Open Westlake. Over 13,000 Seattle-ites signed petitions for
a public square at Westlake in the spring of 1987.47
In June of 1987, People for an Open Westlake almost
succeeded. By paying the developer for costs of the tower to date,
the tower could be eliminated from the project. POW also proposed
converting all of the planned underground parking to short-term,
retail use, eliminating the Monorail terminal, and redesigning the
axis of the shopping arc~de into a more pu비ic galleria, with a better
looking entrance on the north. The City would need to raise
approximately $15 million. Commissioner Jim Street led the charge.
David Brewster, editor of the 효로르효낼 뾰로료~， described the “Battle
。f Westlake" as a desperate attempt to get six signatures before
Mayor Royer learned of the “machinations." In the end,
Commissioner Street could only get the signatures of five
commissioners. Mayor Royer was tipped off and released the draft
proposal “and all parties ran for their foxholes."48 Meanwhile, the
park’s cost (the triangle south of Pine) spiraled to $18 million,
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more than the People for an Open Westlake proposal to the City
would have COSt.49
The grand opening, delayed once, took place on October 20,
1988. The debate still raged whether Pike Street should be closed.
Heavy traffic was destroying the granite pavers. Royer granted the
community a last-minute favor by deciding to keep Pine Street
closed. And when a tie developed at Council, the new mayor, Norm
Rice, declined to cast the deciding vote in the direction of the
downtown business community. The “Battle of Westlake" had
disturbed the p이itics of downtown, a little too late.5o
CONCLUSION
This chapter has described the conflict between the
downtown/city hall urban regime and a succession of civic
organizations and individuals. The 1965 Comprehensive Plan called
for open space along Westlake Boulevard. Forward Thrust earmarked
$1 ,750,000 for downtown parks. Yet, with the need identified by the
plan and with the money in hand, Seattle got a suburban shopping
mall and small but expensive triangular park separated from the
mall by a disused city street. The urban regime had built on the
basis of potential financial return.
Figure 34 illustrates the workings of the urban regime. As the
project history spans several decades, the answers to our three
theoretical questions illustrate a profound shift from easy
community acceptance of the regime's retail pr이ect to the public
perception of a sell-out by the City, from the lone opposition of
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Victor Steinbrueck to mass community disaffection. Ultimately, the
Westlake debacle contributed to CAP’s and Vision Seattle's success.
From the beginning, project supporters were unable to
distinguish private from public interest. Despite Seattle's unique
good fortune to have Pike Street Market at one end and a healthy
retail core at the other end of Pike, standard retail revitalization
strategy called for a private, inward-oriented shopping mall to
"anchor" a downtown’s retail core.
The Westlake Committee named by Uhlman reduced the park to
the existing right-of-way of Westlake Boulevard. The urban regime
was unwilling to create additional pu비ic space. The Chamber of
Commerce, Downtown Seattle Development Association, Allied Arts
and the League of Women Voters and the newspapers represented
mainstream downtown interest who saw the ·redevelopment
potential and desired to condemn private property for predominantly
private development. These interests ignored demands by Victor
Steinbrueck for a better balance between public and private
interests and launched the project. Westlake Park became
subservient to Westlake Mall in the interests of economic
development.
Royer promised a rebalancing of public and private interest but
confused the public spiritedness of the Seattle Art Museum with
public interest. The City was forced to abandon the pr이ect by the
courts but refused another opportunity to build a park as suggested
by Steinbrueck.51 By this time, the City was acting on the basis of
its sunken costs, attempting to get something built. Public concerns
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over the inward nature of the project and the introduction of an
office tower into the scheme were ignored by Council. The
confidential staff memo clearly ties Council approval to the
business community's desires. The land use alliance directed the
City's intent away from the voters' wish for open space.
Community conflict accelerated as the project commenced.
Steinbrueck compromised with the City, gaining as much open space
as possible. It was the pending lawsuit, not reasoned opposition
which pressured the City to compromise. Once the bUildings were
down, Seattle activists could point to the dimensions of the park if
the shopping center were not built. The project’s support was
narrowed to City Hall and downtown business interests, but
strengthened by the momentum associated with construction. Allied
Arts, the League of Women Voters and the newspapers abandoned the
pr이ect and pursued a park for the third time. These activists were
defeated by R이，er. However, they became part of the generalized
opposition to the downtown land use alliance. Citizens Against
Westlake, and People for ·an Open Westlake eventually merged with
the Sierra Club, the Seattle Displacement Coalition and Vision
Seattle to create an electoral alternative to the urban regime.
A comparison between the two cities shows that in Portland
the urban regime success삐lIy negotiated a process by which
influentials were satisfied that the commercial public interest was
being served. In Seattle, the urban regime never balanced public and
private interests to its critics' satisfaction.
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CHAPTERVII
FROMS애D ROADTO NORTH DOWNTOWN
DOWNTOWN PLAN
The 1972 Downtown Plan marked a change in public p이icy for
the area north of Burnside. Until the concept plan map knitted the
areas north and south of Burnside, downtown was considered to stop
at Burnside to the north and Jefferson to the south. The 1964
Comprehensive Plan ac대rately characterized the area, from
Burnside Street north to Glisan Street, as a wholesaling and
automobile sales-service district and as the city’s skid road. No
redevelopment plan was proposed. The area’s strategic location
between the downtown core and Lloyd Center was recognized but
redevelopment was not considered probable within the time span of
the plan.
The Downtown Plan incorporated the area north of Burnside
into downtown. Downtown now included the entire area south of
Hoyt between the 1-405 freeway and the Willamette River. The
concept map indicated the area to be a medium density office
district, with preservation of the Skidmore/Old Town Historic
District. Although the plan called for rep녀cement housing for the
single male pop비ation and allowances for special social and
commercial services and facilities, the transit mall was drawn
through the heart of the district. The plan envisioned redevelopment
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of the area outside of the historic district as a mix of retail , office
and housing uses. Housing would be concentrated west of Third,
offices to the east of Third. At the same time, the plan also called
for a
high priority to increasing the number of residential
accommodations in the Downtown area for a mix of age
and income groups, taking into consideration differing
life styles...the differing needs and problems of the
va,rious groups who will be housed, including those
groups who naturally gravitate to the city core... housing
and services commensurate with their physical and
social needs. These groups include the single retired,
the elderly, itinerant worker, "down and outers,ll
students, and the handicapped, as well as middle and
upper income groups. 1
The Union Station/Railyard area was tagged as the area
appropriate for low-income housing for the “single men who live in
the area" who required special social and commercial facilities (see
Figures 35 and 36). However, the Downtown Plan envisioned that
long-range redevelopment would displace these dependent
populations. The resultant mix of retailing, offices and housing
would probably leave I빠Ie room for these men. The Lownsdale
neighborhood at the south end of downtown would also be
redeveloped but low-income housing could potentially be built in the
vicinity of the Hawthorne or Morrison bridgeheads. No special social
services would be provided there. The Downtown Plan identified
other concentrations of existing or potential housing - South
Auditorium, the Fourth-Broadway corridor south of Market Street,
Skidmore Fountain, Union Station-Railyards, West of Tenth, South
Park Blocks and South Waterfront - but these. areas would contain
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little low-income housing and no support services.2 In retrospect,
the crucial significance of the Downtown Plan to the future conflict
was its “annexation" of skid road via the proposal for office
redevelopment and extension of the Transit Mall through the area.
The plan’s recognition of a declining supply of low-income housing
and the need for the City to intervene in the market came
increasingly in conflict with potential redevelopment. Citizen
involvement of. residents and social service providers came
increasingly in conflict with the urban regime's "public-private
pa야nership. 1I The Burnside Community Council (BCC) was the
recognized neighborhood association and had shared policy-making
with U. S. Bank and the Portland Downtown Plan Office during
preparation of the Downtown Plan. Yet, BCC was to be increasingly
at odds with other actors in Old Town.
IMPLEMENTATIONOFTHE DOWNTOWN PLAN
In 1974, the City embarked upon the “second wave" or
implementation phase of the Downtown Plan. The plan would be
realized through new developm~nt regulations, historic
preservation, and design guidelines to be coordinated by the Planning
Bureau. A Downtown Parking and Circulation Policy (DPCP) would be
put in place. The City would create a waterfront urban renewal
district through PDC. A social plan would consider housing issues.
Irving W. Shandler, Director of the Diagnostic and Rehabilitation
Center in Philadelphia, was retained to visit skid road and
recommend a resolution to the conflict between redevelopment and
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displacement. Shandler's report was to create “social p이icy" to be
folded into the new urban renewal plan to be adopted to implement
the Downtown Plan. This report called for the elimination of the
Burnside community by requiring residents of the area to enroll in
programs “that would improve their life style as an integral part of
redeveloping the area in which they live" and by eliminating both
small stores which catered to the local residents and agencies
which provided social services. Shandler was actually advocating
the destruction of the small 1,500 - 2,000 person Burnside
Community. Shandler specifically stated that the Asian Community
and historic resources were overvalued.3
This was unacceptable to the Burnside community. Burnside
Projects (later Transition Projects), St. Vincent dePaul, and NW
Pilot Projects, all private social service agencies, and Burnside
Community Council, the recognized neighborhood association who
provided services and advocacy for the resident p야씨lation ， objected.
The Citizens Ad씨sory Committee to the Downtown Plan, the
Japanese American Citizens League, and the Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Association were other interested parties who disagreed
with the Shandler dispersion strategy. Although the City's Bureau of
Human Resources agreed that the skid road north of Burnside was
undesirable, it seemed that an immediate dissolution would only
create small skid roads elsewhere. The Bureau of Human Resources
recommended $1 ,000,000 in subsidies over the next five years to
reconstruct 400 housing units.
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Despite continuing support, housing units continued to vanish.
PDC was unwilling to use tax increment money for low-income
housing and new building codes closed unsafe units. The Downtown
Plan had called for the dispersal of the Lownsdale population but the
closure of the Lownsdale, Geneva and Lenox hotels galvanized the
liberal establishment into demanding action. Mayor Neil
Goldschmidt appointed a Downtown Housing Advisory Committee.
The group was well-balanced between businessmen and established
social-service agencies.4 The Committee proposed four p이icy
recommendations and eleven programs. The policies called for the
maintenance of low-income housing, the creation of middle-income
housing, the encouragement of high-income housing and City support
of conversion of commercial space to housing. The p이icy strongly
called for an absolute end to the erosion of no-and low-income
housing:
The City recognizes the importance of Downtown as a
low-income housing resource, appealing to a variety of
needs and life-styles and supported by existing services.
It also recognizes that this housing and these services
cannot be effectively and economically replaced
elsewhere in the City. Therefore, the City is committed
to assure that the 5,183 low-income .units which existed
in April 1978, be maintained in the Downtown.s
The Downtown Housing Advisory Committee continued as an
advisory group. However, PDC and BCD became the dominant city
agencies as they had the use of HCD block grant money.
In 1978, the City organized an umbrella group, Burnside
Consortium (later Central City Concern) which hoped to coordinate
the 40 agencies then operating on Burnside. The first six board
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members balanced social service. property. and residential
interests. The members in미uded property owner Sam Naito.
architect George "Bing" Sheldon; Peter Paulson of Burnside Projects;
Bob Butler. manager of the Villa Hotel; Sherman Partridge. a
resident of a SRO hotel; and Dave Hutchinson. a participant of an
alcohol treatment program. Andy Raubeson. from the Bureau of
Human Resources. became director. Raubeson had previously been
connected with the Model Cities program. Raubeson quickly gained a
reputation as capable of building and maintaining property but
autocratic toward the myriad agencies on Burnside. Burnside
Consortium gravitated toward bricks and mortar and left social
policy to others. Burnside Community Council (BCC) was not
included although it was the offici리ψ recognized neighborhood
association. BCC was excluded because its director. Michael Stoops.
was an outspoken critic of City Hall.
1981 North of Burnside Studv
In 1979. the North of Burnside area was set aside for special
review when the 1972 Downtown Plan was revisited to measure
progress in implementation. City p이icy restraining intense office
development was seemingly challenged by the planned construction
of Pacific Square. the U.S. National Bank tower and other projects.
Northwest National Gas Pacific Square was a proposed five and one-
half block mixed-use project including office and commercial space.
a m리or hotel. World Trade Center. public plaza. oft-street parking
garage. and athletic club. (In fact. out of a total of 2.246.305
square feet of proposed space. only a single office building was ever
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built.) U.S. National Bank proposed and later built a 37-story
headqua빼rs tower on the south side of Burnside between SW Fi한h
and Sixth Avenues (Transit Mall streets). These were the pr이ects
which put redevelopment pressure on Old Town. In addition, although
the Transit Mall was still slated for expansion to the transportation
center on Glisan, floor area allowances were lower north of Burnside
than south of Burnside. Development interests argued that floor
area allowances north of BurnsiCte should be raised. Thi바y projects
were cited as justification for a re-examination of the lower FAR
controls. (These projects were mostly rehabilitations of existing
buildings.)
In order to maintain the contemporary p이icy of restricting
development and maintaining low-income housing, the study
participants had to answer six questions:
1. Is the underused land in the North of Burnside area
necessary to meet the demand for downtown high density
office and retail uses?
2. Is it efficient for the City to continue to target the
North of Burnside area for low income housing resources
and social services?
3. Are existing and planned land uses compatible with the
preservation of historic resources in the North of
Burnside area, pa야ic비arly the Skidmore/Old Town
Historic District?
4. .What is the role of the North of Burnside area in the
downtown transportation system?
5. Are the urban amenities represented by the North Park
Blocks and Waterfront Park currently underutilized?
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6. What form of encouragement should be given the
facilities and identity of the Chinese-American
community in the North of Burnside area?6
Two sets of city staff were responsible for the kernel of the
pr이ect， the economic study. The original economic study was
directed by the Office of Planning and Development. With the
abolition of OPD after Mayor Neil Goldschmidt’s departure to the
Carter administration, the Special Projects section of the Bureau of
Planning under Commissioner Margaret Strachan evaluated the
economic data and continued the process with a study committee and
subcommittees on economic demand, historic preservation, housing
preservation and social services. The leadership of the study
committee w~s balanced between Jim Atwood, representing the real
estate/development interests and Peter Paulson, head of Northwest
Pilot Project, representing the social service agencies. Every
interest was represented by the 53 members of committees and
subcommittees. There were five m리or groups of players with
specific interests: 1) big-time developers who wanted to extend the
transit mall and go for “big-time redevelopment" along the lines of
the gas company project (the Naitos, Kalberers and Elmakers have
sizable private property interests); 2) small-time property owners
and investors who had been attract~d by the low rents, proximity to
downtown or had always been there serving the loggers on skid road
(yuppie-oriented businesses were not yet a factor); 3) historic
preservationists (who had managed to get designation of the
Skidmore/Old Town Historic District east of SW Fourth and who
wanted to save as many buildings as possible in Chinatown) who
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were opposed to raising floor area allowances if redevelopment
pressure would increase; 4} social service agencies and private
operators of SRO hotels who felt the greatest threat from high floor
area allowances and redevelopment pressures; and 5} the Asian
community. City officials in OPO or POC were inclined toward
redevelopment of areas outside the official historic districts. The
planners in the Bureau of Planning were inclined to hold the line.
Richard Meier, who wrote the plan for the Bureau, became convinced
during the course of meetings with Burnside Community Council
and Burnside Projects that there had to be a place for the low-
Income.
The study succeeded in maintaining the existing p이icy (see
Figure 37). The area would not be slated for massive redevelopment.
Floor area limitations would be kept down. At the Planning
Commission review, this issue would be the only point of public
dispute. Chief Planner Karen Kramer would specifically link
permitted floor area to redevelopment potential. Every interest
group but the big developers were in support of maintaining the
status quo. The study made the following conclusions:
1. The land in the North of Burnside area is not
necessary to meet the demand for downtown high-
density office and commercial development.
2. Low income housing in the North of Burnside area,
partie비arly SRO hotels, is a significant resource and is
difficult to replace.
3. Existing and planned land uses are compatible with
the preservation of historical resources in the North of
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Burnside, especi히Iy Skidmore/Old Town Historic
District.
4. The role of the North of Burnside area in the
downtown transportation system remains one of a m리or
entrance and terminus of downtown circulation.
5. The North Park Blocks and Waterfront Park are
currently underutilized urban amenities.
6. The -identity of a Chinatown area in North of Bu바Jrrπr’.댐.
s봐ho아u비JI삐d be encouraged with continued assistance to
development activities and su바pψpo야r야t of a requ…jμ‘e를s힐i파t for
spec히ia러I district des히ignation.?
From a planning standpoint, the most important action of the
Bureau of Planning had been to successfully question the economic
analyses made by consultants Leland and Hobson for OPO/PDC. While
the study found that up to three million square feet of commercial
expansion could happen in the core, there was 4.9 million· square feet
of underused land just in the district and five times that in the
entire downtown.s What had seemed to be very strong demand
seriously restrained by restrictive floor areas zoning code
limitations turned out, in a second look, to be sufficient regulatory
permission for 37 years worth of growth in the entire downtownl
Thus the plan successfully resisted the push for dispersal as
had been suggested by Shandler and parti러Iy implemented by the gas
company. Other accomplishments of the plan included finding a
permanent place for the district’s weekly crafts market, promoting
the Chinatown District and recognizing the historic value of Union
Station. A compromise on social services projected their removal
from the heart of Old Town and relocation northward to Flanders and
Glisan. The North Park blocks would be redeveloped with low-
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income housing. (By 1985, both these last two p이icy choices would
be under attack.)
Mid-1980’s Conflicts
By the mid-1980’s the north of Burnside area was represented
by strong-willed advocates who clearly represented divergent
interests. The social service agencies were represented by Don
Clark, at the newly renamed Central City Concern (formerly Burnside
Consortium); Jean DeMaster at Burnside Projects; and Michael Stoops
at Burnside Community Council. Central City Concern was the
establishment’s agency. Its nine-member appointed board was
comprised of three city positions, three county positions and three
Burnside resident slots. Burnside Projects was a more traditional
agency which heavily relied upon government grants. Burnside
Community Council was the grass-roots independent agency. BCC
relied upon government grants for only 20 percent of its budget. Of
the three, Central City Concern was most in synch with Mayor Bud
Clark. As early as February 1985, Don Clark proposed a “coordinated
service delivery plan" including many of the features that would
ultimately be folded into official social service p이icy.
A pro-active housing p이icy was crucial to keep Burnside
social services and housing from extinction. The building code
threatened many units. Shelters were not meeting health sanitation
codes. In 1983 an Emergency Services Task Force disbanded after
failing to implement recommendations for coordination. Elaine
Cogan, a PDC board member, warned about duplication and lack of
coordination on Burnside. Burnside was becoming a meaner street;
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an increasing number of the ment러Iy ill were being thrown on the
street because of the state’s deinstitutionalization program. Then
crack and other drugs hit during the Reagan administration. The high
hopes of the 1970s for a new Georgetown north of Burnside were
destroyed first by the recession and then by the shifting character
of Old Town's low income pop비ation. Northwest Third and NW Couch
became a center of the drug trade. The bike shop at the corner
moved out. Other businesses had come and gone but the owner had
made the notorious drug trade at the corner of NW 3rd and Couch a
public issue.
Small property owners were upset over the behavior of street
people. In 1985, the Bureau of Licenses, responsible for making
recommendations on liquor license renewals to the state, proposed
a ban on fortified wine in Old Town. The Council’s subsequent action
implementing this p이icy angered surrounding neighborhoods who
feared an influx of inebriates. Business people in the Central
Eastside were especially angered. The Baloney Joe’s shelter
operated by BCC had already been forced to move to the east end of
the Burnside Bridge when westside business people informally
organized to prevent Baloney Joe’s from leasing new space on the
west side.9 The fortified wine ban looked like another effort to push
Burnside area problems onto other districts.
Mavor Clark's 12-ooint Plan
Bud Clark, who had raised the issue of homelessness in his
successful mayoral campaign, brought Dan Steffey into City Hall.
Steffey had been a newspaper reporter and then administrator of a
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workshop for the disabled. Steffey was representative of the
mayor’s staff in that Clark brought in peop뻐 whom he personally
picked, who did not have long-standing ties with established
powers, and who had not served on the relevant citizen committees.
Steffey coalesced proposals of Don Clark with Bud Clark to create an
integrated package of social services and policing p이icies to
complement the replacement housing program.
In December, 1985, Mayor Clark proposed the 'purchase of the
Estate Hotel at 225 NW Couch and the Beaver Hotel at 506 NW Fi야h
Avenue (see Figure 38). The Estate, then rented by Central City
Concern, would continue as a 162-room SRO with 55 fourth-floor
rooms for recovering alcoholics. The Beaver would become a social
service center for transients and the homeless. This was the first
test of the Mayor's campaign pledge to help the homeless.
The business community tested the mayor in his resolve. The
proposal drew immediate opposition from the two-month old Union
Station Business Community Association. The leader of the
opposition was C. Joseph Van Haverbeke, a building owner and
developer with offices at 406 NW. Glisan Street. Van Haverbeke
drew support from Naito property interests, although Bill Naito
merely suggested transporting the transients to the Pacific
International Livestock Exposition building on Marine Drive rather
than pu해ng them on a ship/detention center in the Willamette as
Van Haverbeke suggested. Naito was on record as supporting the
purchase of the Estate Hotel although he also signed a protest
petition along with the gas company and a couple hundred business
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Figure 38. Location of SRO's or Shelters North of
Burnside. From City of Portia핀깅， 씩orth Downtown
Development Proaram (1990).
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peop뻐. The purchase of the Estate was one of 12 recommendations
put forth by Steffey and Clark:
1. Provide case management services to help guide the
homeless through the social service network;
2. Acquire the Beaver as the access point where the
homeless and transients could obtain basic services.
Funds wo비d come from the federal government, tax
increment financing, the Wessinger Foundation, the
Collins Foundation and the Rose Tucker Charitable Trust;
3. Develop a social service plan to define social service
needs and to recommend ways to divide responsibilities
among agencies, the City and Multnomah County. (This
would accomplish what the old Burnside Consortium had
failed to do.);
4. Adopt a housing plan to use vacant hotel rooms and
Portland Housing Authority emergency housing and
establish a unified city-state requisition system for
housing vouchers;
5. Create a public camping area within freeway rights-
of-way with supervision and sanitary services (on the
back burner due to opposition from eastside interests
and reluctance by the Oregon Department of
Transportation).
6. Establish a “man down" response system in which one
agency would pick up public inebriates;
7. Develop new programs through Multnomah County to
meet the needs of drug and alcohol abusers;
8. .Lobby for changes in state law to provide for
inv이untary commitment of chronic alcoholics involved in
a “revolving door" use of detoxification;
9. Provide pissoirs in Old Town;
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10. Encourage private employers to offer minimum wage
jobs to Burnside residents and work with the Association
for Portland Progress on a jobs program for the poor;
11. Prohibit dumpsters on Old Town sidewalks and
develop a trash system, using low-income persons to
haul trash to a central location; and
12. Establish a pilot neighborhood team police unit north
of Burnside. The unarmed p이ice aides would serve to
assure the area of a p이ice presence and would increase
public safety.
It was clear that this was to be a m리or fight. As the
Dreaonian commented:
The rift between businesses and social services
providers threatens to irreparably damage the fragile
mixed residential and business community that has
developed north of Burnside and in the Skidmore Fountain
district over the past two decades. There is general
agreement that construction of a convention center north
of Old Town, if that site is chosen by the City Council,
would exacerbate the conflict, and a growing fear that
privately operated low-income hotels remain threatened
by age and development pressures," 10
Soon afterwards, the Mayor met separately with social service
agencies and business people. The Mayor’s press secretary, Jack
McGowan, emphasized to the public that the goal of the program was
to return the homeless to productive citizen status, thereby
reinforcing community standards.
Peter Paulson of Northwest Pilot Projects, who had co-chaired
the 1981 North of Burnside study, supported the program. C. Joseph
Van Haverbeke, the other chair of the study, did not. The business
community saw this proposal as a setback in their attempts to drive
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the social service agencies out of Old Town. Louis Waschmuth, who
owned property two blocks south of Burnside, installed drip lines
around the perimeter of his restaurant to regularly drench
transients who might be loitering by his building. Van Haverbeke
called for the Mayor’s recall.
In August of that year, public officials Mayor Clark, Dan
Steffey, Pat LaCrosse, and Don Clark brought representatives from
U.S. Bank, Northwest Natural Gas, Pacific NW Bell and Vern Ryles
from CEIC to Seattle for a tour of the program there. At dinner at
the Washington Athletic Club, the big property owners were brought
on board, at least temporarily. Radicals like Michael StoopS11 , who
was running a progressively larger and financially fragile social
service agency 흐낀와 small business people grouped together in the
Union Station Business Community Association were not invited.
The Beaver/Estate proposal required an amendment to the
Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Plan. The Union Station
Business Community Association continued to fight the proposal.
The Association proposed locating any shelter in an industrial zone
in the Stenger building at 77 SE Taylor. Arguments were made to
Council that additional social services would increase transient
pop비ations and make the area permanently blighted, would cost too
much, would cause crime, and social service providers simply
benefited. from human misery.
Council approved the amendment on January 31 , 1986. The
merchants appealed the matter to the state’s land use appeals court.
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Although the Land Use Board of Appeals remanded the issue back to
the City, the hotels were eventually acquired.
The City and County also agreed to meet in a joint session to
consider a revised version of the 12-point plan. A 65-member City-
County Emergency Basic Needs Committee was organized to create a
comprehensive plan to coordinate the delivery of services. The
committee would include two elected city officials and two elected
county officials, four community representatives and one
representative of service providers.
THE CLARK-SHIELS AGREEMENT
The success of the mayor's 12 Point Plan meant that the area
north of Burnside would provide a system of social services in
tandem with a range of low-cost housing from shelters to
independent living. Small businessmen were impatient and did not
grasp. that the eventual intent was to eliminate the shelters in favor
of residential SROs with mandatory rehabilitation program.
Large property owners and businessmen were also frustrated
by the lack of progress toward redevelopment in the North of
Burnside area. The Convention Center’s location at the east end of
the Steel Bridge and the potential for railyard redevelopment
(Glacier Park) meant great potential, but nothing was being realized.
North of. Burnside business people felt that the unsavory character
of their area was frightening away potential investment. This was
an accurate assessment as the eventual loss of the Oregon Museum
of Science and Industry (OMSI) to the Central Eastside and the State
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Office Building to Lloyd District would attest. Private consultant
Roger Shiels was hired to represent U.S. Bank, the gas company, and
the big property interests such as Hillman and Naito. (Shiels was
joined by Doug Obletz who had shepherded both the Rouse pr이ect
and the Transit Mall to completion.) The business agenda consisted
of extending the Transit Mall, relaxing development regulations as
part of the Central City planning effort, and limiting social service
agency expansion. The firm of Shiels and Obletz was able to “shift"
funds around in order to get the Transit' Mall work going. This was
crucial work as the last of the funds associated with the Banfield
light rail project were due to expire.
Also, the Central City Plan was amended to significantly
increase floor area limits. This was done by increasing the number
of blocks with 9:1 floor area ratios from one to fourteen blocks.
Also, there is now a built-in guaranteed 3:1 bonus for corporate
prestige items such as art and water features. With this bonus
system, the minimum floor area allowance north of Burnside is 7:1.
Areas along the transit mall enjoy development permission equal to
most areas south of Burnside.
However, these public works and permissive zoning regulations
have come at a price. In order to push the transit mall through
without public opposition, negotiations were held with Don Clark
who represented the social service agencies.Beginning with lunch
at the Marriott and continuing in the Mayor’s office, both sides
agreed on the followinc principles:
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1. Preservation and upgrading of existing SRO housing to
provide decent, safe and well-managed accommodations
for all low- and zero- income persons living within the
District.
2. Continuation of services which support the permanent
low-income and zero-income persons living in the
District including employment, health, nutritional and
personal services.
3. Continuation of emergency shelter and related
services for the homeless at current levels, while
seeking to eliminate the need for these services by
assuring that adequate permanent housing, jobs and
support services are provided community-wide.
4. Acceleration of economic growth of office, retail ,
restaurant and visitor oriented commercial activities
while preserving and building upon the district’s unique
assets including improving the District’s image.
In order to simultaneously promote housing and services which
served the poor and to “accelerate" economic growth and improving
the District’S 치mage" (the euphemism for getting the bums off the
streets), the private agreement strictly limited the number of
shelter beds to those run by the Portland Rescue Mission (52 beds) ,
the Glisan Street Multi-Service Center (150 beds) and the Union
Gospel Mission (50 beds). SRO beds were limited to 1030 units - the
existing occupied SRO units (803 units), plus SRO units vacant since
1978 (227 units). Additionally, as shelter beds were permanently
removed,.these beds could be replaced by SRO units.
There were two very important results of the agreement.
First, Baloney Joe’s could not return to the westside, nor could other
agencies increase their shelter capacity; and second, all SROs would
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eventually be under public control though conditional use review and
funding. SUbject to city pUblic review. proposals could now be
turned down.
The Council blessed this private agreement by passing
Resolution 34286 on May 13. 1987. commending “the initiative of
the represented property owners and non-profit social service
representative .... for their commitment to resolve past conflicts and
seek cooperative solutions which' support low and no income persons
living North of Burnside while also accelerating economic growth."12
The Essential Service Provider (ESP) provisions were adopted into
the zoning code through a process of adapting the on-going Central
City Plan process to meet the needs of the parties involved. The
proposed draft Central City Plan zoning had proposed to require that
social service agencies apply for conditional use approval. These
code provisions had been suggested by PDC. At the direction of Dan
Steffey and Roger Shiels. staff revised the language to develop
different levels of approval criteria depending upon the distance
between the ESP facilities in order to reduce the impacts of social
service concentrations. Don Clark presented the ESP amendments to
the Planning Commission at the first public hearing regarding
amendments to the Proposed Plan (November 5. 1987.) At the
November 10. 1987 hearing. Richard Meyer. who had moved from the
Planning Bureau to Burnside Community Council. and BCC attorney Ed
Sullivan argued that the distance criteria would make all
applications subject to appeal. The Planning Commission. when
faced with a choice between removing distance criteria or allowing
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the application to be subject to appeal. chose the latter.
Commissioner Lindberg supported the agreement and clarified that
the regulations would be applied only to food and shelter providers.
Council also accepted the request by Roger Shiels that the SRO and
shelter bed limit be placed in the code rather than being a p이icy
consideration. The request was made without the Council being
aware that the social service agencies expected this to be merely a
“gentlemen’s agreement."
The Central City Plan SRO cap north of Burnside. 1030 units,
theoretically meant that Burnside Projects was required to
eliminate about 30 shelter beds in the Glisan Street shelter in order
to open the Shoreline residential hotel. However, Legal Services
challenged the constitutionality of the code provision and it is not
currently being enforced.
At the adoption of the Central City Plan, the low-income
housing supply was 900 units less than the downtown housing p이icy
goal of 5.183 units The Golden West, Foster, Sally McCracken and
Shoreline hotels were rehabilitated north of Burnside before the SRO
lid was reached. This shortfall is proposed to be made up in the
remainder of the Central City. The area west of SW Park Avenue and
south of Burnside contains the only other low-income area
specifically called out by the Central City Plan. With north of
Burnsideand south of Burnside “full-up." Mayor Bud Clark and
Commissioner Earl Blumenauer directed POC to start looking
elsewhere for new low-income project sites. POC was pushed to
expand its South Park Blocks urban renewal district and start using
271
public money to go beyond its previous middle-income projects. POC
extended the South Park Blocks urban renewal district to include
this area and promised to use tax-increment financing for
rehabilitation and renovation of housing units. This new approach
reflects a change of p이icy for POC. With the adoption of the Clark-
Shiels agreement and its incorporation into the Central City Plan,
the business community accepted a small residential program to be
run by PDC. The Downtown Housing Preservation Program, or OHPP,
was adopted in 1988. Its budget was $2.6 million annually, or $7.8
million over three years to produce 450-750 units. The pr이ect
projected a gain of 482 units by the end of 1991.
South of Burnside, POC undertook the renovation of the Henry
Building to house downtown workers with low incomes. U.S. Bank
was opposed to the renovation as it was feared that the City would
begin rehabilitating low-income housing south of Burnside where no
cap was in effect. However, POC criteria, (“...availability, building
size, development cost," etc.) eliminated potential activity south of
Burnside.
The necessity of PDC involvement and the use of tax increment·
financing was demonstrated in the spring election of 1989 when
voters overwhelmingly defeated a measure to permanently fund
housing for the poor. The Building Owners Managers Association
(BOMA) led an overwhelmingly successful campaign against a
proposed real estate title transfer fee. The 0.15 percent tax would
have provided $2.3 million per year. BOMA and the Homebuilders
Association created a llCommittee Against the Real Estate Sales
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Tax" success삐lIy changing the ballot title from fee to tax and
opposing not the principle of helping the homeless but a system of
“patchwork taxation." The measure went down 93,055 to 29,341.
CENTRALCITY P내N POLICY REVERSAL
In addition to institutionalizing the Clark-Shiels agreement
with caps and public approval requirements for shelters, the Central
City Plan marked the end of the former spirit of laissez-faire north
of Burnside.
First, the Plan specifically repealed the 1981 North of
Burnside p이icy. The issue of supply and demand for land was turned
on its head. Instead of concluding that there was plenty of land
elsewhere than the North of Burnside District, the plan advertised
“redevelopment potential." North of Burnside had two-thirds of its
area available for redevelopment
Secondly, as previously mentioned, major upzoning specifically
raised FAR limits from 9:1 on one block to 9:1 on 14 blocks with a
height limit of 460 代. south of Everett along the transit mall.
(Figure 39 illustrates the greatly increased floor area zoning
regulatior념 north of Burnside.) The FAR limit itself could easily be
increased by 3:1 so that the most restrictive floor area limit
became 7:1 , more than twice the existing development pa한ern.
Central City Plan Finding #137 justified the lire-examination" of
FAR limits based on the Clark-Shields agreement; finding #139
stated that 6:1 FAR is inconsistent with extension of the Transit
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Portland, Developers Handbook (1992).
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Mall (a finding which contradicts the 1981 North of Burnside
implementation report - finding #3).
Thirdly, the plan sanctioned the Clark-Shiels agreement,
including the extension of the transit mall and the redevelopment of
Union Station. The challenge of BCC to the urban regime and the
social service agency, City and business community counterreaction
deserves a separate section. If there was to be a compact, there had
to be a penalty for disregarding' it.
The Burnside Community Council Closes
An examination of the fate of BCC once it decided to ignore the
Clark-Shiels agreement and the Central City plan and relocate to the
westside provides the clearest example of the strength of the urban
regime.
The BCC was originally organized in 1974 as the Burnside
Neighborhood Committee, an official Portland city neighborhood. In
1976, Michael Stoops arrived as a Vista volunteer; he conceived of
and worked at a day shelter on Couch Street. In 1981 , BCC moved its
shelter, Baloney Joe’s, to the east side of the Burnside Bridge. BCC
began the Hobo parade. This parade mocked the City’s Rose Festival
by replacing the Rose Festival Queen and her court with the more
colorful transients of skid road. The Burnside Community Council
decided in August 1986 that the shelter was inadequate. And, BCC
had been severely criticized for allowing homeless men to
congregate on the Burnside Bridge waiting to get in the door.
Michael Stoops bought a prope바y at 725 NW Flanders in a blind sale.
The City and business community were outraged because this meant
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that the City’s plan to upgrade the area west of Broadway would
come to naught if day shelters moved to the area and scared
potential residents and businesses away.
This area west of the North of Burnside area had been renamed
the Northwest Triangle. The dividing line was the Park Blocks south
of Hoyt to Burnside. The blocks adjacent to the North Park Blocks
and a newly formed historic district along NW 13th Avenue were
slated for massive upgrading in hopes of creating a Portland SoHo.
In 1983, the City of Portland Planning Bureau had completed a
comprehensive study of the Northwest Triangle following an AlA
study of the area in 1983. The Planning Bureau collaborated with
the Northwest Triangle Business Association to produce a plan
which provided momentum to upgrade the North Park Blocks, build
new streets and create an historic district. Before long the area
was marketing itself as the “Pearl District" -- that is, still grubby
on the outside but an exciting arts environment within restored
warehouse spaces. The Central City Plan codified the work of the
last half-decade to redevelop the area. The Central City plan
rezoned the area and called for an urban renewal district, a cultural
development area, floor area bonuses for housing, and regional public
attractions (and even microbreweries!)13
BCC found itself in increasing difficulty with the City and
downtown business community as it attempted to move to 725 NW
Flanders on the North Park Blocks. In December, 1987, Mayor Clark
visited a BCC Building Committee meeting and requested that BCC
reconsider its options. POC was recruited to spot alternative sites
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on the eastside. In April, 1988, the Oreconian criticized BCC for its
too ample "cash reserves." In May, 1988, the mayor cut $25,000
from BCC's budget. In June, 1988, the Flanders site financing loan
was turned down by U.S. Bank. In November, 1987, Willan뼈tte Week
weekly newspaper accused Michael Stoops of sexual misconduct
with one of his juvenile clients. In November, 1988, Mayor Clark
publicly announced his opposition to the Flanders site, vowing public
condemnation if necessary.14 The Stoops affair had doomed the
agency. The agency was ultimately forced to hand over operations to
the Salvation Army. The shelter remained at the east end of the
Burnside Bridge despi~e the $350,000 spent by BCC to renovate NW
Flanders. An analysis, written by BCC’s bookkeeper, Gene Ediger,
illustrates the isolation of those bucking the consensus reached
during Clark’s tenure. Ediger wrote in an Oregonian opinion piece
that BCC was done in by a variety of factors - the resignation of
Stoops; the increasingly negative media coverage; naivet용 on the
part of BCC in dealing with the City, the banks and other property
owners; and Mayor Bud Clark. Dan Steffey, speaking for the City,
rebutted that the bad press was deserved; that BCe got its just
desserts in rejecting the Clark-Shiels agreement; and that BCe was
not willing to participate in an open discussion, a condition of the
Mayor’S support.15
There have been a few protests since the destruction of BCC.
As previously mentioned, Legal Aid challenged the shelter limit
zoning code provisions under the Fair Housing Act. And Jeff
Liddicoat and New Clear Vision staged a camp protest on land
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opposite the South Waterfront project in 1991. However, the camp
was eventually cleared. And when Mayor Clark allowed protesters to
camp across the street from the Courthouse to protest the lack of a
public campground, the Oreconian expressed indignation that the
protesters had not been rousted immediately.
CHALLENGETO PDC
As part of an on-going struggle to deploy resources more
effectiv~ly ， Portland, Multnomah County, the Housing Authority and
United Way retained a consultant, Barney & Worth, to repo야 on
duplication and wasted effort in the delivery of housing services.
Barney & Worth’s report called for a “county-wide joint mechanism
that is responsible for county-wide housing p이icy， planning,
advocacy and coordination." The Chamber and the City/County
oversight committee reviewed the report and called for a
consolidated p이icy and planning committee. In the fall of 1989, the
City and County created a five-member City/County Housing
Management Plan Development Council. It was comprised of Mayor
Clark, Multnomah County Chair Gladys McCoy, City Commissioners
Blumenauer and Bogel, and County Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury.
These elected officials delegated the work to a group of City, County
and Housing Authority employees. Their charge was to propose “a
consolidation of housing-related agencies and organizations under
the jurisdiction of the City of Portland and Multnomah County to be
reviewed for inclusion in the consolidation of all agencies,
organizations and operations units which carry out housing related
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functions. 11 The technical group decided to recommend that the City
and County HCO agencies, the Housing Section of PDC, the Housing
Authority and the Planning Bureau’s housing planners be merged by
June 30, 1990. Furthermore, the remainder of POC would be merged
“within two years to create a county-wide housing, community
development and urban renewal agency."16 This latter proposal was
tantamount to abolishing POC and the basic businessmen’s premise
that POC’s most important function was economic development.
The proposal was dead on arrival. The news was leaked to the
press before the recommendation could be delivered. Front page
headlines and business objections immediately killed the proposal.
At the Housing Management Plan Development Council Meeting on
January 18, 1990, Gladys McCoy began the meeting by killing the
concept. She was seconded by Gretchen Kafoury and Bud Clark and
Earl Blumenauer. The Chamber of Commerce objected that a
functional study had turned into a organization study. Not only had
POC turned back the most direct assault on its organization, since
the OPD study in the late 70"s (the Marriott tennis court deal), but
Pat LaCrosse fired the POC liaison to the technical group. Don
Clark's and Dan Steffey’s initiative had failed.17
RIVER DISTRICT PROPOSAL
In March, 1992, private business collaborated to lobby City
Council on a proposal for a major city redevelopment focus on the
railyards located just north of NW Hoyt Street at the west end of the
Broadway Bridge. (See Figure 40. The parcels are marked Glacier
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Figure 40. North Downtown Redevelopment Opportunities,
1990. From City of Portland, North Downtown
Develooment Proaram (199이.
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Park, Union Station and Centennial Mills.) The owners of the
railyards wished to collaborate with PDC in creating a new upscale,
pedestrian district adjacent to the light rail crescent. The River
District is the linchpin in the City’s effort to redevelop the light
rail crescent. The River District would also put Old Town in the
center of redevelopment with the River District to the north, the
Northwest Triangle district to the west, downtown to the south and
the Blazer arena/Lloyd District to the east. The River District was a
capstone to City efforts to create an effective “North Downtown"
strategy. The strategy would replicate the South Auditorium effort:
. in that case, two clearance urban renewal areas, once
developed, served as a magnet to p비 I the traditional
downtown southward. The land between was redeveloped
with office and housing uses with minimal pu비ic
investments. For North Downtown a similar strategy is
possible, with the advantage that the railyards provide
already cleared development sites. The difficulty with
North Downtown is the public perception of the area as
generally unsuitable for development. The City’s intent
to maintain both the historic structures and the SRO
housing increases the difficulty of overcoming public
perceptions.18
CONCLUSION
An examination of the outcomes illustrated by Figure 41
indicates the absolute connection between the increasing economic
importance of this once-peripheral district and the downtown urban
regime's increasing control of public development p이icy. Planning
documents labeled the area skid road in the 1960s; followed by
Union Station/Railyard in the 1970s; North of Burnside in the early
281
·트를。른룰。。
틀』。
z
。i
1m。￠
--혹
m
.iQ@-。』a
io·』i”.。
』@〉-￠
•
‘”。--。a
iε@ER。-@〉@뀐Q』
@룹드
E。，〕
”』@Z톨。
mm@z·W그a
@m』m
」
@』@를톨@”-@
miZ@-mεm』i
a·￡m
。‘
‘s---amζ·
‘S
1@』@aE
밍
。〉@3.。。@
i。
응·””@Q@Z=。.m』@〉I。Q
gzmE@
건
@EE@』
Cma』그
-『ii””@Q。그
m·
·튼톨。은툴。。
It
。z
m@
1@N-
--삐그ig@QZ。。@』@g·
”Z』그매
￡t。z
m
@E
。
”u
i그。
”=。·imφ
긍
U
￡Q』mm
이m￠
.F앙
@』그의띠
는@〉---@뀐
@요〉』@”
-m.。。이
등
하@』@iz--zm
i그。-。
-mQ;--。다
i。
뀐Z@-a
@그므투그
gz·izmm@』다@』
-논
m-u
z。(]
￡--톨
@m-E。aE。Q
im그E
m』mz--。
””**드m그(i
@@』m
」
i=@Qω**』。
-m강』@EE。。
xu
z·)iz---m-Q그』Q”@E。Q@a
mm』〈
ωi”.〉·iQmaz·이그。
s
!)F』m
m』@F-툴。
””@c·m그되
=mEm
를。a
i。
mz。·iQ@효。
”**amzmE
i=Eg
@E·@@￠
iC@
E
@
@』@얘
”-m--
￡m,S』m-u
m@〉·iu@-a。
。〉m--。Q@
1cm
”φ-QZ@mm
1@@』。
。〉m뀐
l。Qm
@Q·〉』@%
i”-m@』
”다그。』@
-m강。”
ε**w톨i@a
im.>-iQm
--눔
@Q그』
t
l
@』。。
걱m@』『一m
@I·Itm-ι
。t
φQImisaE-i그〔i
@QZ찍』。(iE­
@z·m@@』QZ gz·”m@』QZ-
men en
G) "c '!:
드'c 5 =i!‘]0C 앨.0 ..그 al t::: .... Qj
.0 G) 임 'c
- 띤 "c 읍트 잊
-;;;G) ..... ~퍼t:~ i:.느 Ie-­E 를@얘늘@ci)i;흘 E 믿믿
zm-
다
.ia
NF
mL
。i얘--
-m』mZ다.』mai-@〉·i -@』---i
야
@그
mm-
i3a
·”i야.〉-iQm.3m@』그a@=·zzm-a
-。』iz。Q
。i
@-am
드--@E
릅@α
cm-4
F∞mF
·mim@』@iI·mm@z·m그a@@』m-1zm
=mEm
Zmw믿를ma
1gz@E@m』i
mQzm---m@m그
1zm
」
icm>@
-@』』
-
-@』@1·”=。。
ω@그””.
iZ@Ea。-@〉@g
。·ζ
』(〕투。p·@』。。
。i
-m』@S다.』@다
m@』〈
”@>imim
』(얻』
--i
』
i-@>·im-@I--@.‘--=。mi。=
@EEm￠
-----되빼터
。
i
cm-ι
Z톨。를톨。Q
←Z버흐버
Q5ιωE
」를
Z버디
-m
버마
。z3
놀。
4
Fx
。(i
i으-ma
im
@@I@=mFiQim-〉-i。〈
(ζ
。m』@i@i
나)
F’〕**@』Q
izmEa으@〉@팅，。·ζi
。c。Q@
』。
@QZmiR@QQ<
(@Z。im~z·4-
…;
F=。.”』@〉C。。
’는mE@
갱
im
iR@뀐m
@E·@@』
m-
282
1980s; and most recently, North Downtown or the River District.
These names indicate how this area moved from the northern
periphery of the westside downtown to the central position in
today’s light rail crescent of development. As the area has become
increasingly central to core development, the area has been renamed,
and reconceptualized, as activists' demands lose ground. At each
stage, the urban regime was confronted with the presence of
transients, displaced workers and seasonal workers and those social
service providers who served them who could not be displaced
elsewhere.
The Downtown Plan reshaped the westside core and excluded
skid road habitues from areas south of Burnside. Furthermore, the
plan proposed to extend the Transit Mall and provide redevelopment
opportunities at the same time it acknowledged the critical loss of
housing. Throughout the 1970s, the City unsuccessfully attempted to
balance these competing p이icies. The City advanced an
organization, Burnside Consortium, which brought together the more
prominent members of the urban regime and which excluded the
radical activist, Michael Stoops. But, the 1981 North of Burnside
Plan brokered five major interests who disputed whether the area
would remain a backwater skid road, or a revitalized and historic
small business community, or a redeveloped northern extension of
downtown. This was a high stakes conflict in which the Planning
Bureau under Commissioner Strachan played an unusual social
activist role. The Bureau restrained pro-growth local businessmen
by actually lowering floor area ratios. In contrast to the Central
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City Plan Experience described in Chapter 川 , the Bureau was able to
recast PDC’s research to demonstrate that the area north of Burnside
was not crucial to the downtown retail and office market. The
economic development argument was examined and found wanting.
Thus, district pro-growth activists were isolated from the westside
business establishment centered around the retail/office core.
Mayor Clark’s 12 Point Plan attempted to finally implement the
Downtown Plan in a decade when divisions between pro-growth
interests and social activists had been exacerbated. The recession
and growing street crime threatened both residents and potential
customers. Planning for a new convention center north of the area
。r across the river signaled that the area was no longer isolated.
The City's d.evelopmental p이icies ， its economic stake in the
convention center, and the question of Burnside were no longer
disconnected p이icy issues. The new geography meant that the
stand-off could not continue. The construction of light rail and the
extension of the Transit Mall (begun in 1993) favored redevelopment.
The construction of the Convention Center across the river and the
railroad's divestiture of Union Station and the railyards created a
powerf비 magnet for new investment. The Central City Plan provi폐ed
the means to change pu비ic P이icy. Just as the Downtown Plan’s
initial success created the demand for the Central City Plan update,
the experience with the South Auditorium district suggested a model
for a mirror River District. The South Auditorium urban renewal
area was Portland's unchallenged economic development success
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story and the warnings that might have been heard by an objective
historian of displacement were very faint.
Both the Central City Plan shelter restriction and the River
District proposal were approved by City Council in public hearings.
But these decisions were fundamentally private negotiations. The
Shiels-Obletz consulting firm represented pro-growth private
property owners at the same time it helped the City save federal
funds for the Transit Mall extension. Total victory for private pro-
growth interests was averted only by the fortuitous position of
Central City Concern director, Don Clark. In this case, Don Clark
exercised a unique blend of political clout and interest in social
service delivery. Otherwise, activists were unable to mount a
serious challenge to downtown interests.
Institutional arrangements for the North Downtown/River
District development program now being put in place will ensure
redevelopment and displacement of many of the poor when the real
estate market turns around,19 Of the five groups contesting public
p이icy in 1981 , large property interests completely dominate
development p이icy as the City pursues its North Downtown crescent
strategy. Only the inability to ship the transients elsewhere
constrains the urban regime.
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Portland, November 24, 1974, pp. 87-125.
4Members included Bill Wessinger, business executive; Richard Cohn, Vera Katz,
Oregon House of Representatives; Bill 니ndsey， head pastor of First Presbyterian Church;
Reverend Joseph, pastor of First Lutheran Church; Jim Atwood, a real estate agent; Edith
Sherman, housing activist; Mary Burkl, housing activist; and the manager of the Ambassador
condominium.
5City of Portland, Downtown Housing Advisory Committee, "Downtown Housing P이icy
and Program,’ Adopted by the Portland City Council, October, 1979.
6Clty of Portland'LOregon, "North of Burnside Land Use Policy," Adopted by the
Portland City Council, May 14, 1981 , Ordinance No. 151568. pp.1-2.
70rdlnance No. 151568, findings 4(a) through (t). .
8L예and and Hobson Economic Cons비tants ， ‘North of Burnside Study: Analysis of
Economic Impacts: Assessment of Development Potentials," September, 1980, pp. 113 and
122.
9Richard Meier, Interview, February, 1991.
10Oreaonlan, “Mayor's Plan Splits Agencies" December 3, 1985 πhis was the first
pu바c draft of the plan in a slightly different form.) Oreaonlan, “Most at hearing balk at plan
for homeless," February 25, 1986.
11Stoops called the plan the Yamhill Market "boutique" approach to homelessness.
12Don Clark, Roger Shiels, ‘'Memorandum of Intent", attached as “Exhibit ’A’· to
Resolution 34286, adopted by Portland City Council on May 13, 1987.
13American Institute of Architects, Last Place in the Downtown. Central City Plan
P이icy 17: Northwest Triangle Action Chart.
14Burnside Community Council, "Flanders Siting Background," no date. The author
q비zzed several knowledgeable individuals as to the tr띠h of this chronology. No rebuttals were
forthcoming.
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15The following Individuals are most knowledgeable: Don Clark, Roger Shiels, Sam
Galbreath, and Richard Meier.
16Adrlana Cardenas, Housing Advisory Group, "Interim Report on the Housing
Management Plan", p. 2.
17빼따댈융 Housing Management Plan Development Council Meeting: 7:30 AM, January
18, 1990.
18Steve Dotterrer, Office of Transportation, City of Portland, ‘ Draft Memorandum,
North Downtown Strategy," • May 26, 1987.
191n 1988, Mayor Clark's office Issued Its own call to manifest destiny: "The
geography of Portland with Its rivers, hills, and fully developed residential areas to the south,
west and ea앙 makes North Downtown the only area In which the city core can expand. 까1e
choice Is to grow Into North Downtown, or quit growing," Office of the Mayor, City of
Portland, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Homelessness: The Portland Model," Revised September,
1988, p. 12.
CHAPTER VIII
RESIDENTIAL DISPLACEMENT IN DOWNTOWN SEATTLE
To his credit, he [Roye매 was willing and able to commit
money, to find money to build housing, and to provide services
to the poor. On the other hand, he pushed p이icies to redevelop
the city, even though the impact of that contributed to the loss
of hundreds and hundreds of low':income housing - much more
th~m we could ever build. The Development community has
been the beneficiaries of his p이icies. Look at downtown as
testimony to that: three to four-hour rush hours in the
afternoon. .He had opportunities to control those forces and he
didn't. 1
John Fox, Seattle Displacement Coalition
COMMUNITY REACTION TO INCREASING DISPLACEMENT
During the 1960s and 1970s code enforcement and demolition
for large-scale public projects contributed to the loss of downtown
housing, even as the gap widened between potential and effective
demand for housing. Between 1960 and 1974, half the supply of
downtown housing was lost - 16,251 housing units in 393 buildings.
The business community recognized the loss as early as the 1960s.
The Downtown Seattle Development Association (DSDA) organized an
In-Town Living Committee in that decade. The In-Town Living
Committee set a goal of 50,000 additional units between 1970 and
1980. Yet by 1974, only 1,163 new units had been constructed; it
was then estimated that commercial re-investment was pushing
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1000 people from Pioneer Square to areas adjacent to Pike Place
Market and the area between Westlake and 1-5 (See Figure 4의.
In 1974, the Skid Road Community Council asked Seattle City
Council to develop a short term strategy for downtown housing. In
1976, the Council created a task force to rehabilitate as many as
31 ,893 units but only 14 units were ever rehabilitated. The
following year, 1977, the Seattle Tenant Rights Association
proposed that rent control be adopted. Over 4,000 signatures were
collected in support. The Seattle Apartment Owners Association
opposed the proposal and Mayor Uhlman and the Council unanimously
rejected the proposal. The Council created another task force to
deal with the newly discovered city-wide redlining phenomenon. The
Task Force on Redlining split on fundamental philosophical issues
and fair housing issues were dropped for another decade. The City
pursued its own strategies based upon federal funding of projects.
The Department of Community Development under Mayor Royer was
unpop비ar with the neighborhoods as the promoter of scatter-site
low-income pu비ic housing.
The Seattle Displacement Coalition (SDC) was formed in
February, 1977 to fight high-rise condominium proposals,
gentrification, and displacement of local businesses along Broadway
on Capitol Hill to the east of downtown. Its first event was a debate
between "mayoral candidates Paul Schell and Charles Royer on the
issue of urban displacement. The coalition was an advocacy group
backed by the Church Council of Greater Seattle with offices in the
Fremont neighborhood (near the University of Washington campus).
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The coalition testified at hearings, held debates, and met with
developers over breakfasts to negotiate. Its strength was its power
to delay as well as "overloading" public hearings with 200 to 300
people prepared to testify. The two major forces in the SOC during
this study period were John Fox and the Rev. David Bloom. John Fox
worked for the Fremont Neighborhood Association before working
full time, at $12,000 per year, for the SOC "Displacement Project,"
financed by a grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Fox is still active in housing issues in Seattle and
provided material for this study. Rev. David Bloom is an ordained
American Baptist Minister formerly in the University Baptist Church.
Bloom is presentlyactive in the controversy over Seattle's huge
homeless shelters at Seattle Center. Both activists were disliked
by the business community. John Gilmore, then executive vice
president of the Downtown Seattle Development Association, now
president, called the SOC "againers," .people who are “against"
anything proposed, in this case, growth or new construction. Of
course, Fox responded in a Seattle Post-Intelliaencer profile, that
wasn't so: "We're for compatible growth that preserves and
enhances the existing character and economic and social diversity of
Seattle's neighborhoods." There was also friction between city
planners and housing activists. City planners accused the housing
activists of making deals with developers outside the zoning code
and creating "chaos." Fox’s view as expressed to the newspaper was
that planners made wrong decisions: "Their decisions tend to reflect
the special interests."2
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Atthis time, in the late 1970s,’ condominium conver댐s히ior아n
created the greatest cαor까)n까trove하r댐sy. The Displacement Coalition
wanted stronger State Environmental Protection Act (SEPA) impact
standards to fight condominium conversions. The Seattle Tenant’s
Union proposed an immediate moratorium on condominium
conversions w]1ich was backed by Council member Michael Hildt. As
chair of the Urban Development and Housing Committee of Seattle
City Council, Hildt drafted a "Housing Policy Plan. 11 This plan
contained a number of ideas which formed the future agenda for
housing activists: rezoning single family and multi-family parcels,
subsidizing developers to build housing, allowing building permits to
be denied if people were to be displaced, and requiring maintenance
and occupancy of existing multi-family units.
In December of 1978, 300 housing activists attended the
Seattle Housing Convention and passed a resolution calling for a
capital gains tax, rent control and rent stabilization, prohibitions on
demolition of multi-family housing, a moratorium on condominium
conversion until the vacancy rate rose to 5 percent, and withholding
of public moneys from projects which would result in the loss of
low-income housing.
Activists rallied at City Hall on occasion, pushing to save
particular buildings or emergency housing legislation. The Royer
administration sought to increase the housing supply by rezoning the
neighborhoods for higher density.
In 1980, the Department of Community Development issued a
Downtown Housing Report which made it clear that market forces
were destroying downtown housing. The conclusions are worth
repeating as a snapshot of a crisis situation:
The poor, the old, the alone, live downtown in housing
which uniquely meets their needs for low rents and
access to services.
The downtown housing stock is quickly disappearing.
Over half of downtown’s housing, 16,000 units, has been
lost since 1960.
The housing for the poor has already been built. When it
is. lost it is not replaced. The loss is not only to the
individual downtown residents, it is a loss to the City.
The displaced people must live somewhere. Housing
available under "Government Programs" is not being built
at a rate which can begin to meet the need; and fewer
units are being made available by Congress because of
the expense of subsidy units.
Costs in social, police and health services also increase
elsewhere when individuals are unable to find housing.
Loss of housing downtown increases pressure in the
remaining rental stock forcing rental rates even higher
and vacancies lower. Transiency increases. Pressure on
social services is great from clients who require
assistance with every basic need· food, shelter, health.
The downtown housing problem is acute, immediate and
is a problem of losing a nonrenewable resource.
The housing crisis affects all Seattle neighborhoods, but
it affects downtown most dramatically. The entire City
experiences low housing vacancy rates, increasing
demand, rapidly rising rents and mortgage payments,
sca.rce vacant land, development pressure, and
displacement, which sum up to a very serious housing
problem Take these factors and add poverty, the
problems and needs of the elderly, central city business
growth, deteriorating. housing and the result is the very
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severe downtown housing dilemma for which answers are
imperative.3
HOUSING PRESERVAllON ORDINANCE
The City responded to the housing and political crisis by
passing a housing preservation ordinance (HPO). The ordinance
required replacement of low-income housing downtown or
alternatively, a contribution to the City’s housing fund. The housing
activists were supported by the Church Council of Greater Seattle
and the Catholic Archdiocese. The Seattle Downtown Development
Association criticized the proposal as placing an unfair burden upon
downtown interests. The HPO barely passed 5-4. The chief sponsor
was Michael Hildt. Council members Paul Kraabel, Norm Rice and
Randy Revelle also supported the measure. Council member George
Benson was the unexpected swing vote in favor, although later he
changed his mind and contributed to the weakening of the ordinance.
The HPO was considered an emergency measure. Housing downtown
was rapidly disappearing.
The symb이 of the fight, the Devonshire Apartment building,
was to be demolished by developer Martin Selig for an office tower.
As the HPO did not prohibit demolition but levied a tax to discourage
demolition and conversion of land from residential to commercial,
Martin Selig was able to proceed with the project. The cost was
$107 per square foot and a $1000 relocation payment to each
displaced tenant.
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Rent Control
Initiative 24, a rent control measure, widened the issue from
the Council to the electorate. The initiative proposed to:
- roll back rents to January 1, 1979 plus an increase equal to
half the Consumer Price Index
- estabUsh a board to review further increases
- restrict demolition and conversion of rentals
- hear eviction appeals based upon "just cause" criteria
Rent control was opposed by builders, realtors, brokers,
bankers, apartment owners and developers, all organized as the
"Washington Coalition for Affordable Housing." The Coalition
countered with an alternative package - a bond issue to build 1,000
to 3,500 housing units, city-wide upzonings, and reduction of
apartment parking standards. The DSDA came out in support of a
bond issue to build affordable housing. Jon Rur댐tad and Paul Schell
organized the Seattle Housing Resources Group to provide low-
income housing as alternative to rent control. Mayor Charles Royer
refused to support rent control. But he used the threat of rent
control to get support of the bond issue from the downtown business
community. As Royer later remarked, "I have no problem using rent
control as a way of getting housing built in this city." The rent
control initiative failed by a 2-1 margin. Opponents spent
approximately $800,000 to defeat the measure.
The HPO was further weakened when Council member Benson
changed his mind. James Mason of the DSDA drafted an amendment
to rescind fees if housing were to be replaced within three years.
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The DSDA used the "1i한Ie guy" argument to claim that small
property owners found the tax to be an insurmountable obstacle to
expanding and remaining in business, an infringement on property
rights. Royer threatened a veto and a compromise was reached
whereby the demolition fee was put on a sliding scale based upon the
disparity in rent between old and replacement housing. Despite the
revision, the resulting compromise was a significant victory for the
activists because it institutionalized the City's commitment to
interfere with the norma히10야pe’rat센ior아n댐1
c。아mmitme하nt wou비j씨|버d become a significant pro야b비i끼|뼈em for the City in the
course of adopting the housing component of the Land Use and
Transportation Project downtown plan.
The Seattle Displacement Coalition commissioned a series of
reports in 1979 which led to the conclusion that growth itself
created displacement throughout the city. The Commission expected
that by 1985, 30.000 new jobs in downtown alone would combine
with regional growth to create a demand for 20,000 additional
housing units in the City of Seattle. Only 7,000 units were likely to
be built. Newcomers would be forced to rent and rents would rise
between 46 percent to 60 percent Approximately 14 percent to 22
percent of the rent increase would be attributable to increases in
downtown employment.4 This new understanding of growth impacts
led to an alliance with energy conservationists to call for limits to
growth. The Seattle Displacement Coalition formed the Downtown
Neighborhood Alliance to specifically tie zoning allowances with
resulting housing, transportation, infrastructure and energy impacts.
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The Displacement Coalition hoped that by forming the DNA. citizen
activists could focus on the causes of displacement rather than
continually fight brush fires such as the demolition of the
Devonshire.
LAND USE AND TRANSPORTATION P내N HOUSING POLICY
The background document prepared to facilitate the Land Use
and TransDortation Plan was ambivalent about the connection
between growth and displacement It argued that “growth improves
the prospects for achieving the City’s goal of more housing in and
around downtown. It also makes older apartments and residential
hotels in the downtown core more susceptible to redevelopment or
conversion to more economic uses." The questions of whether to
maintain affordable downtown housing or to relocate housing to the
surrounding neighborhoods. what would happen to Skid Road and
special pop비ation groups. how to balance downtown needs with
other low-income neighborhoods. and. other issues were presented
in neutral theoretical tones: “What proportion of the current lower
income residents downtown would prefer to live elsewhere if they
could find housing?5 Despite dire warnings of a housing crisis from
Seattle’s Office of Long-range Planning in 1979 and the City’s
Department of Community Developn뼈nt in 1980. the Seattle City
Council concluded in December. 1981 that interim controls on
growth were not required.
In 1983. the issue was revisited. The Draft Land Use and
TransDortation Plan called for an additional 4.000 - 5.000 downtown
297
housing units. The plan called for an affordable housing program to
maintain the then current stock of 8,671 low-income units (half-
subsidized). Three "options" were identified: an accessory housing
requirement, a housing zoning bonus, and an inclusionary
requirement for housing as part of commercial projects.
Option #1 - Accessory Housing Requirement. This
program would require that all new commercial
development provide housing as an accessory use at the
rate of 300 square feet of housing for every 1000 square
feet of commercial development. Housing units provided
under this requirement could be sold or rented. Housing
could be provided on- or off-site and anywhere in
downtown through new construction or rehabilitation of
vacant structures. The planners estimated that
approximately 4000 to 5000 downtown units would be
produced over the next 20 years and result in a 3 percent
to 5 percent increase in construction costs.
An optional payment to a “Downtown Housing Trust Fund"
would build low-income housing. A payment of $5 per
square foot was estimated to raise $15 million,
sufficient to build 620 low-income units. Mayor Royer
had floated this option in his "State of the City'· address
that year. The DSDA was vigqrously opposed.
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Option #2 - Housing Bonus. This incentive program would
allow additional commercial space in exchange for the
provision of affordable housing units. The housing bonus
would complement the use of other bonuses, granted for
providing on-site public amenities Approximately 800 to
1000 units woul.d be produced at no greater expense than
other incentive pu비ic amenities. This was the DSDA
program; later, both Council members Street and Noland
unsuccessfully sought to reshape the program to favor
housing over building amenities and to count low-income
housing before 'middle-income housing.
Option #3 - Inclusionary Housing requirement. Ten
percent of all new housing would be required to be
affordable to low and moderate-income households.
Three to five hundred units would be produced at the
expense of a slight increase in the cost of market rate
housing and possibly a slight reduction in the number of
market rate units built.6
These options would operate in conjunction with the City’s
existing Housing Preservation Ordinance (HPO) and transferable
development rights (TOR) zoning regulations. The accessory housing
program, although officially listed as one of three options was rated
vastly more effective by the planning staff in various analyses
throughout the planning process. Planners also noted that tax
increment financing funding of housing urban renewal programs was
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prohibited by the state. State legislation prevented the City from
using the po~er of condemnation and proceeds from tax revenues to
facilitate private development of affordable housing.
The homeless crisis was the most visible housing
displacement issue at this time. The Seattle Weeklv and P으흐뇨
Intelliaencer newspapers pu비ished reports calling attention to the
homelessness. Panhandling and vagrancy were conspicuous; the
DSDA called for a legal ban on panhandling.7
Under Washington law. draft and final environmental impact
statements were required for each alternative proposal. The impact
statement analyzed the proposed p이icies and actions of city hall
planners and alternatives suggested by community participants.
These proposals were examined in terms of impacts upon the housing
supply. mitigation of impact. and unavoidable impact. The 딛펴한
Environmental Imeact Statement for the Land Use and Transeortation
E마파y..， released in October. 1983. contained a complicated section
on the plan's expected impacts on housing demand and supply. The
impact statement analyzed five basic alternatives: (1) the proposed
action by planning staff; (2) the Allied Arts/Department of
Community Development/Denny Regrade proposal; (3 and 4) two
alternatives based upon theoretical models of "Limited growth" and
"Regional employment center;l' and (5) no action. The planning
staff’s proposed action included accessory housing requirements.
housing bonuses and incentives; inclusionary requirements. and
pu비ic programs funded loc머Iy or by the federal government. Most
of the housing bonuses were oriented toward provision of middle-
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income housing. The other alternatives were basic려Iy variants on
the theme.
The housing market is generally divided into low, middle and
high-income segments. The draft impact statement forecast that
the real estate market would provide upscale housing but also
forecast “the Joss of low-income residential building due to
demolitions, code-enforcement closures and renovation of low-
income units to middle income units.s Each basic alternative
envisioned additional downtown low-income housing units being
lost. Without public action, the Environmental Impact Statement
forecast a net loss of 909 low income units, from 6,615 housing
units to 5,706 units. The City’s draft plan promised no loss of· low-
income units. Other options varied between 5,578 and 5,717 new
units by the year 2000.9 The draft EIS considered the accessory
housing requirement to be most effective in providing low-income
housing units compared to housing bonuses or inclusionary zoning.
The accessory housing requirement could be expected to create
2,100 units compared to 220 and 430 respectively. The draft EIS
proposed a potential range of measures to reduce the “unavoidable
adverse impacts" of 잉rowth. These included a strong accessory
housing requirement, a strengthened Housing Preservation Ordinance,
and an anti-abandonment ordinance which “would restrict the length
of time that a structure can remain vacant, after which the owner
would be subject to a civil penalty or fine."1o
The accessory housing requirement became an issue which
clearly divided developers and architects from neighborhood and
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housing interests. Because each organization responded to the draft
EIS, associated correspondence and testimony provides a record of
each organization’s position at this crucial point in time. The
following list summarizes the actors and their positions:
The Downtown Seattle Association flatly stated that an
accessory hOlJsing requirement was illegal. Housing was a city-wide
pro비em; the role of downtown was to provide regional office,
service and retail employment.
The Downtown Neighborhood Alliance and People for
Downtown Housing called for an expansion of the accessory housing
requirement, actually expanding protective regulations so that 러|
persons earning less than $12,000 would receive rehabilitated
shelter.
Each group’s position was consistent with its position in
general on voluntary vs. mandatory housing requirements:
• The DSA believed that housing could only be encouraged and
never required. A “superbonus" should be considered which would
allow floor area even beyond the routine maximum floor area
permi한ed with bonuses (20:1 FAR). The bonus should be
recalculated with more favorable housing costs and market
assumptions. In addition, the TOR program should be liberalized.
People for Downtown Housing called for controls on
abandonment, tougher restrictions on the demolition of low-cost
housing, a more realistic housing production estimate based on TOR,
and a cap on growth to one-half that allowed by the plan.
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The Downtown Neighborhood Alliance accused the City of
retreating from a previous commitment to maintain and expand low-
income ~ousing by calling housing loss unavoidable in the EIS draft.
The effect of growth on neighborhoods, city services, housing
costs were qu‘갤tioned by these activist organizations.
Interestingly, both the League of Women Voters and Allied Arts took
no stance on the issue.
Mavor’s Recommended Draft
The Mayor’s Recommended Draft dropped the accessory housing
requirement and low-income inclusionary requirement in the face of
business community opposition and the uncertain legal environment.
In 1982 the Washington Supreme Court had declared that local
residential subdivision exactions were iIIegal.11 While the case
was pending, the Washington Legislature pre-empted mandatory
local development impact mitigation fees. .The statute allowed for
voluntary agreements limited to payments for impact mitigation
"reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed
development."12 The City argued that affordable housing could only
be legally provided by existing programs, bond issues and an
incentive system. The housing bonus plan would link additional floor
area with the construction or funding of "low and moderate income
units. These were defined as households with less than 150 percent
of the Seattle area median income.13 However, neighborhood and
housing activists were also assured by proposed p이icy language of
the City’s commitment to maintain, if not expand, the supply of low
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income housing stock by the final EIS statement. The City sought to
repair the credibility gap without using all the tools at its disposal.
With the loss of a linkage program, the City was forced to rely
upon a long list of proposed actions to stabilize the Year 2000
supply of low income housing. Subsidized units would have to
replace unsubsidized. units which market forces would cause to be
demolished, abandoned or gentrified. Figure 39A from the EIS,
reproduced here as Figure 43, represents one “scenario," in which
TOR provisions, floor area bonuses, housing maintenance and a
revised housing preservation ordinance are added to on-going public
housing programs. These programs were expected to result in
maintenance of 1443 units compared to the projected gain of 2,160
units through the accessory housing program.
The LUTP envisioned that approximately 1.6 million square
feet of office development rights would be gained through use of the
housing bonus, primarily in the Downtown office core. Yet, by
placing housing at the highest tier of floor area bonus incentives,
only the largest pr이ects would be required to provide housing.
Earlier drafts did place housing in a greater priority position, but
architects and developers had insisted that hillclimbs or arcades
were more integral to the pr이ect and thus a greater public benefit
than housing produced by the incentive system. While the floor area
bonus system was expected to produce relatively few new low
income units, it became an important planning controversy when
Seattle-ites weighed the benefit vs. cost of projects such as the
TABLE 39A
DOWNTO써N LOW INCOME HOUSING PROGRAM: PROPOSED ACTION
Subsidized Unsubsidized Total
1983 SUPPLY 3.185 4,126 7,311
εHAlfGES IN SUPPLY:
A. Oem이 itions &Closures o (812) (812)
8. Rent Increases o (810) (810)
C. Current Construction1 111 0 III
D. CDBG Programs 1.151 (1 .151) o
E. Transfer of D(meveR1)op-
ment Rights 792 (653) 139
F. Floor Area Bonuses 143 0 143
G. H(RPeOh/aSbection 3l2
l1 itatfon) 455 0 455
H. HPO (He배 43 0 43
I.D배ev0e.}1{oopumsein9
nt Grants 193 o 193
J.R에elDhabRein1tia1
_ Reliabi 1f tation 300 (300) o
K. Other Programs* 538 o 538
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2000 SUPPLY 400 7.311
SOURCE: Department of Cα1IlIunfty Development. June 1984.•
~ Other future loca I. state. federal and prf vate programs.
lSI-units-tn 뻐rket House and 60 units fn South Arcade.
104
Fiaure 43. Downtown Low Income Program. From City of
Seattle, Draft Environmental Imoact Statement for the
Land Use and TransDortation Plan (1984).
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Washington Mutual tower (see Figures 20 and 44). In an incentive
system, public vs. private benefit becomes a question of pricing.
LUTP assumed average land values of $250 per square feet and
a discount factor of 0.8 to provide an incentive to developers;
typical development would generate about $20 in housing assistance
per square foot of bonused office space.
$250 per square foot
1'0-FAR" - "- _. x 0.8 Discount Factor =$20 square foot
= Value development rights
These numbers attempted to link land values to housing costs:
The Proposed Action would structure the housing bonus
to respond to future changes in office core land values
(and hence value of development rights gained through
the bonus), housing production costs, and household
incomes of downtown workers. Thus, as office core land
prices increase due to redevelopment, a portion of the
increase in value will be captured to assist the
production of affordable downtown housing. Bonused
housing is likely to be produced on less expensive
downtown land, such as in the Denny Regrade and
International District. If housing production costs
increase at a slower rate than office ·core land prices,
the number of units assisted would be greater than
estimated in this analysis. Conversely, the opposite
would be true ifinflation in housing production costs
exceed increases on office core land prices.14
Court Invalidates HPO
These estimates were conditioned upon controls over housing
demolition and abandonment, i.e. the Housing Preservation Ordinance.
The Housing Preservation Ordinance was considered essential to
retard speculative pressure on “affordable" housing. The 1980 HPO
306
RA)뼈ARE뼈A껴O
E】빼mpleofT봄힘dFARSct홉dule in Office core 1 Dis힘야
260\
Fiaure 44. Housing Bonus. From City of Seattle, Land Use
and Transoortation Plan (1985).
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was strengthened by LUTP to require that units demolished
downtown would be replaced downtown, demolition license fees and
relocation payments to displaced tenants were increased; low-
income housing was to be counted on. a four square foot to one basis.
However, the 1980 HPO was invalidated by the Washington State
court in April ,.1987. The court based its decision upon 1982
legislation which prohibited real property exactions. The Court
ruled that the City could not constitutionally pass on the “social
costs" of housing displacement to the developers alone. The City
was required to return $1.3 million. Most of the money ($1.1
million) was returned to Metro which had paid the fee as part of its
bus terminal project. The successful litigants, San Telmo
Associates, had ties to OSA and the business community.15
Inclusionary requirements were also eased by the Mayor’s
Recommended Plan. The 10 percent I꺼clusionary zoning requirement
applied to moderate income households only. The Mayor’s
recommended draft dropped reference to low-income households and
set moderate income levels at 150 percent of the area median
Income.
A more palatable regulatory device was the transfer of
development rights regulation (TOR) which realized profits for
owners of sn뀐II residential properties. The TOR proposal allowed
“unused"- development rights to be transferred from low income
housing to any site within an office or mixed use commercial
district downtown, provided that the donor (housing) site be
retained in low income housing for a period of at least 20 years.
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Although the TDR system also worked with historic structures, by
assuming that the system would work on the basis of proportionate
supply, about three-quarters of the transactions was expected t。
involve low-income housing. Both Denny Regrade and downtown
owners would benefit:
Most low income housing TDR transactions will involve
sending (housing) sites where land prices are relatively
low, such as the Denny Regrade and International
District, and receiving (commercial) sites in the two
office districts where land is much more expensive. This
will occur for two reasons: (1) the proposed density
schedules in the office areas would 0메y permit use of
the housing bonus or low income housing TDR to achieve
the highest densities, and (2) the development rights are
more valuable if sold to sites in office areas·1 6
TDR’s were considered an important part of the “incentive
system." It was hoped that TDR’s would account for almost one-
fourth of the incentive space which would be gained through TDR or
bonus incentives (about 1.5 million square feet). ,This would provide
a total of 139 low-income housing units. The largest potential
supply of low-income assistance, Community Development Block
Grants (CDBG), was assumed to work in conjunction with the HPO
。rdinance. This program would rehabilitate 1,151 units.
Business Commitment
In implicit exchange for dropping the accessory housing
provision and low-income inclusionary requirements, the Mayor’s
Recommended plan reiterated the call for private business support
The City is seeking a commitment from the downtown
business community to work aggressively and
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cooperatively in the retention of a supply of 7,311 low
income downtown housing units. The business
community shall agree to participate in low income
housing' programs through its own nonprofit housing arm,
the Seattle Housing Resources Group, or other mutually
agreed to mechanisms, which may include a downtown
wide assessment district for public improvements.17
This was rhetoric on the part of the City, as the plan no longer
specifically aSKed for 500 new units from the business community.
The business community had softened the original planning staff
proposals to the point of rhetoric. Sm.all pro때φp야er야따tyo뻐W빼n맨er댄s i씨n the
De밍nr까Ir깨 Regrade were the only commercial interests adversely
affected by the LUTP. Their properties were downzoned to
residential use preventing spec비ative commercial investments.
DSA lent its support to the subsequent campaign to pass a city-wide
housing levy. A $49.975 million housing levy was passed in 1985.
Approximately, 1,100 units could be built with these funds.
CITIZENS' ALTERNATIVE PLAN CHALLENGE
Even as the Land Use and Transportation Plan was being
adopted in June of 1985, the housing crisis intensified. The 흐르르깐얻
工펙료를， Sea한Ie Weeklv, and the Post-Intelliaencer pu비ished repo야s.
The Post Intelliaencer called its series, "Broken Housing, Broken
Promises." Only 6,000 low income units were counted in downtown.
The City administration was short 1,300 low-income units within a
year of its commitment. The City explained that there had been a
miscount of several hundred and that two hundred units had been
simply upgraded and only 330 units demolished. Another $50 million
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levy was passed to construct senior low-income housing. In 1987, it
was estimated by the newspapers that there were 12,000 to 14,000
homeless people on the streets of Seattle. By 1988, the City felt
comp에led to impose a moratorium on the issuance of permits for
demolitions or change of use of low-income housing throughout the
city (Ordinan밍 113821 , effective February 8, 1988). Vision
Seattle, a community based civic group, claimed credit for the
moratorium.
Low-income housing continued to disappear despite the new
p이icy. Seattle activists noted that the Washington Mutual Tower,
the first tower to be built under the new LUTP rules and completed
by November, 1988, would demolish the Savoy Apartments which
contained a vacant 225 units.18 When the Council considered
revising the housing bonus program to target the low-income the
DSA objected.
When CAP was filed in 1989, the Council responded prior to the
vote by imposing interim controls, eight years after the first
request by the Seattle Displacement Coalition. The Council
appointed a Downtown Plan Revisions Advisory Committee who
altered the bonus system to make housing a de facto requirement
and lowered FARs. Growth issues, housing displacement, and housing
affordability issues had coalesced in the CAP debate.
The planners had argued that it was not possible to isolate the
impacts of new office construction on the housing costs downtown
and throughout Seattle. They argued that it was impossible to
estimate the impact of growth:
It is difficult to isolate the impacts of new office
construction on the availability of low income housing
downtown. ... There is a basic amount of downtown low
income housing (between 800 and 900 units) that is in
such poor condition, that if it is not demolished for new
construction it will be lost through other closures, and
vice versa; the overall total of low income housing loss
would remain the same for all Alternatives....
It is not possible to quantify the effects of downtown
employment growth on housing prices in Seattle’s
neighborhoods outside of downtown, due to the complex
relationship between housing and employment. The
generalized theory of this relationship is as follows:
employment growth means growth of labor and then
population growth to provide that labor. Population
growth, in turn, means growth of households which, in
turn, means increased demand for housing. This
increased competition could mean upwards pressure on
prices and rents. The amount of increase in prices and
rents depends on the extent of imbalance between supply
and demand and on the ability and willingness of housing
consumers to pay higher prices and rents. It also
depends on whether the housing market automatically
responds with new development to increase the supply.
Generally, employment growth would mean that housing
prices are likely to be higher than they otherwise would
be.
However, there are many complicating factors. For one
thing, housing demand and employment levels are
regional phenomena. Housing prices have increased
dramatically throughout the region in recent years, and
prices are likely to increase in the future even if future
growth is shifted from downtown to other parts of the
reg,lon.
It is difficult to isolate the effect of employment
growth on housing costs, since at anyone time other
factors also contribute to the demand for, and the supply
of, housing; employment levels, especially employment
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levels inonly one section of the region (downtown
Seattle) is only one factor, and proba비y not the most
important one. Other factors affecting housing prices
include changes in life style (such as increased demand
for in-city living), changing demographic and household
characteristics (such as smaller family .sizes but greater
number of households), the attractiveness of the Puget
Sound region and Seattle as places to live, the
attractiveness of real estate as an investment, etc. The
cost and availability of money for housing construction
and purchases have played a very significant role in
setting housing price levels in recent years. Financing
has been available only at very high interest rates, due to
the inability of savings and Iqan institutions to attract
inexpensive deposits in competition with alternative
saving vehicles.19
Yet, housing activists charged City complicity in “bulldozing
the poor." John Fox, the most prominent activist, wrote that Seattle
had traded off its soul for a glitzy downtown:
There is much talk about the liveability of Seattle for
the middle class and families. Yet the city is losing its
middle class as more families join an “underclass" of
long-time residents-minorities, elderly and the poor.
They coexist with a growing class of young professionals
who are the recipients of the jobs created by the
highrise explosion. Nowhere. are the contrasts as visible
as they are on downtown streets, where ‘yuppies’
uncomfortably rub shoulders with an army of unemployed
and homeless street people.
Downtown growth, however, is notmerely a product of
changing market conditions. There are conscious
decisions made by locally elected officials which
promote the office boom at the expense of other
economic options for Seattle. The city, Metro, the State
of Washington and the federal government will spend
over one billion dollars in the next three or four years to
accommodate more office growth downtown. They will
provide added transit capacity (the downtown bus
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tunnel) , a convention center, a new Westlake park, an a바
museum, and numerous street improvements for the area.
More city services -sewer, water, electric wiring,
police, fire - are also earmarked for downtown.
While the city allocates a large chunk of its budget each
year to support the office boom, it spends little to
minimize the effects of that growth on downtown’s long-
time residents. Only about four million dollars will be
available city wide this year for low-income housing
production. Most of these funds come from federal
sources that are drying up. It costs more than $50,000
to rehab or construct a new single unit of low-income
housing. Roughly $20,000 of that is borne by the city,
using federal funds. The rest of the funding comes from
non-profit housing organizations -foundations, churches-
or private developers meeting what replacement
requirements do exist. During the coming year, city
programs will be lucky to add 400 units to the low-
income stock. In downtown alone, developers already
have applied for permits to demolish 700 low-rent units
in 1986.20
Vision Seattle and Citizens for an Alternative Plan also
disagreed with the City’s neutral conclusion. The CAP resolution
directly ties liberal permitted floor areas and amenity-oriented
bonuses to displacement of the poor and an affordability crisis for
the middle-class:
WHEREAS, thousands of units of downtown low-income
housing have been lost in recent years to office
deve|opmeItdangerof demo|ition; and
WHEREAS, the city-subsidized replacement of downtown
low-income housing lost s이ely because of office
development will cost taxpayers millions of dollars,
which could better be spent for other purposes if such
housing were preserved; and
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WHEREAS, overdevelopment of downtown office space
will adversely affect the city’s residential
neighborhoods, driving up the price of homes, depriving
middle income families of the option of living in Seattle,
and increasing the likelihood of residential up-zones in
single family areas21
CAP put restrictions on growth and put low-income housing
much farther down the bonus tier. Floor area ratios were reduced to
7:1 and less without provision of housing. To build a moderately-
sized building a developer must now support housing.
∞NC나JSION
The continued loss of housing throughout the study period
presented two very different challenges to housing activists and the
downtown business community. Housing activists, themselves
negatively affected by the ever worsening housing market, saw this
issue as crucial to Seattle’s quality of life at the least and a matter
of survival at the extreme. These activists, with the help of
Commissioner Hildt, pushed thorough a housing preservation
ordinance although they failed to pass rent control. The downtown
business community accepted housing displacement as the price of
re-investment in the core. The Downtown Seattle Development
Association organized an ineffectual promotional campaign to
attract middle-class residents as its first response to the crisis.
The DSDA fought both rent control and the housing preservation
ordinance. DSDA supported a housing bond issue as an alternative to
rent control and the DSDA fought the HPO in the name of the small
real estate owner. Although business owners were eventually able
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to have the courts rescind the HPO, its temporary survival thanks to
Hildt and Royer22 signaled that the urban regime split between
downtown business interests and progressive City Council
p이iticians.. The urban regime was unable to agree that economic
development imperatives superseded all public regulation of private
housing investment decisions. (Figure 45 illustrates splits in the
urban regime at the beginning of this case stUdy period.)
The Land Use and Transportation Plan allowed activists to turn
to other progressive tools such as accessory and inclusionary
housing requirements, linkage and city housing programs. These
proposals were supported initially by the Royer administration and
were proposed in the first plan draft. DSDA opposition shifted the
emphasis back to government funded and taxpayer supported
programs. LUTP planners retreated to a defensive position; the Draft
and Final Environmental Impact Statements decoupled continuous
downt。wn growth and continued housingisp|acer Itforcedto posit an un|ike|y scenario i which 7,311 low-income
housing units would be saved by hypothetical use of housing bonuses.
The relatively low influence of the housing activists is illustrated
by the last place assigned to housing in the original bonus system.
As the Land Use and Transportation Plan got closer to Council
passage, incentives for provision of housing were lessened,
requirements became encouragement and business was asked only
for promises. The business community did support both bond issues,
but these funds were levied on a city-wide basis and administered
by the DSDA’s own housing development arm. The urban regime
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followed its disposition to accept the business community’s
preference for city-wide funding. (As if Portland were to extend its
tax increment financing boundary to the entire city and privatize
POC.)
The urban regime effectively ignored the housing crisis as it
worsened. By 1988, activists estimated that 12,000 to 14,000
homeless were on the streets of Seattle. The Seattle Displacement
Coalition had tied housing losses to downtown growth as early as
1979. The City was open to criticism that it subsidized downtown
development at the expense of downtown low-income housing and
the city’s residential neighborhoods. The activists equated this
favoritism to depriving middle income families of the option of
living in Seattle and increasing the likelihood of rezoning single
family neighborhoods to apartment zones. The Citizens' Alternative
Plan referendum confronted the urban .regime with the powerf비
neighborhood fears of middle-class displacement.23 CAP combined
housing, urban design and environmental issues - a combination of
demands beyond the urban regime’s ability to control. This was an
unmanageable p이itical factor. The disposition of the courts and the
legislature had worked in favor of OSOA/OSA positions, but the
activists had shifted the debate from property rights and the limited
dialogue of the downtown urban regime to a city-wide issue. This
challenged LUTP’s position that growth could be harnessed to
neutralize the negative impacts of growth.
These unresolved conflicts over housing policy reflect the
differing p이itical styles in Portland and Seattle. Portland came to
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a compromise and then reduced the strength of the activists through
the redefinition of the problem from North Burnside to North
Downtown. The total acceptance of redevelopment outside the
Skidmore/Old Town historic district and resultant displacement was
only tempered by the inability of the regime to ship the transients
elsewhere. Large business owners dominated redevelopment p이icy.
In' Seattle, the city-wide impact of the housing crisis brought city-
wide attention to this issue. The failure of LUTP to manage the
issue and the absence of an effective public response undercut the
public’s willingness to allow a private-oriented approach which left
the issue to the good .works of SHRUG . The urban regime must now
accommodate an alternative agenda. This activist agenda may
rebalance the trade-off between growth and housing supply.
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CHAPTERIX
CONTRASTS IN URBAN REGIMES
HOW깨EUR없N REGIMES OPERATE
Portland
In Portland, the business association, private consultants and
public bureaucracies are indistinguishable. Representatives of
banks, utilities, large property owners and large property-owning
corporations serve on the boards of commissions such as PDC on an
on-going basis or an ad hoc basis on pr이ects such as Portland’s
Future Focus. (The Future Focus strategic plan effort acknowledged
them as “stakeh이ders.")
The Terry Schrunk/BiII Roberts days have passed, but the
Portland Development Commission and Association for Portland
Progress are adept players. The same small group of private
consultants are useful to PDC and larger business interests, project
after project, issue after issue. Furthermore, westside downtown
interests are quickly coming to terms with new players such as
Pacific Development, Inc. on the eastside. The ease with which the
Planning Bureau put together a “Blue Ribbon" committee to ratify
the Central City development review process - the “Central City
Fundamental Guidelines" - indicates that the local influentials such
as downtown property owners Bill Naito or Melvin Mark, utility
executive William Scott in Lloyd District, and entrepreneur Jack
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Burns on the eastside are well known and accommodated. These are
all legitimate members of the growth machine or entrepreneurial
regime. 1
A potential rupture in this remarkable consensus among the
growth coalition over Cadillac-Fairview was averted when a new
system of private business participation in POC projects was
institutionalized for Rouse. A new request for proposal system
allowed local firms full warning of POC initiatives.
With the completion of the Central City Plan and the adoption
of two urban renewal districts on the eastside, especi히ly around
the Convention Center, little downtown land lies outside PDC's
domain.2 Westside/eastside conflict has been replaced by debates
over core vs. suburban development restraints such as regional
parking limitations or expansion of the urban growth boundary which
restricts spec비ative development on far.m land. The potentially
disruptive Central City Plan issue - unequal parking restrictions on
west and east sides - is now being quietly decided. A p이icy
committee consisting of City Council members and Association for
Portland Progress representatives will pass on previous work by a
citizen's committee and bureaucratic technical committee.
Presently, the City Council expects development disputes to be
resolved internally without City Council debate, much less a role for
citizen ballot initiatives. Crime and city/suburban disputes
displace Downtown Portland issues. All city council candidates
support downtown growth, presented as a pro-environmental p이icy
to avoid regional sprawl. An entrepreneurial urban regime is united
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in pursuit of a common “p이itics of profit."3 Yet, little of this
seems forced. The 1980’s represented the institutionalization of
city involvement in private development decisions and an easy
involvement of influentials in city p이itics. The city plans on the
basis of influentials who seek government involvement in a
relatively weak economic climate. A vision, such as returning the
east bank of the river to Portlanders, in the spirit of Tom McCall,
can animate an activist group such as Riverfront for People but only
for a short time. Most citizen involvement is eventually managed in
carefully tailored committees. This mechanism works against
individual influentialsas well. Not all the demands of individual
members of the regime were met. For example, the City Council
turned down most demands for individual floor area increases in the
Central City Plan. Council members can usually check with the
Association for Portland Progress to differentiate an individual
interest from general business concerns.
Portland elections have not challenged CBD growth as in
Seattle since the 1950s. Successful local businessmen are
integrated into Portland decision-making regardless of the
administration (unlike the abrupt transition in Seattle from Royer to
Rice) Portland even has an unofficial mayor, Bill Naito. Elkin’s
criticisms of Dahl’s pluralism seem reasonable in Portland.
Portland .is a place where the “institutional context" promotes an
entrepreneurial regime. Elkin’s description of an entrepreneurial
regime p이itics in Dallas fits Portland just as well:
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The essential point of difference between this sort of
political economy and the pluralist and federalist types
is that the behavior of pUblic officials in the
entrepreneurial version is not as much shaped by the
building of electoral organizations and political
coalitions. Concomitantly, public officials are less
drawn to land-use schemes to generate the stream of
benefits helpful to their electoral careers. Rather, they
are drawn to land-use schemes because the political
arrangements work to recruit those with a strong
disposition to ally themselves. with local
bu마s퇴5허i삐n.‘essmenπ..….Equ응a리‘“ ly’’ important, in entrepreneurial
political economies, insofar as citizens play an active
rqle in political life, they are drawn into p이itics either
to speak for their neighborhood, ethnic group or some
other interest or as a bureaucratic client.4
를료학낀르
Elkin’s description does not fit Seattle well. In Seattle, the
growth coalition split badly over Westlake Mall; local papers even
supported CAP. The local land use alliance was weakened by CAP.
The retailers could not even keep Pine Street open. The CAP
committee has turned into a de facto design commission despite
business (and their architects’) opposition. Vision Seattle’s
electoral challenge has put Margaret Pageler on the Council.
Early victories by downtown business interests such as
repositioning Westlake Park into a shopping mall, monopolizing
discussion of LUTP regulations and bonuses, and shifting the cost of
a housing program to a general bond issue are increasingly offset by
a distrustful electorate. A general distrust of government
involvement in private affairs prohibited the use of eminent domain
in the Westlake process. .And local environmental p이itics created a
325
requirement for an environmental impact statement and continues a
complex and antagonistic development review process. The
establishn띤nt entrepreneurial regime is in a trough. The functional
bureaucracy is fractured in Seattle. Numerous reorganizations and
lack of contact among planners has left a void. Most notably, the
lack of eminent domain power and tax increment financing leaves
the city with few carrots or sticks. The floor area bonuses scaled
down by CAP were some of the few carrots available to shape
downtown development
Seattle lacks the links between land use alliance, byreaucracy
and electorate that Portland enjoyed. For example, when Strachan’s
outsider, citizen-driven process Central City Plan faltered, poe
provided the requisite market perspective. The Planning and
Transportation Bureaus were able to translate the desire for
eastside downtown expansion into appropriate zoning and capital
improvements needed to push the expansion. In Seattle, the planners
success삐lIy negotiated a compromise acceptable to the more civic-
minded downtown interests but disregarded neighborhood-oriented
activists to the city’s peril.
Social p이icy ， as debated in the downtown plans or individual
initiatives, reflects the differing regime structures in both cities.
In Portland, Burnside Community Council stood as the only’
institution outside the regime consensus on “tough love." Only
Baloney Joe’s, run by the BCC, would provide homeless shelters
without regard to impact on neighboring property values. The close
links among the other social service providers, local governments
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and other funding sources led to the Clark-Shiels truce between
social service providers and influential property owners. BCC went
out of operation and North of Burnside became North Downtown -
incorporated into the arc from downtown to Lloyd Center. In return,
PDC was pressured to begin low-income projects throughout the
Central City (Downtown Housing Preservation Program). The
weakness of the housing activists was signaled by the failure of
their proposal to reconfigure poe into a housing development agency.
In Seattle, the fight over rent control, the housing
preservation ordinance and proposed LUTP linkage requirements
revealed a clear divide between the downtown business interests
and housing activists allied with the Greater Church Council of
Seattle. The formation of a privately funded counterpart to POC’s
Downtown Housing Preservation Program did not result in
diminished antagonism. Issues such as housing displacement have
resulted in city policies like the housing preservation ordinance,
which have led to numerous court battles and stalemate.
Both cities completed their Rouse projects. Portland
successfully negotiated conflict; Seattle survived conflict. The
ability of POC to reform the process - selection, negotiation and
financing through the RFQ and RFP process - allowed Bill Roberts,
chair of the Commission, to qUietly direct its retail mission. The
Rouse Company rer띤gotiations were never subject to significant
community oversight, much less challenge. The bumpy Seattle
process led to the creation of another political grouping, Victor
Steinbrueck’s Citizens Against Westlake (C.A.W.). Compromise was
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not satisfactory to later activists and Public for an Open Westlake's
frustration led to Vision Seattle.
During this study period, Portland and Seattle have pursued
remarkably similar CBD redevelopment p이icies. Both cities
proposed massive redevelopment schemes to modernize their cores
after the war. Modernization included new permissive zoning codes,
proposed demolition of historic districts and promoted new freeway
access. From the 1970s on, both cities recognized the negative
impact of these proposals. Both cities talked about quality of life
and urban design quality. Both cities committed to retaining
downtown housing. Both cities even employed Rouse projects which
are located in similar strategic locations in order to anchor an
upscale retail core. Yet the p이itics of urban redevelopment have
differed in significant ways. In Portland, a downtown plan was
adopted in response to a visibly declining downtown.
Implementation was slowly developed over the course of a decade
through urban renewal, capital improvements, zoning and design
review. Seattle responded to neighborhood concerns over the quality
of life with a p이icy plan, Goals for Seattle 2000 which papered over
real conflicts within the community.
While both Portland and Sea'삐e shared the vision of a regional
office and commercial core leavened with pedestrian amenities,
different .histories separated Portland’s success and Seattle's
partial failure. In Portland, Downtown Plan participants began a
decade and a half process leading to mutual accommodation as
reflected in the Central City Plan. Neighborhoods such as Northwest
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which was adjacent to downtown, and Irvington, just across the
river, were key players in writing the Downtown Plan. These
neighborhoods were anxious that downtown be revitalized as the
cornerstone of Portland livability. Downtown was surrounded by the
freeway, Skid Road, and eastside industrial uses from the
neighborhoods. It would be many years before Downtown would
create displacement pressure. Portland institutions were
strengthened. The Portland Development Commission was redirected
away from the urban clearance projects of the 1960s. New projects
promoted downtown growth but with a sophisticated blend of new
construction and reh~bilitation. PDC no longer acquired vast tracts
of blighted neighborhoods, but specific sites to further specific
goals of the Downtown Plan as amended by the Central City Plan.
These project decisions were ratified by amendments to the
appropriate urban renewal plan which were reviewed by the
Development Commission, Planning Commission and City Council in
advance of condemnation. These amendments specified the public
purpose and requirements of developers. The Planning and
Transportation Bureaus worked in tandem with the Development
Commission
In Seattle, the adoption of the Seattle 2000 Commission's
닫으효l흐 2요00 led to a city-wide effort to rewrite the Comprehensive
Plan, a process in which the city lost credibility with the
neighborhoods. The city liberalized the single-family zoning code
only to experience overly large and incompatible residential
development. Maximum allowed density was then scaled back in a
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decade-long period of neighborhood/City Hall acrimony. Ultimately,
Seattle activists focused on the downtown office core as the source
of increased pressures on the neighborhoods. The Citizen's
Alternative Plan tied downtown development p이itics to powerf비
neighborhood p이itics. Lacking a powerful development commission,
the Seattle government emphasized the regulatory aspect of
planning and adopted a local environmental impact assessment
process. This regulatory process created visible winners and losers.
The impact statement provided information for opponents of
partic비ar projects; for example, the CAP initiative depended for its
electoral propaganda upon the Washington Mutual office tower
environmental impact statement
By the late 1980s Portland and Seattle had traveled in
opposite directions. Portland's neighborhoods supported downtown
redevelopment guided by the Ilpublic-private partnership.11 Seattle’s
downtown entrepreneurial regime was challenged by neighborhood,
social service and church-based community groups.
WHY꺼케E PORTLAND URBAN REGIME IS MORE SUCCESSFUL
Returning to indirect as well as direct determinants of public
p이icy ， we can answer why Portland has generated a more successf비
urban regime than Seattle. Some of these reasons have been detailed
by this r~search; some are more spec비ative.
The period of greatest downtown construction benefited
Portland more than Seattle. Most of Portland's construction growth
came after the adoption of the Downtown Plan and tax increment
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financing in the early 1970s. Portland’s parking and retail core
crisis lent legitimacy to efforts to stimulate growth. The
Downtown Plan was a corrective to concerns raised in the 1960s
about quality of life issues and was well-positior띤d to meld quality
of life issues and economic development through creation of a
"public-private" partnership. By 1982, the same "links" had been in
place for a decade. In Seattle, downtown growth peaked just as the
Land Use and Transportation Plan was adopted. There was no time
for adjustments. Seattle growth seemed to be destroying whole
precincts (such as Pioneer Square and Pike Place Market). Also,
unlike Portland, Seattle experienced cycles of boom and bust which
further reduced confidence in the worth of Seattle’s official
assumptions about future downtown growth, production of housing
or shape of the built environment. Planning in an uncertain economic
environment is more difficult than in a steady environment like
Portland's. As a result, p이icy issues came to be understood
differently in Portland than in Seattle. While Portland sought to
halt downtown decline, Seattle’s Land Use and Transportation Plan
sought to redirect growth. Portland could spend public funds for its
open space but needed private investment to revitalize the retail
core. Seattle had bUdgeted for a public open space but seemed
unable to agree on the mix between public and private space. Both
cities sought to halt the "natural" workings of the real estate
market. While Portland struggled with the depressed market of skid
road 홉nd frustration in redeveloping the area north of Burnside,
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Seattle sought to halt displacement caused the rising demand and
rising rents.
The impact of previous downtown plans, projects and policies
힘vored the Portland urban regime. The Portland Downtown Plan
proved that mass transit was the solution to access problems of the
constricted downtown, rather than more and more shopper and
employee parking. This solution put government in a permanent
activist role. Furthermore, adoption of a parking lid and design
standards and d바i띤sc하re하t헤io이야n뀐1
into every deve히lopme댄nt and or면edeve히lop미m띤e댄nt decision. Siphoning off
property taxes directly to poe through the tax increment revenue
system balanced regulatory sticks with public subsidy carrots. In
contrast, Seattle's legendary World's Fair and Forward Thrust bond
issues were private successes. These projects originated within the
business community, making legends of Hotelman Eddie Carlson and
Ford dealer Joe Gandy and attorney Jim Ellis.5 With permissive
zoning in place, with no design standards or design review and no
height requirements, Seattle developers could think big. Every
downtown office core block could be envisioned as a site for a
world-class skyscraper. Larger pr이ects meant that more was at
stake with each decision. Larger pr이ects also created bigger
impacts. Seattle’s environmental impact statement process was
indicative of a stronger regulatory climate.
The interplay of private investment climate and governmental
response results in a contrast between process and product
orientation. Portland is process-oriented. Seattle is product-
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oriented. Process-orientation means frequent communication
between property interests and City Hall. Consultants grease the
flow of communication. Product orientation in Seattle means that
developers are more leery of the exercise of bureaucratic discretion.
Design review was successf비Iy resisted until passage of CAP.
Portland bene젠ts from a closer tie between elite residents
and the downtown core. Both cities are middle-class cities without
vast areas of inner-city slums surrounding the center. Both cities
retain close-in wealthy residential enclaves - Portland's West 배Is
and Seattle's Queen Anne Hill - which literally look across the CBO
to Mount Hood and Mount Rainier respectively. Portland partie비arly
benefits from a close relationship in which residential
neighborhoods are cut off from their views if downtown towers rise
above 350 feet in elevation. Elites attend downtown religious and
cultural activities during the weekend as well as working downtown.
This physical and functional proximity has created a greater
interest in downtown among Portland's west side elite. Seattle's
connection is somewhat more distant; Queen Anne Hill is at a
greater distance from downtown and religious institutions are
spread throughout the city. Until the recent move of 'the Seattle Art
Museum to downtown (not to Westlake) , no high culture institutions
were located downtown. Seattle's elite is spread throughout north
Seattle and the suburbs to the east of Lake Washington. This elite is
also less intimately involved with downtown development interests.
Much of Seattle’s prosperous middle-class is tied to Boeing, the
University of Washington, and the electronics industry, 리I of which
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are all located outside downtown. At the same time, this
independent base has allowed sophisticated residents to form
coalitions in opposition to the downtown urban regime. CHECC
represents an early, business-oriented grouping. Vision Seattle
currently represents a coalition of north Seattle activists.
Seattle ’'s downtown business association has fought defensive
battles. Since CHECC, Seattle City Council and the Seattle
downtown business association have fought defensive battles -
against rent control, against the Housing Preservation Ordinance,
against Royer's early LUTP housing linkage proposals, and then
against the Citizens' .Alternative Plan. Also, crime and the state of
the schools have replaced planning for downtown growth as the
significant issues for post-Royer Seattle. In contrast, the
Association for Portland Progress has been able to act strategically,
providing planning services that the City has ceded to the
Association - most notably, a strategic plan for the downtown
completed after the adoption of the comprehensive Central City Plan.
APP is currently teaming up with POC and downtown property
owners to abolish the downtown parking lid.
Portland ’'s Commission form of government is less transparent
than Seattle님 Strong Mayor-Strong Council form of government.
Both cities have adopted non-partisan, at-large political elections
which makes the threshold for activist activity much higher. In
addition, however, Portland’s Commission form of government works
to the activists' disadvantage. The Commission form of city
government is ostensibly weaker. The Mayor has but one vote of five
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and the Mayor shares administrative duties with four
Commissioners. But this system creates the p이icy equivalent of the
old ward system. Downtown development politics generally
concerns only the Development Commission, the Planning Bureau and
the Office of Transportation. The Mayor typically oversees the
Development Commission and assigns the Planning and
Transportation Bureaus to one or two Commissioners who is/are
keen to further downtown ·growth. Only three votes are required at
Council to pass pro-growth p이icies. Even if an ·activist were to win
election to Council, that one vote would not make a difference. The
reader may recall the difficulty when Commissioner Strachan
attempted to balance citizen representation with the usual pro-
growth agenda. In Seattle, an independent, strong Council form of
government means that there are potential places at City Hall for
activists. Seattle activists have advanced to the Council.6
Portland’'s successes mask the trade-off between
effectiveness and democracy. The successful Downtown Plan
implementation made it easy for Portlanders to feel that things
were going well downtown. Few failures have meant less
controversy. In Seattle, the failure to get projects like Westlake
going left more time for new activists to follow-up where Victor
Steinbrueck left off.
SY$temic power arrangements in both cities 힘vor those who
value the use of space for exchange purposes versus those who value
space for use purposes. The former faction, the “growth machine"
coalition, tends to benefit from systemic power. The latter faction
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。ften must justify the stability of a community as financially
rewarding. Historic preservationists have fallen for the trap of
님dapt헤ive r대el빼use. 11 They cannot fight for pr머eservat힌ion of an historic
structure if a convenient reuse of the structure is not apparent.
Activists must highlight the biased nature of the downtown
development process. An entrepreneurial urban regime creates
institutional arrangements. These institutional arrangements are
buttressed by the sociological process of systemic power or
stratification. Stone writes that the "durable features of the
socioeconomic system" confer advantages and disadvantages.
Portland case studies show an increasingly durable system. Steady
growth, public investment according to a plan, and the lor띠­
established ties between City Hall and the downtown community
have created a predictable investment climate. Both City Hall and
the business community increasingly institutionalized development
review. The business community accepted design review, aware that
approvals would be forthcoming with only minor aesthetic
m0difications required by the City. POC would control pu비ic
investment and the board of poe would be almost synonymous with
the leaders of the business community. APP proved a model of the
new, sophisticated downtown business association. Portland is an
extremely cautious town. Tax increment funding insures that
proposed. projects are carefully reviewed to avoid the risk that
project revenue cannot payoff bonds.
In Seattle, the socioeconomic climate was challenged as the
middle class found itself disturbed by the boom of the 1980s which
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created a real housing crisis. City Hall and the downtown business
community refused to acknowledge the city-wide impact and city-
wide interest in downtown development. The activists' articulated
demands, so clearly indicated by each set of responses to the LUTP
。r Westlake draft Environmental Impact Statement, met an official
disposition to consider neighborhood interests as peripheral to City
Hall/downtown business community negotiations. Seattle pursued
the same pro-growth p이icies as Portland but the pluralist
composition of Seattle caused an increasing backlog of unmet
demands.
Where Portland and Seattle differed most greatly was the
composition and .strength of dissidents. In the three case studies we
have examined, there have been few Portland ad hoc citizen
committees, and no p이itical groupings. Ed Tenny and Michael Stoops
were isolated figures. Save Our Livable Downtown quickly vanished.
Even when the alternative was another pro-growth strategy such as
the crescent approach advocated by George Crandall, the alternative
vision was not allowed to compete with the urban regime’s
preference. The Seattle urban regime has had to confront enduring
organizations - Allied Arts on urban design issues; SOC/Greater
Council of Churches on housing issues; environmentalists; and
finally, Vision Seattle, an organization capable of getting a
candidat~ onto City Council.
One may compare the CAP referendum to the ultimate pro-
development disposition of the Central City Plan. The public demand
for a true river city became p이icy number one, but mostly as a
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graphic. POC created p이icy rather than implement the CSC’s vision.
Stor띤’s stratification theory provides a plausible reason why the
Portland agenda excludes viable alternatives to official policy.
Plans and pr이ects simply represent the articulated demands of
local Portland influentials who came to consensus as the result of
the Downtown Plan crisis.
SUMMARY: LESSONS FROM SEATILEAND PORTI.AND
I hope that this dissertation has shown that Portland and
Seattle have ren뻐rkably similar socio-economic environments.
Similarities are greater than differences. . Both downtowns
experienced growth and both cities created plans based upon a
similar desire for continued regional dominance and a new concern
for quality of life issues. Both cities desired a thriving retail core
and both cities recognized that old hou~ing stock was disappearing.
Both cities used plans and pr이ects to address these issues. .Each
city brought mostly middle-class interest groups to the table, but
favored business interests.
Seattle distinguished itself with the dogged commitment and
perseverance of ad hoc electoral coalitions. In Portland, government
officials and associates in the downtown business community
proved to have the greatest staying power. In both cities the
effectiveness of demands for resources were affected by the status
of the parties involved. Business interests could hire consultants to
present material at public meetings and could mobilize informal
support. Portland brokered a Central City Plan which accepted
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eastside interests into the core but restricted the role of housing
activists and architects who threatened the success of the crescent
concept. The Central City Plan provided the means through which the
entrepreneurial regime has consolidated the economic objectives of
the Downtown Plan and reached across the river to meet the regional
challenges of the next century. Downtown interests and surrounding
neighborhoods have come to terms. No outside activists threaten. In
fact, environmentalists accept the argument that the center must
grow to avoid peripheral sprawl. The definition of downtown is
successf내ly enlarged and within the boundary, development can
proceed without much review of impacts (see Figure 46). Housing
activists are closely managed. Shiels and Obletz is currently
engaged in a process to reduce the number of shelter beds and close
the homeless shelter on the east end of the Burnside Bridge.
Portland also obtained the Rouse pr이ect by re-adjusting PDe’s
procedures to provide a place at the table for local investors.
Seattle wrote the Land Use and Transportation Plan which
brought business owners closer to accepting liberal notions of
quality urban environments. But the city hall and downtown
business parties to these agreements neglected to understand the
increasing impatience of neighborhood and social activists who
came to see downtown growth as the root cause of housing price
inflation, .housing displacement and the deteriorating quality of life.
Westlake Mall was built without responding to Seattle-ites love of
the outdoors and long-stated policy of providing a real park in the
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Fiaure 46. Portland: Urban Renewal, Redevelopment and
Downtown Plan Special Districts. From City of Portland,
DeveloDer’s Handbook (1992).
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heart of Seattle. The urban regime’s disregard for activist concerns
over the proliferation of towers and loss of housing fueled CAP.
Although these case studies are not exactly comparable, they
provide a convenient pause to this study. Elites in Portland have
successfully pursued a strategy to maintain downtown’s pre-
eminence, adapting to the dispersion of the pop비ation throughout
the region. Portland has always been portrayed as conservative in
nature. But this conservatism has masked a very successful public-
private partnership.
In Seattle, the urban regime is under attack. Ad hoc citizen
groups have risen in the past and again threaten city hall/downtown
business interests. The passage of CAP and continued efforts by
Vision Seattle are part of a continuing, cyclical contest between
downtown interests and middle-class neighborhood residents. This
is a surprising conclusion because the “Seattle spirit," a legendary
entrepreneurial attitude, seems to promote unbridled growth.
Despite the World’s Fair booster image of Seattle spirit, there has
always been a strong progressive element in the electorate. Royer
was elected on a progressive platform, attacking the Westlake Mall
pr이ect. The public voted for CAP. The downtown agenda was
eclipsed with the election of Norm Rice and the elevation of public
safety and education concerns.
Pro-development p이icies do not always mean clear positive
economic benefits, as suggested by Peterson. Lack of conflict is not
equivalent to consensus. Lack of conflict in Portland means that
there are relatively few dissidents. Their resources are scant and
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the urban regime manages the few demands which surface. More
conflict in Seattle meant a less durable outside environment and
more powerful and able citizens. This is not to say that conflict is
better than consensus, but that the real costs and benefits of
downtown growth are clearer to a citizen of Seattle.
These case histories describe a city in which the urban regime,
meaning the downtown business community and City Hall, are not all
powerf비. Activists dispute EIS' conclusions, put initiatives on the
ballot, and run for City Council seats. Activists have successf내Iy
challenged what Molotch calls the "growth imperative." Activists
specifically tied downtown development to negative externalities
like congestion and displacement. Seattle fits Dahl’s model of
dispersed influence, at least in the 1980s. Pro-growth interests do
not have a monopoly on resources and cannot silence the opposition.
This does not mean that Elkin’s urban regime model is wrong. There
will always be a natural affinity between downtown business
associations and City Hall. Even relatively independent
bureaucracies are negotiating from a position of weakness when
professional norms conflict with the bottom line. Almost all
p이iticians run on a pro-businE뭘s platform or at least sidestep the
issue. But we can thank Seattle for showing us that fundamental
issues can be raised and the business agenda can be expanded.
On. a darker note, the Portland case studies indicate that
unless activists make it to the ballot box, and unless the public
interest can be framed in terms of public interest rather than urban
regime interest, "citizen participation" rhetoric becomes
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camouflage for elite decision-making. The Portland regime is more
inclusive than the old Seattle regime, but that broader base reduces
the potential for an alternative decision-making process through
electoral p이itics. The tight network of relationships in Portland
means that business interests must at least listen to social service
members of the regime. This is generally a quiet discussion, away
from the pUblic spotlight. In the absence of specific public
discussion, quasi-public agencies such as the Portland Development
Commission create the dominant p이icy environment. Citizens are
not asked to prioritize downtown development in relation to other
public expenditures. Funding and p이icies are not subject to general
debate. Discussion of the public interest is reduced to regard for
fair procedures, that is, impartial government selection of private
investors, within the general context of private property. Seattle’S
past conflict and cool relationships leads to more open conflict.
Factions turn often to local election to determine politics outcomes.
For example, CAP specific러ly asked Seattle voters to balance
growth costs against benefits. This makes for more open p이itics.
Seattle grass roots organizations, like Vision Seattle, have no
counterpart in Portland.
Portland's elite may be enlightened but it is not democratic.
There is no room for debate on the fundamentals in Portland.
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Suburban growth remains the dominant and yet unconquered
threat to downtown primacy. In November, 1990, elections in both
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metropolitan regions revealed the strength of the Portland urban
regime and the weakness of the regime in Seattle. A m리or
difference between Portland and Seattle is the role of the central
city vis a vis the metropolitan region. Although both cities are
becoming politically weaker in comparison to the suburbs, Portland
is engaged in an effort to contain the region and refocus it upon the
center. The containment of sprawl and increased city density is in
Portland's interest. Oregon’s statewide land-use planning system
allows Portland city planners to legitimately explore issues such as
suburban sprawl. In Washington, Seattle has just embarked upon a
quest to harness ne~ statewide growth legislation.
The Oregon elections in November, 1990, provided a rare
referendum on the ruling regime’s organizational and strategic tools
regarding growth and regional development. The voters approved
three measures: Measure 1 granted Metro the right to “self-
governance" through adoption of a home-rule charter. This measure
confirmed the increasing tendency to seek “regional solutions."
Passage of Tri-Met measure 26-1 allowed Tri-Met to expand the
light rail system from downtown to suburban Washington County to
the west. . Measure 5 slashed local government property taxes and
inadvertently put a lid on tax increment revenue.
Measure 1 mandates regional planning through Metro. However,
this is caref비Iy limited by placing local governments in an
oversight position. Local governments will decide whiCh functions
Metro will take on. A committee of local governments must approve
the tasks that Metro takes on. These will be those tasks such as the
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downtown arts comp뻐x which the city wishes to share the burden of
funding.
Tri-Met measure 26-1 passed by a 2-1 margin despite the
simultaneous passage of a propeπy tax limitation. The light rail
measure included $110 million for the construction of a Washington
County link and $15 million for engineering and right-of-way
ac;quisition of a North Portland/Clackamas County line. The measure
was a referendum on the region’s light rail program and its role in
shaping future regional growth. Supporters argued that light rail is
a fast, quiet, environmentally sound alternative to highways and a
weapon against suburban sprawl. Opponents argued that the pr이e하
was a “boondoggle" which would benefit only downtown business
interests and suburban developers. This election was critical for
the success of the project. The federal/local match of 75/25 could
not be assured beyond this election date. Passage of this measure
was essential to continue to build the system and move toward a
grand growth management strategy of a structured metrop이itan
region with downtown the dominant center. Growth is directed
along light rail lines and at the hub of the light rail network,
downtown· Portland. Metro operates the UGB, Tri-Met operates the
light rail network and the City of Portland promotes downtown
growth in urban renewal districts using tax increment financing to
fund pUb.lic improvements. In addition to the $110 million, Tri-Met
secured $99 from the Oregon Legislature and $21 from local
governments to meet the local match. Local match for transit will
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be more difficult as the federal government will no longer put up 75
percent.
Passage of Measure Five limited property taxes and
inadverter배y the revenue which the Portland Development
Commission needs to implement urban renewal. After failing to get
court exemption from this limit, the city is pursuing an amendment
to the state constitution.
On balance, it appears that the Portland regime is succeeding
in its pursuit of regional p이icies which benefit the center.
In Washington state, voters rejected a growth management
initiative sponsored by Citizens for Balanced Growth - Puget Sound
environmentalists - which promised to establish strict limits on
growth, creating a state agency whose mission would be similar to
LCDC's. This was an outsider’s movement. Initiative 547 would
have set up a state panel to review local growth management plans,
institutionalizing a protectionist vision of the environment, imposed
developn띤nt-impact fees and given local citizens more power to
contest developments. Developers raised over $627,657 compared to
$161 ,600 raised by initiative supporters as of one month before the
election.7 Voters rejected an Oregon approach by a 2-1 margin.
Instead, the Washington Legislature did pass a limited growth
management measure but the effect this will have on redirecting
growth tc;>ward the city is still unclear. Washington voters
consistently reject any statewide planning system which would
limit the ability of suburbanites to escape central city problems.
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In the mass transit arena, the , Rail Transit Plan (RTP) is poised
to have King, Snohomish and Pierce Counties endorse its $9.3 billion,
120 mile, heavy rail transit plan to the voters:
Back in the Boeing Boom the Legislature insisted that
Pierce, King, and Snohomish counties yoke together a
plan. That idea made planning sense, but p이itically it
meant that a swarm of p이iticians had to deliver goodies
to their voters. In short order, the scheme got loaded up
like a Christmas tree with extensions, commuter-rail
lines, HOV lanes, road-widening, urban jitneys, and
transit stops. Needing to have voter approval from three
counties meant the rail line had to be far-flung right
from the first. The cost went through the roof before
anyone really noticed.s
A proposal of such enormous scale is in keeping with the "Seattle
spirit. 11 The response was in keeping with our research. The Washington
Environmental Council, the Sierra Club and a private cor댐ulting firm,
Petrie Transit Consultants, appealed the EIS statement. The
environmental groups ques힌oned the impacts on air quality and energy
consumption. Although the appeal was denied on April 19, 1993 the
project is not yet scheduled for a vote. In additional to environmental
。bjections that the project is too grandiose, neighborhoods fear that the
project will tear up neighborhoods like Capitol Hill’ where an enormous
tunnel is proposed. The Sea'해e Weekly considers it a boondoggle. The
planners have already rejected compromises put forward by ad hoc
activist groups such as SMART who call for a small system to be added
upon later Oust like Portland’S MAX).9
Thus, Portland and Seattle seem to be continuing their
divergence at a much larger, regional scale. We can continue our
basic research into the potential for a regional-scale downtown-
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focused urban regime and the increased difficulty of Incorporating
citizens into decision making, much less getting projects done. An
interesting question in further research would be to ask how
downtown growth coalitions cooperate with the environmental
movement in stopping “edge city" development. How are downtown
coalitions reacting to the challenge of the increasingly diffused
suburban centers of influence? How does the state value its
relationship with sub-entities whose purposes cross?
Portland's past success does not ensure continued
effectiveness in the regional realm just as Seattle may not continue
to stumble. The late 1960s and early 1970s were a golden era of
coalitions of grass roots activists and the civic elite in both cities.
In our study period, 1972 through 1992, city politics shifted to an
urban regime which either didn't need or. didn't want grass roots
activistinvo|verneItmetropolitan, g|0b | wor|d. The task is to redirect private and
public investment to effectively compete, yet avoid further
degredation of the environment. If the urban regime respects the
integrity of willing activist partners, democracy and the lives of our
metrop이itan citizens will benefit. 1 0
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단0«1TES
1Pacific Development Inc. Is In the process of s배Ing Its properties on the eastside. A
recent decision to h이d 빠 an office tower pr이ect has left the city with several million d이lars
Invested without much tangible return.
2The passage of property 빼x limitation Measure 5 has placed a lid on local property
tax assessments. Portland 않n no longer exclude Increment revenue from property taxes from
the limit. PDC's budget Is suddenly visible and subject to new political pressures.
3Frederlck -M. Wirt, Power In the City Decision Makino In San Fral]cjsco. Berkeley,
U메verslty of California Press, 1974. Wlrt divides San Francisco politics Into the ‘politics of
profit" (downtown redevelopment) and the ‘p이Itlcs of deference" (ethnic rivalry). City
politics results from history and external Influences. This dissertation has picked Portland and
Seattle to factor out national Influences, both economic and p이Itlcal ， leaving history and state
and regional constraints on the two c삐es.
4Elkln, Cltv and Realme In the American ReDubllc. Chicago: U미verslty of Chicago
Press, 1987, pp. 81-82. EI써n seems to stop at the distinction between a commercial private
Interest (bias) and the pu비Ie commercial Interest (the commercial republic). I think that much
of the conflict In Seattle Is motivated by progressive concern over the use of space being
subverted for Its exchange value. The concerns of Lefebre seem to motivate the most
progressive of Seattle-Ites. Portlanders seem to fe머 that the Downtown Plan successfully
melded use and exchange values.
5Norbert MacDonald, Distant Nelahbors, p.170.
6Note that formal Institutional structures do not explain why Portland activists do not
put initiatives on the ballot.
7 Linda Yoshikawa-Cogley, ·Antl·547 spending outpaces rival group," Seattle Post-
Intelllaenc:er, October 17, 1990. 니nda Yoshikawa-Cogley, ·Voters rejecting Initiative on
growth control," Seattle Post-Intelllaencer, November 7, 1991.
8Seattle Weeklv, ·Our Two Cents: Derailing the RTP,· Ap끼I 28, 1993.
gSeattle Times, ·Translt appeals 떼ected ，· Ap메 20, 1993. Seattle Weeklv, ’A KING
special: Too cozy with Metro,· April 21 , 1993.
10ln 1983, Carl Abbot summed up his history of planning, p이itics and growth in
Portland by noting that: "The 삐ture [of planning] will belong to leaders who can bring
together grassroots activists and members 하 the civic elite in new coalitons for the
improvement of Portland’s metrop이itan environment and the lives of its citizens."
fQ다뭘mi.， p. 277
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APPENDIX
훈YPLAYERS
PORTLAND
The most influential members of the downtown community
have remained on the scene since the beginning of the study period
with few exceptions. The most notable departure has been that of
Bill Roberts who saw the implementation of the Transit Mall, the
single defining pr이ect in downtown Portland. Mayor Goldschmidt
(1973 - 1979) reappeared as Governor Goldschmidt (1987 -199이 .
The Association for Portland Progress (APP) has a convenient
list of 75 members. These members may join by invitation only and
are expected to participate in APP’s programs and to contributeto a
special assessment to provide an extra level of city services from
civic promotion to sanitation to p이ice patr이. The most prominent
developers/property owners are: Doug Goodman, Melvin Mark Jr.,
William S. (Bill) Naito, Patrick R. Prendergast, John Russell , and
Jack Saltzman. Others are officials of big development concerns
such as Harriet Sherburne, Olympia & York; Denis 0 ’Neill,
Cornerstone (Riverplace); Larry Troyer, Lloyd Center; and [formerly]
William C. Scott, Pacific Development Inc. (owner of most of the
remainder of the Lloyd District). The two big banks, First Interstate
and U.S. Bank, are represented by Robert Ames and Edmund P. Jensen.
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Harry Demorest, Managing Partner of Arthur Andersen &Co. and
former chair of PDC; Robert Frasca, partner at ZGF architectural
firm; Stephen T. Janik, Partner at Ball, Janik & Novack law firm; and
Jon R. Schleuning, SRG Partnership are all professionals with
intimate ties to the business and development end of downtown
development. 、Retailers include Meier & Frank, Nordstrom and Rouse.
Hotels are also represented. Media institutions include the I뇨호
Oraconian, and KATU, KPTV, KOIN, and KGW television. Other
institutions include the gas company, the Portland Trail Blazers of
the National Basketball Association, and Portland State University.
The Chamber of Co~merce or the Port of Portland may be involved on
a limited basis.
Not members of this club are those co이아r’.뀐.
Sh에1끼i띤e리l닝sand Dou띠g Ob비|뻐e하tz who represent north of Bu바Jrns히i버de interests
and Peter Fry who represents the East Portland interests. It should
be noted that the Central Eastside Industrial Council has little tie-
in. The Association for Portland Progress, which once included only
downtown westside interests, has now expanded to include the Lloyd
District but no Central Eastside business Interests. However, Vern .
Ryles of the Central Eastside is the new chair of PDC.
Most importantly, the Portland Development Commission is a
player in any urban renewal district. And urban renewal districts
stretch from Union Station to Cornerstone, from the South and North
Park Blocks to 니oyd District and Central Eastside (that is, just
about everywhere.)
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Community action is usually limited by function, for example,
the League of Women Voters was concerned about downtown parking
issues. The Riverfront for People group organized to fight for the 1-
5 move. The Downtown Community Association and Goose Holloware
the only relevant neighborhood groups as the Burnside Community
Council no longer exists and no neighborhood group exists for the
Lloyd District. Individuals such as Ray Polani, head of Citizens for
Better Transit, is one of a handful of individuals without
pro마fess허i치ior아n뀐1
p이icy debates. George Crandall, who is associated with the local
chapter of the A.I.A., has paticipated in many issues.
Although both Seattle and Portland have downtown business
associationsand powerf비 private businessmen, local government in
Portland is much more invoWed inredeve|opmeIttieswith pri at intgrests an |oca| s。cia| activists are a!s。 tIed
into city policy.
SEATTLE
In April, 1987, the Seattle Times published a special report,
“Who runs Seattle. - Facts and opj; ~ions about People, Politics and
Power in the City." The newspaper gathered over 400 names before
winnowing these into a list of 10 influentials, 10 more in a second
tier, and .dozens of names in varying fields. The top ten were: Jim
and John Ellis, Jon and Judy Runstad, Herman Sarkowsy, Frank
Shrontz (Boeing), Martin Selig, Ned Skinner, Andrew Smith (Pacific
NW Bell); G. Robert Truex (Ranier Bank), George Weyerhauser, Bagley
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and Virginia Wright. The top twenty individuals or businesses
mentioned in interviews were: Jim Ellis; Boeing; Mayor Royer; the
Seattle Times and Seattle Post-Intelligencer newspapers; Rainer
Bank; Seafirst Bank; Seattle City Council; Metro; KING, KIRO and
KaMa television; Weyerhaeuser; Pacific NW Bell; Seattle University;
Jon and Judy Runstad; Seattle Chamber of Commerce; King County;
Ned Skinner; Nordstrom and Burlington Northern railroad. The
Seattle Times grouped these forces into p이iticians ， bureaucrats,
the establishment, the banks, the developers, the media, the culture
elite, the sports elite, the clubs, networkers, and minorities and
women. The Downtown Seattle Association represents the
establishment, the developers, and the media.
However, controversies in Seattle have brought forth
counterforces. These have been primarily neighborhood, housing or
reform civic groups. The most prominent groups are Allied Arts, the
Municipal League, Seattle Displacement Coalition, and Vision
Seattle. Previous groups havε included Citizens for an Alternative
Plan, People for an Open Westlake and CHECC.
Seattle City government occupies a middle ground between the
downtown establishment and the neighborhoods: The Office of
P이icy Evaluation (OPE), Office of Long-range Planning (aLP) ,. and
Land Use and Transportation Plan (LUTP), and the Department of
Communi.ty Development (DCD) report to the mayor [Wes Uhlman,
Charles Royer and now Norm Ric어. The Seattle City Council reviews
the Mayor’s recommended p이icies. Jim Street and Paul Kraabel
negotiated many of the decisions regarding land use.
392
KEY PlAYERS IN EACH CITY
The following are the key players in each of the decisions
discussed within this dissertation.
PORTLAND
ChaDter III: From Downtown Plan_to_Central City Plan
Edwin W. Steidle (Meier & Frank department store); Bill
Roberts (Lipman’s department store); Glen Jackson (Oregon Highway
Department); and Ira Keller (PDC); Downtown Committee; CH2MHiII;
Dean Gisvold, Citizen’s Advisory Commission; Portland Chapter of
the AlA.; Bob Baldwin, Multnomah County planner; Portland City
Commissioner 니oyd Anderson; and City Planner Rod 0 ’Hiser.
Central Citv Plan
'Strachan era
Commissioner Margaret Strachan; Pre-planning Committee
members PDC Executive Director Patrick LaCrosse, Planning Bureau
Director Terry Sandblast, William Wya'야 (APP) and Donald Lengacher
(CEIC); Strachan confident architect Donald Statsney; consultants
Don Barney and Gordon Davis; Citizen’s Steering Committee
members; PDC staff; Planning Commission and Bureau of Planning ex
。fficio members; Citizen Functional Advisory' Committees; George
Crandall’ Will Martin and Paddy Tillett, Urban Design Advisory Team;
Vern Ryles, Central Eastside Industrial Council; Ernie Bonner,
Riverfront for People; Plan Manager Dean Smith and City Planner Rod
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0 ’Hiser; Planning Director Norm Abbott; and “10,000" Portland
participants in public Design Events One and Two.
Blumenauer era
Those listed above and Michael S. Harrison, Portland Planning
Bureau; Joseph Angel and other members of the Planning
Commission; attorneys Steve Janik and Timothy Ramis; housing
activists; Commissioners Earl Blumenauer and Mike Lindberg and
Mayor J.E. "Bud" Clark, City Council; and Jane Cease, Metro JPac
Committee.
ChaDter V. Portland Morrison Street Proiect
Cadillac Fairview
Mayor Goldschmidt; Portland Development Commission staff;
Office of Planning and Development staff; Linden Bronan, Society of
I'ndustrial Realtors; Bill Naito; Robert Frasca; Don Barney; the
Oreaonian; Homeowners Association; Martin Gix, Downtown
Community Association; Portland Chapter of the AlA and Ed Tenny,
Save Our Liveable Downtown.
Rouse Phase
Doug Obletz; Morrison Project Selection Advisory Committee -
Joan Smith, Planning Commission, Pat LaCrosse, PDC, Robert Franz,
Pacwest Bancorp, Jon Schleuning, AlA and Bill Roberts; the Design
Commission (skybridges); Diane Spies (condemnation suit) and Tom
Dennehey (tax increment funding critic).
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Chaoter VII: From Skid Road to North Dowtown
Downtown Plan
Robert Baldwin; George IBingl Sheldon; Dean Gisvold and other
Downtown Plan actors; Irving Shandler; Bureau of Human Resources;
and the Downtown Housing Advisory Committee.
1981 Plan
Northwest Natural Gas; U.S. Bank and other big property
owners; small time entrepreuners; historic preservationists; social
service agencies; the Asian community; Office of Planning and
Development; and Bu.reau of Planning (Karen Kramer).
Mayor’s 12 Point Plan
Mayor Bud Clark, BCD executive Don Steffey, and PDC Executive
Director Pat LaCrosse; Donald E. Clark Burnside Consortium (renamed
Central City Concern); Jean DeMaster, Burnside Projects; Michael
Stoops, Burnside Community Concern; Union Station Business
Community Association; and Bill Naito.
Central City Plan/North Downtown
PDe (development limitations); Don Clark/Roger Shiels (Clark-
Shiels agreement).
Challenge to PDC
Barney & Wo바h; City/County Housing Management Association.
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River District
Bob Ames, First Interstate Bank; Roger Breezley, U.S. Bancorp;
John Carroll, Prendergast Associates; Jim Edwards, Hillman
Properties Northwest; North Downtown Consortium; Paul Hathaway,
Chamber of Commerce; Don Magnusen, Union Station Task Force
(PDC); Bill Naito; Pat Prendergast; Robert Ridgley, Northwest Natural
Gas Company; Mike Thorne, Port of Portland; Doug McGregor, PDC;
(Prepared by Shiels & Obletz and Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership)
Central City Plan
PDC; Businesses represented by Roger Shiels; Don Clark,
Central City Concern; and Bureau of Planning.
Seattle
Chanter IV: Land Use and Transnortation Plan
Downtown Seattle Association (DSA, formerly Central
Association and Downtown Seattle Development Association);
Seattle Chapter of the AlA; Allied Arts; Sierra Club; Citizens'
Alliance for Urban Seattle; housing activist organizations such as
the Downtown Neighborhood Alliance; Mayor’s Advisory Group, and
the League of Women Voters.
Land Use and Transportation staff; Paul Kraabel, chair of the
Urban Redevelopment Committee of Seattle City Council.
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Citizens' Alternative Plan
DSA/Citizens for a Better Downtown, i.e. developers, banks,
contractors, manufacturers, real estate utilities, architects and
engineers, hotels, business associations, lawyers, accountants,
retailers, and unions; Ted Inkeley, Peter Steinbrueck, Pat Stroshal,
Citizens for an Alternative Plan; Vision Seattle; Paul Schell,
Cornerstone; Mayor Royer and Seattle City Council members Jim
Street and Virginia Galle.
Post CAP
Downtown Plan Revision Advisory Committee: John Ph때ips ，
Phillips and Wilson; Dorm Anderson, NBBJ; Steven Arai,
Arai/Jackson; Sue Cary, Southeast Effective Development; A.M.
Clise, Clise Agency; Ken Cole, Pioneer Human Services; Jerry Ernst,
TRA; John Fox, People for Downtown Housing; Joan Gamble, Puget
Sound Power & light; John Gibson, Gibson Economics; Tom Graff,
Allied Arts; Jim Greenfield, Seattle Goodwill Games; Grace Jansons;
Brian Jennison; Mary McCumber; Melo씌y McCrutcheon; Gary
Schweikhardt; Peter Steinbrueck; Lucy Steers; Sue Taoka; Steve
Trainer, Wright Runstad & Co.; Tom Walsh, Foster Pepper &
Shefelman; Carol Warren, League of Women Voters, Mark Wheeler;
Lane Powell; and Moss Miller.
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Chaoter VI: Seattle Westlake_MaLLProiect
Westlake Mall/Uhlman
Mayor Wes Uhlman, City Council, City Planning staff, Central
Business Association Cultural and Beautification Committee,
Seattle Chapter of the AlA, Allied Arts, CHECC, and Citizens and
Merchants against the Westlake Project.
Mondev phase
Mayor Charles Royer; Westlake Advisory Committee; Westlake
Development Authority; Seattle Art Museum/Royer; and Citizens for
an Alternative at Westlake (CAW)Nictor Steinbrueck and F이ke
Nyberg.
Rouse phase
Mayor Charles Royer; Westlake Proposal Evaluation Committee;
Gang of Five, CAW; City A한orney Doug Jewett; and the Seattle City
Council.
Demolition phase
People for an Open Westlake (organized by League .of Women
Voters, Allied A야s ， 13,000 petition signers)/Margaret Pageler;
David Brewster; Patricia Denny and Brewster Denny; and Mayor
Charles Royer.
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ChaDter._VIII: .. __ Re.sldentiaLOisolacement .in Downtown Seattle
Housing displacement
DSA, Denny Regrade Property Owners, property owners such as
West Coast Paper Profit Sharing Trust, Harbor Properties, Inc., Block
60 Associates, and Sterling Recreation Organization; Downtown
Neighborhood -Alliance; People for Downtown Housing; International
District Housing Alliance; Plymouth'Housing Group; Emergency
Housing Coalition; Downtown Neighborhood Alliance; Elder Citizens
Coalition of Seattle-King County; King County Union Retirees;
Downtown Human Services Council; John Fox and Rev. David Bloom,
Seattle Displacement Coalition; and Church Council of Greater
Seattle; Market Residents Association; Pike Place Market
Constituency; Pike Place Merchants Association; Pike Place Market
Preservation & Development Authority; Belltown Coalition; Denny
Regrade Community Council and Interim Community Development
Association.
